Poor Behavior, Good Behavioral Policies? Double Standards for the North and South

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Behavioral approaches to development economics and policy have gained momentum in recent years. A growing number of papers studying behavior of people in poor countries have been published in top journals, accompanied by the rise of randomized controlled trials (RCTs). In 2015, the was dedicated to behavioral and cognitive research and policy. Papers studying how to or have become classics in the field. Lots of hope has been placed into social experiments and behavioral policies .

Behavioral policies are of course not reserved for policy-making in poor countries. In fact, nudges became famous with a . Many behavioral instruments have been discussed and tested in and for rich countries. But there has been an important difference as compared to the debates in development economics: when debating behavioral policies in rich countries, scholars have also devoted lots of time to consider normative and ethical concerns. For example, following Thaler and Sunstein鈥檚 exposition of (see also ), a debate unfolded on whether nudges could be anti-libertarian (, , , or ). Implications of the use of nudges as a new form of government policy have been analyzed, for example, from a , or with a focus on . have been written about . The debate has reached a great level of differentiation, e.g. when authors argue that so-called (these are nudges that seek to stimulate voluntary cooperation in social dilemma situations) may be justified for different reasons than those targeting individual welfare. Overall, the debate has become really sophisticated, and the autonomy, welfare, and dignity of citizens in rich countries as well as consequences of the use of behavioral policies for these countries鈥 modes of government have received lots of careful scrutiny (recently again ).

Double standards for the North and South
Much less so in developing countries: here, effectiveness rules. The bulk of behavioral development economics is first and foremost concerned with questions of how most effectively to design behavioral policies. In their 2008 review of behavioral development economics, for example, focus on lessons to be learned from field experiments, and the design of those, but they do not mention normative considerations. Likewise, in Duflo and Banerjee鈥檚 , the chapter that comes closest to welfare implications is concerned with how to correctly implement policies in the face of political dynamics. by Christian Berndt and Marc Boeckler summarizes and critically discusses this rise of behavioral policies (see also for a comparison of Global South and North). Of course, you may say, Thaler and Sunstein do not debate the normative implications of their policy proposals, either 鈥 but in rich countries, lots of other people have taken over this job. All these papers do not explicitly exclude the relevance of their arguments for poor countries. But in behavioral development economics, this literature is not referred to. by Guy Standing is an exception in that it discusses RCTs and behavioral interventions in poor and rich countries together.

There is, thus, the risk that development economists are too quick in implementing their RCTs, without sufficiently considering the impacts and side-effects on the lives of the people they 鈥榯reat鈥. Yes, it may well be that 鈥渋nformal savings technologies can substantially increase investment in preventative health and reduce vulnerability to health shocks鈥, as Dupas and Robinson summarize their . But we would be on the safe side if we knew that the money that is being saved is not missing elsewhere, that the savings technologies do not create social tensions, or that the intervention does not influence behavior in different ways than those intended. By the way, if we want to improve health care provision for poor people, public policies are often much more straightforward than behavioral interventions on poor individuals. We should not forget that originally, behavioral policies were advocated as compliments and not substitutes.

Let鈥檚 not take for granted that behavioral changes improve people鈥檚 lives
Or consider the following that was conducted in Ethiopia. The authors were concerned with prevailing low levels of aspirations. Low and downward-biased aspirations may lead to psychological poverty traps when people forego opportunities to improve their lives (see and ). It is understandable that researchers or development practitioners want to avoid situations in which poor people do not make use of their full potential. A life in material hardship is difficult enough, and many living conditions are difficult to change 鈥 so why not go for apparently low-hanging fruits? The researchers developed and tested an intervention aimed at influencing presumably fatalistic aspirations of poor Ethiopians. In an experiment, they implemented a one-day treatment. Participants in the treatment group watched movies about people from similar backgrounds who had successfully set up a small business or agricultural project. Success, as reported in these stories, was achieved through goal-setting, hard work, and perseverance. The researchers argue that this intervention has had positive effects on future orientation and optimism: in the treatment group, reported aspirations, as well as savings, the use of credit, and investment in education had all increased six months after the intervention. The World Development Report 2015 praises this intervention, saying that it illustrates the ability of an intervention to change a mental model 鈥 one’s belief in what is possible in the future鈥 (p. 4).

Unfortunately, things are often not so easy. How do we know that increased goal-setting and perseverance will improve the living conditions of the people in the treatment group? For example, interventions that promote optimism run the risk of provoking frustration. Particularly under uncertain living conditions, being ambitious and hopeful might be rewarded on some occasions, but not on others. Not expecting too much may thus be a strategy that reduces psychological costs. Of course, you may object, this strategy may make people forego chances that may have improved their living conditions. Yes, sure: when poor people have adjusted to their poor living condition, this is certainly no situation worth being conserved. But then, behavioral policies should not be our first instrument of choice. As the authors of the Ethiopian experiment write in their last paragraph: 鈥淎re we giving false hope? We cannot judge this. But we did not suggest to individuals 鈥 rightly or wrongly 鈥 what path would lead them out of poverty, unlike most interventions that offer 鈥榮olutions鈥 in microcredit, health or education. We only invited our treatment group to listen to stories told by their peers from similar backgrounds. The extent and nature of their response has surprised us.鈥

We must take ethics seriously in the Global South, too
This clearly invites us to pay close attention to what behavioral interventions actually do with the people they target. Systematic considerations of both intended and unintended effects and their normative evaluations can help improve the design of behavioral policies. For example, there has been some normative discussion on the policy implications of aspiration traps (, , and ) from which we can derive some concrete directions and constraints for the design of policies. (In a nutshell, policy interventions must in most cases tackle aspiration traps in a policy mix alongside traditional policies, and they should never push people into specific directions.) Normative evaluations, broadly conceived, should be undertaken across the board 鈥 to design better policies and experiments, and because the autonomy and dignity of people in the Global South should be of no less value to development researchers and practitioners.

Svenja Flechtner is a Post-doc research assistant at Freie Universit盲t Berlin.

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2 thoughts on “Poor Behavior, Good Behavioral Policies? Double Standards for the North and South

  1. […] These seems like remarkable successes and should of course be welcomed. 鈥淭hat a brief exposure to an inspirational story transformed even a few people鈥檚 lives in a measurable way strikes me as remarkable鈥, Jayachandran writes. At the same time, she concedes that 鈥渉ope isn鈥檛 a cure-all (鈥, a)nd instilling hope without skills or financial resources is unlikely to be enough to lift people out of poverty.鈥 She also mentions that lifting people鈥檚 aspirations to such an extent that hopes and expectations become unrealistic can potentially be harmful. These points cannot be emphasized enough, as it seems that the reception of such studies is often overly optimistic and even na茂ve. For example, the World Development Report 2015 evaluates another experiment aimed at influencing presumably fatalistic aspirations of poor Ethiopians. Without mentioning potential downsides, the report states that 鈥渢he study illustrates the ability of an intervention to change a mental model – one鈥檚 belief in what is possible in the future鈥 (p. 4). The intervention consisted in a one-day treatment involving watching an inspirational movie as well. All the potential reasons not to expect too much and also to be cautious about the overall effects of such an intervention briefly mentioned by Jayachandran 鈥 such as links with structural and non-psychological barriers to overcoming poverty, or the risk of raising unrealistic aspirations 鈥 all too often go unnoticed. As a consequence, there is a considerable risk of overestimating the positive effects of such interventions, and to overlook some potential downsides (as also discussed in one of my previous posts on this blog). […]

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  2. […] I would like to stress an overlooked point: the double standards in the North and in the South (see this blog by Fletchner). For much discussion on safeguarding the 鈥榣ibertarian鈥 in libertarian paternalism […]

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