The Rise of the Robot Reserve Army: Working Hard or Hardly Working?

The rise of a new global 鈥榬obot reserve army鈥 will have profound effects on developing countries but will it mean people will be working hard or hardly working?

Robots, robots, everywhere

Stunning technological advances in robotics and artificial intelligence are being reported virtually on a daily basis: from the versatile聽听补苍诲听听迟辞听, and聽.

In fact, the聽聽 estimates that next year the stock of industrial robots will grow by more than 250,000 units per year concentrated in production of cars, electronics, and new machinery.

In some domains, emerging economies are actually ahead of richer countries. Take for example,听聽or mobile聽. Robots could even聽. So, this is really, really quite serious now鈥

This year鈥檚聽聽focuses on the changing nature of work (although its messages feel oddly dated). And it鈥檚 not the only one. A broad range of international agencies have recently flagged such issues relating to the future of employment in the context of automation including the聽, the聽, the聽,听,听,听聽and the World Bank聽, and聽. Ditto the private sector folks at聽, the聽听补苍诲听. In fact, the International Labour Organization (ILO) has gone as far as launching聽.

So, why does it matter?

What does automation mean for developing countries? Are the East Asian pathways to development based on job creating manufacturing-led growth gone forever? Will 1.8bn or two-thirds of the workers in developing countries need to find new jobs (as聽)? Is a global universal basic income needed as Indonesian Minister of Finance聽聽at the IMF and World Bank meetings? Does every developing country need to set up a聽聽as Thailand has done?

In a聽聽we take a closer look at what we call the聽rise of the robot reserve army聽(and here鈥檚 the聽聽at LSE) and what it means for the future of economic development and employment in particular in developing countries. It鈥檚 all part of a聽聽that studies what we鈥檝e called the 鈥榙eveloper鈥檚 dilemma鈥.

鈥榃hat鈥檚 the developer鈥檚 dilemma?鈥 we hear you cry (we can dream). It鈥檚 this: structural transformation, aka genuine economic development (not just commodity fueled growth), often leads to rising inequality unless public policy intervenes. At the same time inclusive growth is more likely with steady or even falling inequality. That鈥檚 the developer鈥檚 dilemma.

In the years ahead big issues such as automation, but also聽聽are important mega-trends. And it鈥檚 important not to forget the聽聽which points towards the case for聽.

In this context, automation is clearly of聽听补苍诲听for economic development in developing countries.

That said, interest in the impact of technological change is of course by no means new. There鈥檚 the detailed empirical study of聽聽from the 1980s and, going further back, the work of聽,听,听听补苍诲听.

So, what did we find?

Continuing the聽, we have three headlines (why is it always three?):

  1. D鈥檕h! Automation is not just a rich country issue.

The bulk of thinking on the economic implications has so far focused on advanced industrialized economies where the cost of labour is high and manufacturing shows a high degree of mechanization and productivity. Yet, the developing world is both affected by automation trends in high-income countries and is itself catching up in terms of automation.

Automation is likely to affect developing countries in different ways to high-income countries.听The kinds of jobs common in developing countries鈥攕uch as routine agricultural work鈥攁re substantially more susceptible to automation than the service jobs鈥攚hich require creative work or face-to-face interaction鈥攖hat dominate high-income economies.

  1. D耻丑!听Automation is not only about technology.

The current debate focuses too much on technological capabilities, and not enough on the economic, political, legal, and social factors that will profoundly shape the way automation affects employment. Questions like profitability, labour regulations, unionization, and corporate-social expectations will be at least as important as technical constraints in determining which jobs get automated, especially in developing countries.

  1. Ay, caramba! Pay more attention to stagnating wages than unemployment.

In contrast to a widespread narrative of 鈥榯echnological unemployment鈥 (漏聽), a more likely impact in the short-to-medium term at least is slow real-wage growth in low- and medium-skilled jobs as workers face competition from automation. This will itself hinder poverty reduction and likely put upward pressure on national inequality, weakening the poverty-reducing power of growth, potentially placing social contracts under strain.

As agricultural and manufacturing jobs are automated, workers will continue to flood into the service sector, driving down wages, leading to a bloating of service-sector employment and wage stagnation but not to mass unemployment, at least in the short-to-medium term.

How developing countries should respond in terms of public policy is a crucial question.

In sum,听developing countries face real policy challenges unleashed by automation.

Given the pace of technological change, upskilling strategies are unlikely to be a panacea. Safety nets and wage subsidies may be desirable, but the question remains how to finance them (without making labour more costly and thus exacerbating a trend towards replacement). Investing in labour-heavy sectors such as infrastructure construction, tourism, social services, education or healthcare provision may be a way for developing countries to manage disruptive impacts of automation though these would imply major public investments and do not in themselves constitute a long run strategy for economic development. In the longer run the moral case of a GUBI (global universal basic income 鈥 remember, you heard the acronym here first) may become overwhelming.

So those are the headlines. For the real nerds, we鈥檒l聽聽on drivers of automation, our theory on the effect of automation in developing countries; the forecasts of automatability and employment displacement; and different approaches to public policy responses.

And here鈥檚 黑料社区r, showing how not to do it.

is a Research Associate with the ESRC GPID Research Network at King鈥檚 College London. He works on structural change, digital transformation, and political behavior in developing countries.

Andy Sumner is a Reader in International Development in the Department of International Development, King鈥檚 College London. He is Director of the ESRC Global Poverty & Inequality Dynamics (GPID) Research Network.

This article originally appeared on the聽聽and the聽聽blogs.听It is the first of聽a special series of blogs on the future of economic development, work, and wages in developing countries that is published by the .听

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