黑料社区

the Chilean government confirmed a report published earlier that morning: Chinese companies BYD and Yongqing Technology (Tsingshan Group) had abandoned their planned lithium cathode production facilities in Chile. This announcement dealt a significant blow to the ambitions of a country with a longstanding mining tradition, now striving to build industrial capabilities and develop value-added products from its mineral resources amid the global energy transition. However, just one day later, the Chinese embassy in Chile both the initial report and the Chilean government’s confirmation. After consultations with both companies, the embassy clarified that neither had officially withdrawn their investment plans. Instead, they reaffirmed ongoing interest in maintaining dialogue with Chilean authorities. The embassy further emphasized Chile’s continuing attractiveness to Chinese businesses, highlighting the numerous firms eager to participate in the country鈥檚 National Lithium Strategy. the Chinese embassy鈥檚 statement鈥攊ssued amidst escalating trade tensions and shifts in the international order鈥攕uggests this chapter is far from concluded.

This episode highlights the complexity and uncertainty confronting peripheral economies attempting to industrialize by leveraging their comparative advantages amidst the so-called energy transition and broader geopolitical tensions marked by trade wars. While significant global attention remains focused on the socio-environmental impacts of critical mineral extraction, less consideration has been given to examining how peripheral economies鈥攃ountries heavily reliant on natural resource extraction鈥攁re strategically navigating or capitalizing on this 鈥渃ritical minerals moment鈥� in relation to their own ambitions to industrialize.

Critical minerals鈥� role in peripheral industrialization

Industrialized countries are actively formulating ambitious plans aimed at reshoring production networks and securing mineral supplies鈥攊llustrated by initiatives such as the Inflation Reduction Act in the U.S., the EU’s Green Industrial Plan, and the Net-Zero Industry Act. Meanwhile, mineral-rich peripheral economies are also increasingly implementing their own policy interventions. indicate that export restriction measures have increased fivefold over the last decade, with approximately 20% of critical mineral trade now subjected to at least one form of export restriction. Although these measures vary widely in their specific objectives, they generally aim to enhance rent capture or foster industrial upgrading further downstream within global production networks.

While some analysts interpret these interventions as a setback for free trade 鈥攑articularly prior to the introduction of protectionist tariffs by the United States鈥攁nd a resurgence of, mainstream international organizations such as IEA or UN are gradually beginning to acknowledge鈥攁nd in some cases even endorse鈥攕uch policies as strategic tools for Regardless of differing perspectives, the growing significance of critical mineral policies in peripheral economies is undoubtedly .

A crucial question emerging from these developments is whether such policy measures might serve as for peripheral economies, or whether they merely reinforce rentier dynamics. The notion of a 鈥済reen ladder鈥� refers to the potential of industrial policies, implemented in the context of the energy transition, to foster new productive capabilities in peripheral economies. While traditional rentier states focus primarily on capturing resource rents to fund general public spending, many contemporary export restriction measures pursue more ambitious objectives, such as advancing down the value chains associated with energy transition technologies reliant on their minerals. Notable examples include , which banned nickel ore exports to stimulate domestic processing and move downstream into stainless steel production, , which established clauses in lithium extraction contracts mandating producers to offer 25% of their output at preferential prices to companies committed to developing value-added products domestically.

The (latest) failed attempt to industrialize via lithium in Chile

In 2023, both BYD and Tsingshan had been selected through a competitive process overseen by the Chilean state agency CORFO to receive preferential quotas of domestically extracted and processed lithium, specifically intended for local value-added manufacturing. According to information , these projects were expected to supply lithium cathodes primarily for the Brazilian market. Indeed, Brazil had recently emerged as BYD鈥檚 largest market for electric vehicles (EVs) outside China, prompting the company to initiate construction of an EV assembly and components manufacturing plant in Bahia (Brazil). This scenario appeared highly favorable for Chile, as it promised integration into a regional value chain within South America, potentially overcoming the country’s historical geographic disadvantage concerning access to competitive markets. Momentarily, the plan seemed strategically sound.

However, the announcement on May 7th acknowledged this policy’s failure. provided was the significant decline in global lithium prices, rendering preferential pricing agreements far less attractive to producers. Additionally, specific complications arose regarding the corporate structure of Tsingshan鈥攑articularly its subsidiary Yongqing鈥攁nd internal challenges faced by BYD.

This latest setback, reflecting the difficulties inherent in industrial policies leveraging competitive advantages in critical minerals, echoes a similar . At that time, CORFO selected three lithium-processing projects under analogous conditions鈥擬olymet, Posco-Samsung SDI, and Sichuan Fulin. None of these projects materialized, largely due to contractual disputes with lithium producer Albemarle regarding the definition , as well as unmet expectations related to Albemarle鈥檚 intended production of 鈥攁 critical component used in certain types of cathodes.

Why is industrialization via critical minerals a struggle in the periphery?

Despite Chile’s efforts to develop value-added products derived from mineral processing, this episode serves as a reminder that it is not easy for peripheral economies to challenge their position within the international division of labor. One of the most evident obstacles relates to the limited state capacity often observed in peripheral contexts鈥攂oth in general terms and specifically for industrial policy鈥攊s typically lacking in peripheral economies. emerge from goodwill or strategic vision alone. Instead, it requires sustained governmental efforts to build institutional capacities and cultivate technocrats and bureaucrats who deeply understand both policy and industry dynamics. Chile exemplifies this point clearly: the country鈥檚 scope for industrial policy has been constrained since the dictatorship era. Lithium became politically salient in Chile around 2009, and although the state has since acquired knowledge about the industry, its learning curve has lagged significantly behind industry developments. This disparity partly explains the contractual issues observed during the first tender aimed at attracting specialized lithium processors鈥攊ssues which Albemarle leveraged to its advantage. Additionally, the Chilean state has become embroiled in legal disputes with both major lithium producers (Albemarle and SQM), primarily over taxation. Likewise, 鈥攅ven before announcing its withdrawal from the quota allocation鈥攃iting uncertainties in the existing agreement for developing value-added products, particularly regarding lithium supply and the mechanism for determining the preferential rate. Thus, peripheral economies must realistically assess and acknowledge their institutional capacities when crafting industrial policies for critical minerals.

However, peripheral economies must also contend with the profound power asymmetries that structure the global economy. In this context, multinational corporations from developed countries often have limited incentives to align with the policy objectives of host states. Their primary objective remains profit maximization; if they perceive conditions as unfavorable, they simply will not invest. In this regard, the limited availability of productive capabilities in peripheral economies, the relatively weak domestic markets, and the strategic control maintained by developed economies over technological capacities are likely more decisive factors than preferential pricing for strategic minerals. . However, equally important is exploring complementary mechanisms that incentivize or compel multinational corporations to cooperate. A potentially transformative path involves rethinking the global governance of the energy transition, promoting cooperation between developed nations and peripheral economies in pursuit of shared policy goals. Current discourse around a just energy transition predominantly emphasizes local socio-environmental impacts, but it rarely addresses, with equal urgency, the need for global actors to support industrial policy ambitions of peripheral economies.

From this perspective, the Chinese embassy’s recent message in Chile is notable, especially in the context of the contemporary upheavals reshaping the international order. Nothing comes freely in the global economy鈥攏either before nor during the energy transition. Chile’s longstanding diplomatic relations with the United States and the European Union have not advanced its industrial policy goals; quite the contrary, policies such as the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act and the EU鈥檚 Green Industrial Plan explicitly focus on reshoring value chains within their borders, merely securing mineral supplies from abroad. Far from it, the EU-Chile FTA restricted measures such as preferential rates. Such protectionist policies effectively China, thus far, has not demonstrated significantly different behavior from the U.S. or EU. However, with the global economy navigating troubled waters in 2025, the Chinese embassy’s recent message to Chile represents the first explicit diplomatic signal toward supporting mining policy in the country鈥攁n intriguing development given the broader geopolitical context.

Felipe Irarrazaval is Assistant Professor at Universidad Mayor, Chile.