By Carolina Alves and Jan Toporowski

Cambridge Journal of Economics Special Issue / Deadline for submitting papers via CJE refereeing process: 30th April 2022.

2023 marks the fortieth year since the passing of Joan Robinson and her one-hundred-and-twentieth anniversary. This special issue of the Cambridge Journal of Economics aims at presenting a collection of papers that reflect the extraordinary breadth of Robinson鈥檚 career and examine what insights these might offer the economics profession and policy makers to address our seemingly most intractable problems of inadequate demand, rising margins with falling competition, and widespread and seemingly intransigent inequality and its consequences. For Robinson the purpose of our discipline is in understanding the real world to enable all global citizens to enjoy life to the full. It is therefore fitting that we follow her lead and demand that we ask of ourselves whether we have done enough to address her challenges to economic theory.

Despite making her international reputation in the Marshallian tradition of economics, she came to regard her generalisation of John Maynard Keynes鈥檚 theories and their integration with Kaleckian and Marxian insights as her more substantial contribution, along with a vigorous defence of rigorous evidence-based thought over inductive mathematical modelling. Among an impressive body of work, three books by Robinson mark key moments in the evolution of her ideas: The Economics of Imperfect Competition (1933), An Essay on Marxian Economics (1942), and The Accumulation of Capital (1956) (Marcuzzo, 2003).

In 1933, she made her international reputation with brilliant work within the orthodoxy on imperfect competition, offering an internal critique of the marginalist theory of distribution. Only a decade later, her reflections on reading Karl Marx persuaded Robinson to question the Marshallian methodology, in particular its polite theory of income distribution which became so incongruous during and after the depression (Marcuzzo, 2003).1 Finally, in 1956, she had the courage to follow the logic of her argument to examine the whole neoclassical theory of income distribution and its predominant method, facing the might of the now dominant American economics profession in the [in]famous capital controversy. She had to accept the pyrrhic victory of her interlocutors accepting she was right, yet the profession moving on regardless.

The Economics of Imperfect Competition is certainly Robinson鈥檚 most widely known and enduring work. It is often seen as a radical critique to Marshallian analysis. However, the book makes amendments more than breaking away from Alfred Marshall. It carried out the whole method of market analysis, refining and perfecting it, further developed a technical apparatus to deal with markets in general, and eliminated some of Marshall鈥檚 ambiguities. After Robinson鈥檚 reappraisal, it is perfect competition that became a special case of what in general is a monopolistic situation (Pasinetti, 1987). Written only after eight years since she had graduated 鈥� and being barely thirty years old 鈥�, The Economics of Imperfect Competition guaranteed Robinson worldwide acclaim.

In the midst of this well-deserved recognition, Robinson became one of the members of a group of young economists known as the 鈥楥ambridge Circus鈥�, whose members included Richard Kahn, Piero Sraffa, James Meade and Austin Robinson. These economists met regularly to discuss the evolving drafts of Keynes鈥檚 future General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. Keynes, having been a part-time in Cambridge and part-time in London, teaching more orthodox monetary theory and policies during Robinson鈥檚 time as a student at the beginning of 1920s, was now a more interesting figure to her. His ideas and the discussion taking place at the 鈥楥ambridge Circus鈥� were a break with the economic tradition at the time and a deep dive into the social problems associated with unemployment.

A fruitful outcome of the Cambridge Circus was Robinson鈥檚 Essays in the Theory of Employment (1937a) and Introduction to the Theory of Employment (1937b). Written as guides to follow Keynes鈥檚 General Theory, these two works clarify, among other things, a very central but obscure point in the book, namely, effective demand and how investments determine savings. This was no minor matter for Robinson: it was her understanding which cemented this point and made it central to a generation of policy makers. In the orthodox theory, the rate of interest remunerates one鈥檚 sacrifice for saving and, thus, for supplying capital. A clear rupture from this is the understanding of investment as an independent variable and saving as being determined by investment, which means that 鈥渢he rate of interest cannot be remunerating anybody鈥檚 鈥榮acrifice鈥欌�� (Pasinetti, 1987).

During these years, we also started seeing Robinson turning back to her life-long journey to confront the marginalist theory of distribution and reconstruct economic theory. For Pasinetti (1987), she was very cautious in her early years, trying to build a solid analytical foundation. Once sure of this 鈥榚quipment鈥�, she would become gradually fiercer and more impatient with dogmas, 鈥渇ighting for new unorthodox ideas鈥� (p. 4). Robinson was not satisfied with either economics, orthodoxy or what would become known as Keynesianism (or 鈥榖astard Keynesianism鈥� as she renamed its denuded theory later). She had never let go of the horror of having more than a million workers unemployed at the time when learning that it was logically impossible to have unemployment because of Say鈥檚 Law. Keynes proved the Say鈥檚 Law wrong, but Robinson wanted more.

Her contact with Marx鈥檚 ideas in 1936 through her review of John Strachey鈥檚 The Nature of Capitalist Crisis (1935) in 1936 and her friendship with Micha艂 Kalecki2 was a key aspect of this journey. Approaching Marx with a mere intellectual curiosity, she wanted to see 鈥渨hat his economic theory had to teach orthodox economists and Keynesians鈥� (Harcourt and Kerr, 2009, p. 10), while also expecting Marx to 鈥渕ake her economics more 鈥榬eal鈥�, to address the inequities of the capitalist world鈥� (Harcourt and Kerr, 2009, p. 34). As a result, she elaborated a critique of the orthodox theory of the rate of profits and took on board Marx鈥檚 insights on the long-run tendencies of capitalist economies. She also concluded that 鈥淢arx鈥檚 analysis of accumulation and the development of crises provides the basis for understanding the history of capitalism鈥� (Robinson, 1980c, p. 297). The importance of time and the large forces of capital were replacing a stabilising equilibrium system as her frame of reference.

If in 1933 Robinson offered an internal critique of Marshallian value theory, by 1942 she relied on Marx鈥檚 insights to escape Marshallian orthodoxy. Her personal journey from her teenage years to understand the causes of poverty and unemployment conflicted with the orthodoxy of equilibrium and an order based on the harmony of interests. Marxian economics gave Robinson access to redress the system. The idea of transition from one mode of organising production to other and the understanding of economic life in term of a conflict between workers and capitalists would complement the discussions in the 鈥楥ambridge Circus鈥�. Yet, the reaction to An Essay on Marxian Economics was mixed; seeming to achieve the inevitable of dividing mainstream economists and Marxists alike. Among many criticisms, it was Robinson’s rejection of the labour theory of value (see also Robinson, 1950) which she considered gave her the status of “enemy by the professed Marxists” (Robinson 1978, p. 276).

By 1956, with her The Accumulation of Capital, Robinson was on a clear mission to build 鈥渁 new framework for economic theory鈥� (Pasinetti, 1987). She tried to move away from the limitations of the short run and centred her attention on the problem of capital accumulation, which is for her the key process in the in the development of a capitalist economy. She was convinced that orthodoxy economic theory did not give enough attention to how wealth is built over time, which for her was a very important part of economic analysis. She also asked an uncomfortable question: what is the marginal product of capital? She had tried to find the answer for it only to realised that no economist really knew. Looking into fundamental categories, such as of labour supply, technical progress, and natural resources, she criticised the concept of 鈥榩roduction function鈥� and reconstructed it.

These three key moments in the evolution of her ideas are enriched by Robinson鈥檚 keenness to question and criticise dogmas and the orthodox ideas in economics (Pasinetti, 1987). As seen in her 1962 Economic Philosophy, Robinson was among the strongest advocates, second perhaps only to Gunnar Myrdal, in arguing about the non-neutrality of economic science and of the necessity of stating explicitly one鈥檚 convictions and beliefs. In Economic Philosophy, she again confronted the 鈥榦ther鈥� Cambridge, whose way of detaching 鈥榮cience鈥� from 鈥榠deology鈥� was a form of mathematical modelling that had bastardised Keynes and was rapidly doing the same to Harrod鈥檚 growth theory, by showing the extent to which metaphysical beliefs still permeated the supposedly value-free orthodox foundations.

The limitations of the modern orthodox theory of her time are further developed in her Economic Heresies. Some Old-fashioned Questions in Economic Theory (1971), where the narrowness of the discipline in its scope and relevance is associated to Walras鈥檚 excessive influence. For Robinson (1971), the issue of time and uncertainty would never allow for the Walrasian model to be relevant to long-run growth in the capitalist economy (p. 27). Robinson also saw the need to reach out to students with an alternative approach to economic reality, which resulted in a textbook co-authored with John Eatwell in 1973 called An introduction to modern economics.

It is impossible to read Robinson鈥檚 critique to the established orthodoxy at her time and not ask of ourselves whether we have done enough to include her challenges with respect to incorporating time into our macroeconomic theory. She tirelessly emphasised the need to differ 鈥榣ogical鈥� from 鈥榟istorical鈥� time in the economic analysis, challenging the absurdity that we can go forwards and backwards in time and the implication that uncertainty, by definition, would become a repeatable game of risk. This sleight of hand may be convenient and underpins the attempt to use a 鈥榞eneral equilibrium鈥� simultaneity to evade the circularity of interest-rate setting and capital-stock valuation. Yet, it robs us of our need to take account of imagination and creation as well as the very behaviours of social integration which make humans a social animal. Instead, we are stuck with Lionel Robbins鈥� redefinition of economics as a pure allocation problem asking what conditions are necessary to be consistent with allocative efficiency. It is easy to understand Robinson鈥檚 disdain for Samuelson鈥檚 鈥榮ocial welfare鈥� theory, devoid of all distributional questions, as adequate for society.

Finally, revisiting Robinson鈥檚 journey would not be complete if her extraordinary analytical ability, which would best work while confronting or supporting ideas, is not mentioned. She was a particular type of original thinker with a strong social message coming from her writings. Her logical chain of arguments combined with her 鈥榖ox of tools鈥� aimed at practical actions ranging from unemployment before the war and underdevelopment to the struggle of ex-colonial nations after the war, with a special attention to Asia and initial enthusiasm for Communist China (Pasinetti, 1987).

Since her death in 1983, modern economics has evolved. Despite a whole new look at mark ups and imperfect competition and lack of competition, the assumption of perfect competition (鈥榩otential鈥� if not actual) came back and is well established in economic analysis; Marxism has renewed an interest in questions of value, the rate of profit, and inequality; and Keynesianism has mutated into New Keynesianism and Post-Keynesianism. With political economy facing unprecedented challenges, the fortieth anniversary of Joan Robinson鈥檚 death and the one-hundred-and-twentieth anniversary of her birth in 2023 are excellent occasions to review her work and critical observations on twenty-first-century economics.

Please, considered to submit a paper! The Special Issue is not merely interested in the history of Robinson鈥檚 thought but in interpreting, applying, and advancing her economic and methodological ideas. More details here:

Looking forward to your submission!

Carolina Alves and Jan Toporowski

Internal CJE Editors: Sue Konzelmann and Alan Shipman

Bibliography

Harcourt, G. and Kerr, P. (2009) Joan Robinson, (London, Palgrave Macmillan)

Marcuzzo, M. (2003) 鈥楯oan Robinson and the Three Cambridge Revolutions鈥�, Review of Political Economy, 15:4, pp. 545-560.

Pasinetti, L. L. (1987) 鈥楯oan Violet Robinson鈥�. In: J. Eatwell, M. Milgate & P. Newman (Eds) The New Palgrave: a dictionary of economics, Vol. 4. London, Macmillan.

Robinson, J. (1933). The economics of imperfect competition. London: Macmillan.

Robinson, J. (1937a). Essays in the Theory of Employment. London: Macmillan.

Robinson, J. (1937b). Introduction to the Theory of Employment. London: Macmillan

Robinson, J. (1942) An Essay in Marxian Economics. London, Macmillan.

Robinson, J. (1950) 鈥楾he Labour Theory of Value鈥�, in Robinson, J. (1980a) Collected Economic Papers, Vol. I. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Robinson, J. (1956). The accumulation of Capital. London: Macmillan.

Robinson, J. (1962) Economic Philosophy. Penguin Books: Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England.

Robinson, J. (1971) Economic Heresies. Some Old-fashioned Questions in Economic Theory. London, Macmillan.

Robinson, J. (1978) 鈥楩ormalism vs Dogma鈥�, in Robinson, J. (1980b) Collected Economic Papers, Vol. V. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Robinson, J. (1980a) Collected Economic Papers, Vol. I. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Robinson, J. (1980b) Collected Economic Papers, Vol. V. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Robinson, J. (1980c) Review of J. F. Becker, Marxian Political Economy, American Journal of Sociology, 85, pp. 1476鈥�1478.

Robinson, J. and Eatwell, J. (1973). An introduction to modern economics. London: McGraw-Hill.

Strachey, J. (1935) The Nature of the Capitalist Crisis. London: Victor Gollancz).

By Carolina Alves, Daniela Gabor and Ingrid Harvold Kvangraven

Decades of research have documented the devastating impacts of the Washington Consensus in the developing world. Yet revisionist accounts of this story have emerged in recent years. Remarkable amongst these, a recent blog post by the Peterson Institute for International Economics –  鈥溾�� – draws on research that is jaw-droppingly ideological and flawed. 

The revenge of the synthetic counterfactual

For decades,  mainstream and heterodox economists broadly agreed that the Washington Consensus failed (, , ). Debt-crisis ridden developing countries that implemented the reforms associated with privatization, liberalisation and deregulation in the 1980s and 1990s tended to see an increase in poverty along with worsening health and educational outcomes. This led to the 1980s and 1990s being dubbed the 鈥榣ost decades鈥� of development () and ultimately paved the way for the the post-Washington Consensus and pro-poor policies ().

But this is about to change. New methods that 鈥榩roduce credible counterfactuals in case studies鈥�, turn the conventional wisdom of the Washington Consensus failure on its head (, , ). Essentially, the counterfactual approach involves first creating fictitious or synthetic countries, whose policy makers chose the opposite policy trajectory, and then testing whether the Washington Consensus package works better than the alternative. The results, the PIIE blog informs us, stack up for the Washington Consensus: countries adopting WC policies are to () be better off in GDP per capita terms. In contrast, left-wing populists – of the Latin American pedigree – hurt their economies by the Washington Consensus policies out with the neoliberal bathwater. 

The counterfactual revenge against the many critics of Washington Consensus reinforces an emerging revisionist literature (e.g. , ). It may offer tempting opportunities to rescue the memory of John Williamson, the PIIE fellow that coined the term 鈥溾�� thirty years ago. But if one unpacks its mechanics carefully, the counterfactual approach turns out to be a thinly-veiled ideological attempt to whitewash the Washington Consensus, to resurrect its key tenets: that minimising the footprint of the state is the right policy choice in health or education, that macroeconomic policy should mean inflation targeting by central banks not active fiscal policy by elected politicians, that state-owned companies are all white elephants in urgent need of privatization, that trade unions harm labour markets. 

To understand the politics of the Washington Counterfactual, it is instructive to examine Nicaragua, one of the countries would have done much better under Washington Consensus than its left-wing populist leader Daniel Ortega, at least during the Sandinista Revolution of 1979-1990. 

Unpacking the 鈥榗ounterfactual鈥�: synthetic Nicaragua

The PIIE blog uses the findings of to argue that 鈥渓eft-wing populism made Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Bolivia 20 percent poorer relative to a plausible counterfactual. These countries did not experience reduced inequality or improved health outcomes that might have justified such a large sacrifice of income.鈥� 

The paper elaborates the following history of the Sandinista Revolution: having defeated the Somoza dictatorship in 1979, Sandinistas under Daniel Ortega embraced 鈥榓nti-market鈥� policies: nationalized banks, mining and fishing, and 20% of arable land that had been held by Somoza family and its supporters. Sandinistas also proved reluctant to enforce land property rights (a cardinal sin in the Washington Consensus world). Having initially flirted with anti-democratic politics, Ortega won the 1984 elections and oversaw a new Constitution in 1987. His time in office ended in 1990, when he lost elections.

In that same section, the paper compares Nicaragua under Ortega with a synthetic Nicaragua that would have followed the Washington Consensus prescriptions. It provides a stark picture of the economic costs of Ortega鈥檚 鈥榮trong state鈥� policy choices: by 1990, the average citizen of synthetic Nicaragua would have enjoyed a (roughly) 8.200 USD GDP/capita. In the real world, the GDP/capita under Ortega fell to around USD 3.000 USD. Even starker, 15 infants per each 1000 live births would have stayed alive in synthetic Nicaragua, or conversely, were killed by Ortega鈥檚 deviations from the Washington Consensus. 

For anyone familiar with Latin American politics, the ideological machinations behind this narrative are apparent on two levels. 

First, take the treatment of 鈥榬eal鈥� Nicaragua. The paper is silent on a well-known historical reality: the Ortega administration had to contend with a civil war waged by the Contras paramilitaries throughout the 1980s, with direct support from the and the US under the Reagan Administration.  Why not examine instead Ortega’s return to power in 2007, far more consistent with the paper’s definition of 鈥榩opulism鈥�? Could it be because the second Ortega regime has had a Washington Consensus, pro-market disposition in economic policies, despite rhetoric to the contrary, and does not fit easily the 鈥榣eft populist鈥� narrative, civil war aside?

Instead, the authors, US-based economists and political scientists, abstract from the US-sponsored civil war in the discussion of Nicaragua鈥檚 economic policy outcomes, although the – the US Administration selling arms to Iran in order to finance the Contras –  exploded into one of the most serious political scandals of the second Reagan Administration. After all, Ronald Reagan in 1985 that he would stop pursuing regime change in Nicaragua 鈥渋f the present government would turn around and say 鈥� all right 鈥� if they鈥檇 say 鈥榰ncle鈥欌�︹�� . Could it be that the Sandinista Revolution was distracted from growth outcomes by Ronald Reagan bombing them for refusing to say 鈥榶es uncle, mi patria tu patio鈥�? 

Second, how does one empirically create a fictitious country? The synthetic control method predicts a  ‘no Ortega’ growth/infant mortality path by creating a pool of  鈥榙onor鈥� countries and calibrating their relative contribution to a synthetic Nicaragua such that the pre-Ortega growth or infant mortality path is close to actual Nicaragua. The Washington Counterfactual thus creates a  synthetic Nicaragua composed of 23% Chile, 54% Honduras, 9% Mexico, 8% Norway, and 7% the US. 

Or, to bring a historical touch to the method, synthetic Nicaragua, like a neoliberal Frankenstein, consist of 7% country bombing Nicaragua (US), 54% country used by the CIA/US to bomb Nicaragua (Honduras),  23% country where Washington Consensus was being implemented by Chicago Boys and a military dictatorship (Chile), 8% country never analytically paired with the Washington Consensus (Norway), and Mexico. It is this synthetic Nicaragua where per capita GDP would have been 5.000 USD dollars higher, a Nicaragua that the US empire does not bomb.

Poor scholarship? Poor method? It is tempting to answer yes to both. But in a discipline that is obsessed with objectivity and neutrality, the ideological intent is clear: the Washington Counterfactual produces fictitious countries in an attempt to restore the credibility of the Washington Consensus policies as 鈥榞ood policies鈥�. 

Not much has changed since the 1950s, it seems. Then, Gunnary Myrdal () noted that economists often smuggle in values from the beginning of their analysis, but that these only show up explicitly later on in the form of policy recommendations. To better understand the impacts of policies associated with the Washington Consensus, and to have open and meaningful debates about how these can be understood, we need research that is explicit about its ideological underpinnings and assumptions from the get-go. 

Beyond History: Why the Revisionist Account Matters

This is not just a debate about the past. Indeed, recent research demonstrates that the IMF has been actively conditioning its loans on the Washington Consensus staple policy of austerity over the past two decades ().

At a moment when are again turning to the IMF, forced by  COVID-induced economic crises, how we understand the impact of policies associated with the Washington Consensus matters. Policy-based 鈥榚vidence鈥� that the Washington Consensus works may allow the IMF to diffuse increasingly vocal that it abandons austerity and avoids 鈥榣ost decade鈥� of development. 

More broadly, revisionist accounts of the Washington Consensus matter because the pandemic has revived around the role that the state should play in the economy. Countries at risk of debt distress may be more willing to accept the Washington Consensus prescriptions when research tells them that short-term pain is worth the long-term gain. That long-term gain, it is argued at the of the World Bank and the IMF that are taking place this week, is the low-carbon transition without a large green developmental state. The World Bank鈥檚 new Climate Action Plan for a Green, Resilient and Inclusive Development () suggests that global finance can deliver where the fiscally-constrained state cannot, as long as concessional lending and scarce fiscal resources are directed to  private finance for development by de-risking development assets. Such plans retain Washington Consensus logic at its core, but go further in terms of actively promoting global private finance as the solution to financing gaps and development risks – the so-called Wall Street Consensus ().  

It should perhaps not be a surprise that authors from the Free Market Institute and the RAND Corporation will go to unusual, evidently ideological, lengths to produce 鈥榚vidence鈥� that left-wing governments produce less successful economic outcomes than neoliberal ones. But we would find it easier to swallow this classic example of academic gaslighting if  economists were not always insisting on the strong standards of objectivity in the discipline. If anything, this is a powerful reminder that all economics is political, however much some hide it behind new or 鈥榮ophisticated鈥� econometric techniques. 

Bibliography

Absher, S., K. Grier  and R. Grier. (2020). . Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 177, 787鈥�817.

Archibong, B., B. S. Coulibaly and N. Okonjo-Iweala. (2021). . AGI Working Paper, February 27th, 2021.

Easterly, W. (2001). . Journal of Economic Growth 6: 135鈥�157.

Easterly, W. (2019). NBER Working Paper 26318.

Gabor, D. (2021) . Development and Change.

Grier, K. and R. Grier. (2021). . Journal of Comparative Economics, 49, 59鈥�72.

Krueger, A. (2004). . IMF Speech, New York, March 23, 2004. 

Marrazzo, M. and A. Terzi. (2017). (SSRN Scholarly Paper 3071545

Mkandawire, T. (2005). . Africa Development 30 (1 & 2): 1-33. 

Myrdal, G. (1954). . New York: Routledge.

Ray, R., K.P. Gallagher and W. Kring. (2020). . GEGI WORKING PAPER 11/2020.

Saad-Filho, Alfredo. (2010). . DESA Working Paper ST/ESA/2010/DWP/100. 

Steward, Frances. (1995). . London: Routledge.

Williamson, J. (1990). . In J. Williamson (Ed.), Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened? Washington, D. C.: Institute for International Economics.

Carolina Alves is a Joan Robinson Research Fellow in Heterodox Economics at University of Cambridge, the U.K. She tweets at

Daniela Gabor is Professor of Economics and Macro-Finance at the University of the West of England, Bristol. She tweets at .

Ingrid Harvold Kvangraven聽is a Lecturer in International Development at the University of York.聽She tweets at .

Photo: Frankenstein by .

The workshop was a success in many fronts, such as attendance, quality of papers and exchange of ideas. Five roundtables attempted to encompass key crucial aspects of this discussion in the context of DEEs, namely, Financialisation and The Global Economy, Financialisation and Production, Variegated Financialisation, Financialisation and the State, and Micro-financialisation. This was complemented by two excellent plenaries approaching both the theorisation of financialisation in DEEs and the avenues for future research. See the programme聽.

Questions related, for example, to the specific features of financialisation in DEEs and the roles of different institutions, policies and locational factors in shaping this process sparked the room, leaving all of us wishing for more. It would be fair to argue that at the end of the workshop we all felt that there is a lot of strong scholarship addressing these issues from different angles 鈥� luckily, emerging not only from economics but also political economy, sociology, geography among other disciplines. We indeed achieved our goal, which was to spur conceptual discussions of whether, and if so how, financialisation is distinct in DEEs.

The next step is to consolidate this conversation – and to broaden it beyond the confines of the workshop. We wish to bring together the many pieces of this discussion from across the world to set the ground for future studies and research. That is why we have an open call for papers in the Cambridge Journal of Economics. We invite contributions on the theoretical and empirical specificities of the manifestations, drivers and implications of financialisation in the DEEs. We are particularly interested in papers that make a conceptual contribution to the literature, and we encourage interdisciplinary work, both in theory and method.

The deadline for paper submission is the 31st of August 2020. See more details .

by Carolina Alves,听听补苍诲

Earlier this month the final deadline arrived for political parties in Brazil to register their candidates for the presidential election in October 2018. The official launch of candidates allows us to discuss more concretely the political forces and players that will be shaping the election. It means that coalitions, alliances, and vice-president choices have taken place. So we asked, what can be said about the first candidates leading the polls? What are the main political forces underlying this election?

The Brazilian political landscape has been extremely polarised since the impeachment of president Dilma Rousseff in 2016. If the left-right dichotomy has recently been considered blurry or outdated, in Brazil one can argue that, due to the impeachment, this dichotomy has a new face, with the coup winners on one extreme and the coup losers on the other.

The nuances between right and left on the political spectrum have largely been overshadowed due to this dichotomy, with one side leading a for a clean and corruption-free country and the other side highlighting the . The political mayhem reached its peak with Lula’s trial and conviction in April, which has led to a great deal of uncertainty over this period (see recent Lula鈥檚 from prison in the NYT).

President Termer may have been able to 鈥渒eep the markets calm in鈥� throughout such political instability, but Brazil鈥檚 economic recovery has been , hardships for many families have increased (see IBGE indicators for increases in , , and ) and the country has just set a new record for homicides at in 2017, with violence against women also increasing. There is a lot at stake in this election.

What鈥檚 new

The political alliances forged resulted in a strong centre-right block supporting Geraldo Alckmin (PSDB) [1];聽a medium to weak left block supporting Lula (PT); and weak far-right block supporting Jair Bolsonaro (PSL).

Despite an important alliance with Manuela D’脕vila (PCdoB, far-left), the PT failed to capture other expressive far-left parties and even the centre-left candidate Ciro Gomes (PDT, centre-left), while Ackmin forged a broad nine-party coalition with the 鈥渃entr茫o” [2], which assures him great political party funding, and Bolsonaro forged a political alliance with an inexpressive far-right party.

Alckmin鈥檚 choice of vice-president (Ana Am茅lia of centre-right PP) reflects a sharp turn to the right for the party. The PP has a long tradition of being led by conservative politicians and economists, and has generally enjoyed close support from both the military and the Evangelical bench. One could argue that in a multi-party system like Brazil, such an alliance may not have much ideological meaning since the PP has formed political alliances with both Lula and Rousseff in the past, but it is notable that Am茅lia was one of the pro-impeachment frontline figures. Given the country divide over the impeachment, the PSDB choice seems to target voters who have a strong pro-impeachment view. Further, this turn to right poses challenges to far-wing candidate Bolsonaro.

Lula鈥檚 choice for vice-president, Fernando Haddad, is a clever attempt to put in place a candidacy that gives the PT some room for manoeuvre given the unclear situation regarding Lula鈥檚 future. As for now, the聽United Nations Human Rights Commission聽that the Brazilian government allow Lula to聽run for president 补苍诲听access the media and members of his political party until his appeals before the courts have been completed in fair judicial proceedings.

On one hand, it seems that the PT is maintaining Lula鈥檚 candidacy for the presidency so that he can use the campaign as a defence strategy against the accusations that weigh against him. Lula’s defence will try to reverse the conviction on the grounds that there is no evidence against him, and will use legal strategies to keep him in the electoral contest through different appeals and injunctions. On the other hand, as Lula鈥檚 vice-president, Haddad will be able to participate in the electoral debates, have greater TV time and travel the country with Lula. This might be able to help increase the votes for Haddad as president, which is currently predicted to be around 4%. If Lula will likely be barred from running by an electoral court due to the so-called , this strategy is ideal for the PT, as in that case Haddad would ultimately become the presidential candidate with Manuela D’脕vila as his vice-president.

The poll

Following the polling institute 聽[3],听we plot two scenarios, the first with Lula and the second without Lula. The poll shows five big players in this election: Lula, Bolsonaro, Marina Silva (REDE), Ciro Gomes and Alckmin. In both scenarios, the dispute is between far-right candidate Bolsonaro and centre to centre-left options, Lula or Marina.

It must be mentioned that in the second scenario Bolsonaro, who openly cheers dictatorship and publicly insults women, people of colour and homosexuals, leads the elections by a large margin among men, young voters (16-24 year-olds), the next age group (24-35 year-olds), college-educated individuals, and households with relatively high income.

The main political forces

The outcome of this election is harder to predict than usual. Looking beyond the polls, we see four main political forces shaping this election: centre-left Lula, a progressive band with Ciro Gomes and Marina Silva, centre-right Alckmin, and far-right Bolsonaro.

Lula has moved away from an alliance with far-left parties. However, the historical conditions that allowed the PT broad class alliances in 2002 are no longer existent or possible. Thus, the only way to guarantee a left and strong candidate in the second-round is if Lula manages to pass his voters to Haddad in the next two months. Then, we may see a configuration of a strong left block.

Lula鈥檚 campaign is likely to be based on both his defense, as mentioned above, and challenging the legal basis for Rousseff鈥檚 impeachment. This seems to be a plausible strategy considering his faithful supporters (Lula鈥檚 Northeast base), and the undecided groups that, despite not being PT supporters, are sceptical about both the anti-democratic turn Brazil has taken and the social and economic deterioration of the economy in the last five years. Part of the strategy is corroborated by the polls showing that 32% of interviewees believe that Lula is the most prepared candidate to 鈥渁ccelerate the growth of the economy鈥�, as against 15% for Bolsonaro.

Ciro Gomes came out weakened after the political alliances forged in early August. Buttressing a centre-left project for the country, he aims to go after PT鈥檚 voters, but in reality, his resistance to forge an alliance with the PT left him with a small space in the national media to strengthen his candidacy. Further, his previous association with the PT moved him away from the centre-right, but public statements such as 鈥淏razil does not need, and cannot endure, a leftist government鈥� and his choice of vice-president, K谩tia Abreu (MDB), prevented him from allying with the far-left. As a lawmaker and also a land baron, Abreu has continuously taken pro-agribusiness positions, against workers in this industry. She is strongly disliked by social movements and environmental groups close to either the left or the PT.

Moving to the right of the spectrum, but keeping within a progressive box where Ciro Gomes belongs to as well, we have Marina Silva. Marina is the only candidate with a green agenda, but her campaign is mainly based on a conservative rhetoric of moral聽goodness, with a strong Evangelical stance. She is known for her progressive pro-environmental views and her conservative social views (being opposed to both abortion and gay marriage, for example). In the past, when pressured, she opted for alliances with parties with a clear pro-market agenda and conservative views in social matters. This imposes a limit to the number of voters she can swing from the PT in the next two months. Both Ciro Gomes and Marina Silva鈥檚 potential to swing either to centre-right or left will certainly add more tension to the second round where their choice of alliances will have the power to tip the scale of the election.

On the centre-right, we have Alckmin, the candidate of the ruling class, especially the wealthy class from the state of S茫o Paulo. Alckmin has actually been considered the candidate of the centre, and his politics underlines 鈥渢he pacification of social extremism鈥�, but his political alliances, DEM, PP, PR, PRB and SD, known as the 鈥渃entr茫o”, are all of centre-right political orientation, some of them with a strong Catholic stance. Despite representing a party tainted by scandals over corruption, Alckmin, with a moralising rhetoric about democracy, has promised to 鈥済ive back the stolen dignity of the Brazilian people鈥�. Posing no challenges or changes for Temer鈥檚 government and economic policies, Alckmin鈥檚 centrism pleases both the financial markets, including international investors in Latin America鈥檚 largest economy, and the traditional media, as argued

Finally, there is Bolsonaro who, despite leading the polls, is isolated politically. After switching parties and struggling to form political alliances, he ended with a [military] vice鈥損resident as extreme as him, and a coalition party (PRTB, far-right) that will not have much to add to his candidacy. He has neither political party funding nor great TV/radio time. Yet, Bolsonaro is the main right-wing candidate, bringing together the military, which is probably the most trusted institution in Brazil today, and sectors of Brazilian society that have openly called for a military intervention to end corruption in the country and crack down on criminals, amongst other things. Bolsorano also counts on the support of newly formed right-wing groups, such as MBL (Free Brazil Movement), Revoltados On Line (On Line Rebels) and Vem Pra Rua (Let鈥檚 hit the Streets) [4].

With the risk of oversimplifying, Bolsonaro鈥檚 success in the polls can be understood by bearing in mind two points. First, his extremist views over many social issues and lack of political support are overshadowed by聽the decline in support for democracy and increasing support for the military in Brazil since the impeachment, see . Second, his pro-market agenda, with a strong de-nationalisation and de-regulation take, makes him a candidate that does not scare the financial markets. It is very difficult to predict which party would accept a possible alliance with Bolsonaro in the second round of the election. He will most likely remain isolate politically, despite his large electoral support.

Final comments

The latest DataFolha poll has Lula rising to 39% predicted votes, against 30% last June. This would mean his election as president without a second-round runoff. For this reason, candidates are very likely to increasingly use the country divide over Dilma鈥檚 impeachment and Lula鈥檚 arrest in an attempt to win voters. See, for example, former PSDB president聽Fernando Henrique Cardoso鈥檚 in the Financial Times. This is a dangerous manoeuvre, as it has spillover effects on the right-left wing debate and social movements more broadly, which in turn fuels political violence and persecution in the country. See, for example, of social, indigenous and environmental activists since the impeachment, especially in , and of Marielle Franco, a 38-year-old activist and rising political star known for defending Rio鈥檚 black, LGBT and favela communities.

In general, the next two months will now witness sensitive topics strengthening this political landscape (and its tensions). For example, the privatisation of Petrobras will certainly weigh on the electorate鈥檚 voting behaviour, especially after the last May. Other topics such as corruption, crime and violence, agenda聽for聽minorities and abortion will most likely be watersheds in this election as well.

This reminds us that this election is unique, and will be historically remembered, not only because of the sorry state of democracy in Brazil and the divide between coup winners and coup losers, but also because of a reactionary wave that Brazil, like many other countries around the globe, is going through right now. Human rights are under threat in this country. So does the very short attempt to create a welfare state in an economic reality where poverty and highly skewed income distribution are still serious issues.

Brazil may聽take a聽huge backward聽step, economically and politically, depending on the outcome of this election. As the moral crusade against corruption has not meant a , the political regime in Brazil has been accentuating its reactionary and authoritarian traits.

Endnotes

[1] The acronym in brackets refers to the political party of the candidate. Please, refer to annex for a complete list of the parties mentioned and their respective abbreviations.

[2] 鈥淐entr茫o” refers to small centre-right parties that do not have strong candidates but together represent one-third of the Deputies in Brazil, so they can assure good electoral resources and greater TV/radio time, which make them the 鈥渄esired object鈥� in Brazilian politics.

[3] Period: 21-22 August 2018. Candidates who did not reach 1% of voting intentions were left out of our tables.

[4] Both the newly formed right-wing groups and the call for military intervention came into existence after the Rousseff鈥檚 impeachment.

Thanks to Ingrid Harvold Kvangraven and Feyzi Ismail for helpful comments. All remaining errors are my own.

Carolina Alves聽is a Joan Robinson Research Fellow in Heterodox Economics at University of Cambridge, the U.K.

Photo:聽S茫o Paulo – Political demonstrations against corruption in then President Dilma’s government. ()

by Carolina Alves, , and Ingrid H. Kvangraven

This is a response list to recommending Economics books of 2018 for summer reading. While there are many good books listed, we were struck by the consistent monism in his choices, as the books are all by scholars based in either the UK or the US, 12/13 of the authors are men and most of them come from the same theoretical tradition. Such lists perpetuate the strong white male – and mainstream – biases in our field (the recent list by suffers from the same biases).

To counter these biases, and with the purpose of broadening our field to become more inclusive of diverse approaches and perspectives, we have put together an alternative list. We deliberately chose books by scholars approaching Economics with alternative theoretical frameworks and by scholars from groups that tend to be excluded from the field, namely women, people of color, and scholars from the Global South. We recognize that no one is exempt from biases, which is why we are providing an explanation for the motivation behind our selection. Due to institutional and language barriers we were unable to include as many scholars from the Global South as we would have liked. For example, we would love to read the new book by Laura Carvalho, but we are still waiting for the English translation. We hope you enjoy it and welcome more suggestions in the comments section.

Teaching the History of Economic Thought – Integrating Historical Perspectives into Modern Economics

By Daniela Tavasci and Luigi Ventimiglia | 2018, Edward Elgar Publishing

Stemming from the idea that economics is a social science that tends to forget its own history, this refreshing book reflects on the role of teaching with historical perspectives. It offers novel ways of integrating the history of economics into the curriculum, both in history of economic thought modules and in other sub-disciplines. Coming from a wide diversity of experiences, the chapters share the idea that studying the history of thought exposes students to pluralism and is therefore an essential pedagogical tool.

See more .

Building Power from Below: Chilean Workers Take On Walmart

By Carolina Bank Munoz | 2018, Combined Academic Publishers

This book attributes Chilean workers鈥� success in challenging the world鈥檚 largest corporation to their organizations鈥� commitment to union democracy and building strategic capacity. Chilean workers have spent years building grassroots organizations committed to principles of union democracy. Retail workers鈥� unions have less structural power, but have significant associational and symbolic power. Their most notable successes have been in fighting for respect and dignity on the job. Warehouse workers by contrast have substantial structural power and have achieved significant economic gains. While the model in Chile cannot necessarily be reproduced in different countries, we can gain insights from the Chilean workers鈥� approaches, tactics, and strategies.

See more .

When Things Don’t Fall Apart 鈥� Global Financial Governance and Developmental Finance in an Age of Productive Incoherence

By Ilene Grabel | 2018, MIT Press

Ilene Grabel challenges the dominant view that the global financial crisis had little effect on global financial governance and developmental finance. Most observers discount all but grand, systemic ruptures in institutions and policy. Grabel argues instead that the global crisis induced inconsistent and ad hoc discontinuities in global financial governance and developmental finance that are now having profound effects on emerging market and developing economies. Grabel鈥檚 chief normative claim is that the resulting incoherence in global financial governance is productive rather than debilitating. Inspired by Albert Hirschman, Grabel demonstrates that meaningful change often emerges from disconnected, erratic, experimental, and inconsistent adjustments in institutions and policies as actors pragmatically manage in an evolving world.

See more 聽.

International Trade Policy and Class Dynamics in South Africa. The Economic Partnership Agreement

By Simone Claar | 2018, Palgrave Macmillan

This book provides an innovative perspective on class dynamics in South Africa, focusing specifically on how different interests have shaped economic and trade policy. As an emerging market, South African political and economic actions are subject to the attention of international trade policy.. Claar provides an in-depth class analysis of the contradictory negotiation processes that occurred between South Africa and the European Union on Economic-Partnership Agreements (EPA), examining the divergent roles played by the political and economic elite, and the working class. The author considers their relationships with the new global trade agenda, as well as their differing standpoints on the EPA.

See more .

Modern Imperialism, Monopoly Finance Capital, and Marx鈥檚 Law of Value

By Samir Amin | 2018, Monthly Review Press

Samir Amin extends Marx鈥檚 analysis to describe a concept of 鈥渋mperialist rent鈥� derived from the radically unequal wages paid for the same labor done by people in both the Global North and the Global South, the rich nations and the poor ones. This is global oligopolistic capitalism, in which finance capital has come to dominate worldwide production and distribution. Amin also advances Baran and Sweezy鈥檚 notion of economic surplus to explain a globally monopolized system in which Marx鈥檚 鈥渓aw of value鈥� takes the form of a 鈥渓aw of globalized value,鈥� generating a super-exploitation of workers in the Global South. This book offers readers a complete collection of Amin鈥檚 work on Marxian value theory and includes Amin’s answers to his critics.

See more .

Work: The Last 1,000 Years

By Andrea Komlosy | 2018, Verso

By the end of the nineteenth century, the general Western conception of work had been reduced to simply gainful employment. But this limited perspective contrasted sharply with the personal experience of most people in the world鈥攚hether in colonies, developing countries or in the industrializing world. Moreover, from a feminist perspective, reducing work and the production of value to remunerated employment has never been convincing. Andrea Komlosy argues in this important intervention that, when we examine it closely, work changes its meanings according to different historical and regional contexts. Globalizing labour history from the thirteenth to the twenty-first centuries, she sheds light on the complex coexistence of multiple forms of labour on the local and the world levels.

See more .

Extracting Profit 鈥� Imperialism, Neoliberalism and the New Scramble for Africa

By Lee Wengraf聽 | 2018, Haymarket Books

Extracting Profit argues that the roots of today鈥檚 social and economic conditions lie in the historical legacies of colonialism and the imposition of so-called 鈥渞eforms鈥� by global financial institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. And while the scramble for Africa鈥檚 resources has heightened the pace of ecological devastation, examples from Somalia and the West African Ebola outbreak reveal a frightening surge of militarization on the part of China and the U.S. Yet this 鈥渘ew scramble鈥� has not gone unchallenged. Extracting Profit offers several narratives of grassroots organizing and protest, pointing to the potential for resistance to global capital and fundamental change, in Africa and beyond.

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Algorithms of Oppression 鈥� How Search Engines Reinforce Racism

By Safiya Umoja Noble | 2018, NYU Press.

Safiya Umoja Noble challenges the idea that search engines like Google offer an equal playing field for all forms of ideas, identities, and activities. Data discrimination is a real social problem; Noble argues that the combination of private interests in promoting certain sites, along with the monopoly status of a relatively small number of Internet search engines, leads to a biased set of search algorithms that privilege whiteness and discriminate against people of color, specifically women of color. Through an analysis of textual and media searches as well as extensive research on paid online advertising, Noble exposes a culture of racism and sexism in the way discoverability is created online.

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Economics of Real-Life – A New Exposition

By C.T. Kurien | 2018, 聽Academic Foundation

Economics of Real-Life: A New Exposition is possibly the first book attempting to introduce interested readers to the working of contemporary economies with special reference to India. Unlike most introductory books in economics its objective is not to concentrate on a priori logic based on untested (and untestable) premises, but to rely on the history of the evolution of human communities from the rudimentary state to the latest because economic activities鈥攕ocial interaction to provide the material basis for survival and to go beyond鈥攊s common to all. The book relies on 鈥榗apsule history鈥� and 鈥榯hought experiments鈥� as expository devises.

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Turbulence and Order in Economic Development: Institutions and Economic Transformation in Tanzania and Vietnam

By Hazel Gray | 2018, Oxford University Press

The terms of debate on the role of institutions in economic development are changing. Stable market institutions, in particular, secure private property rights and democratically accountable governments that uphold the rule of law, are widely seen to be a pre-requisite for economic transformation in low income countries, yet over the last thirty years, economic growth and structural transformation has surged forward in a range of countries where market and state institutions have differed these ideals, as well as from each other. Gray studies the role of the state in two such countries, examining the interplay between market liberalization, institutions, and the distribution of power in Tanzania and Vietnam.

See more .

Classical Economics Today – Essays in Honor of Alessandro Roncaglia

By Marcella Corsi, Jan Kregel, and Carlo D’Ippoliti | 2018, Anthem Press

This book is a collection of essays that investigates and applies the method and principles of Classical political economy to current issues of economic theory and policy. The contributors to the volume, like all classical economists in general, regard history as a useful tool of analysis rather than a specialist object of investigation. By denying that a single, all-encompassing mathematical model can explain everything we are interested in, Classical political economy necessarily requires a comparison and integration of several pieces of theory as the only way to discuss economics and economic policy. Economists inspired by the Classical approach believe that economic theory is historically conditioned: as social systems evolve, the appropriate theory to represent a certain phenomenon must evolve too.

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Sense And Solidarity – Jholawala Economics for Everyone

by Jean Dr猫ze | 2018, Indian Books & Periodicals

Jean Dr猫ze has a rare and distinctive understanding of the Indian economy and its relationship with the social life of ordinary people. He has travelled widely in rural India and done fieldwork of a kind that few economists have attempted. This has enabled him to make invaluable contributions not only to public debates on economic and social policy but also to our knowledge of the actual state of the country. Dr猫ze鈥檚 insights on India鈥檚 鈥渦nfashionable鈥� issues 鈥� hunger, poverty, inequality, corruption, and conflict 鈥� are all on display here and offer a unique perspective on the evolution of social policy over roughly the past two decades. Historic legislations and initiatives of the period, relating for instance to the right to food and the right to work, are all scrutinised and explained, as are the fierce debates that often accompanied them.

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by Carolina Alves and Ingrid H. Kvangraven

With 2017 marking the 150th anniversary of and 2018 marking the bicentennial of the birth of Karl Marx, it is not a surprise that the number of events and exhibitions celebrating Marx’s work and exploring the significance of Marxism in the world today have gone through the roof. A little sample,,, and (see also The Guardian鈥檚 of exhibitions, books 鈥� and pub crawls)! And it would be unfair to not mention the British Library鈥檚 offered last summer, which aimed to develop ideas for events and activities that would engage the public and research communities with Marx鈥檚 life and his wider legacy (with a brilliant emphasis on – a writer and political activist in her own right). Some of the results can be seen,, and.

Of course, Friedrich Engels鈥� far-reaching contributions have not been ignored ( and ); and neither should contributions, who, like Mary Burns, have never been a[1] and, before falling in love with the Jewish romantic rebel, was a woman interested in French socialism and German romanticism, engaged in an early feminist views on women鈥檚 equality, and committed to the struggle for the working-class (influenced by her father). Hence, Jenny鈥檚 possible allusion that Marx was 鈥淕oethe鈥檚 Wilhelm Meister and Schiller鈥檚 Karl von Moor, and he would be Shelley鈥檚 Prometheus, chained to a precipice because he dared to challenge a tyrannical god鈥� (, p. 20).

Putting aside this rich line-up of events, what has caught our attention is the equal proliferation of pieces celebrating Marx鈥檚 birthday, for the better or for the worse. From misleading and derogatory articles such as the published by The Economist to educational short pieces such as Cooper鈥檚, it is difficult to not wonder about the reasons behind such opposing views. Similarly, it is difficult to resist the temptation to add a little contribution to the debate. So here we are.

We will not dwell on Marx鈥檚 contributions and current relevance, which has been done effectively by so many academics, political activists and journalists. Neither will we unpack and discuss the issues with value-laden opinions on Marx鈥檚 economic theory, and simple-minded association of Marx鈥檚 political ideas with historical events of the 20th century. We will, however, for the sake of being one more blog post on Marx鈥檚 200th birthday, reiterate and explore Marx鈥檚 work鈥檚 undeniable and vital influence in contemporary thought, politics and political practice. Further, and perhaps the main inspiration that led us to write this blog post, we wish to add some more thoughts on Marx鈥檚 influence (or lack thereof) 聽in modern times, namely the effects of the marginalization of his ideas in the field of Economics.

Regarding the former, our point is brief. Statements considering Marx鈥檚 work 鈥渁 study in failure鈥� (and even the hate towards Marx) strikes us as an unfruitful dismissal of the influence that Marx鈥� ideas (along with ideas from Anarchists, Ricardian and Utopian socialists) had on social movements, trade unions and other forms of politics. His analysis and political activism provided a foundation for the fight for changes in inhumane working conditions associated with the development of capitalism. Marx鈥檚 work was a vital impulse for the working class to unit and fight against poverty and exploitation. As Coopers reminds us,

The reason little English girls stopped having their fingers ripped off in power looms, or American women stopped being chained inside fire-prone sweatshops nine hours a day, is not because the working class patiently waited to be reached by the tide of prosperity, but because they joined together and desperately fought the capitalist class for decent pay and working conditions 鈥� often facing soldiers and live ammunition in the process.

Marx鈥� seminal work on class conflict in 19th-century England is still useful for understanding that the distribution of income, capital ownership and decisions regarding employment contracts are inherently political. A vivid piece by Eric Hobsbawm reviewing the historical and political events that led to the May Day holiday () reminds us of the influence of Marx鈥檚 ideas on the history of the struggle for the eight-hour day in the USA and elsewhere, as well as demonstrations and strikes that led to implementations of workers right, power, recognition and hope. Needleless to say many people around the globe currently benefit from the rights and gains inspired by Marx鈥檚 ideas. In broader terms, as Ned Richardson-Little remind us in this , Marx and others were pioneers raising demands that, once achieved, went to become basic features of our modern society. As an example, think of paid elected representatives, free access to justice, and universal free education.

This is not all. By the mid 20th century, Marx鈥檚 influence was also seen in many anti-imperialist and independence movements in the so-called 鈥楾hird World鈥� countries. The theoretical and political development that unfolds from Marx has resulted in an interplay with feminism, postcolonialism, environmentalism, anti-racist movements, global justice struggles, LGBTQ liberation, and so forth. Many of these voices echo some aspects of Marx鈥檚 legacy, in an attempt to understand and transform the world into a better place. As in the last century, Marx and his ideas are still the cornerstone of movements for social changes, emancipation and liberation. Anyone who equates Marx with communist movements, must therefore expand their horizon to understand that Marx鈥檚 influence actually extends much further.

Although the Marx-inspired movements listed above are already important reasons to acknowledge the importance of Marx, we as economists are, of course, also fascinated by Marx鈥檚 economic theory. Due to Engels incessant dedication to organising and translating Marx鈥檚 work and the development of social-democracy in Germany at the beginning of the 20th century, Marx was studied not only by political activists and trade unionist, but also by economists such as Kautsky, Luxemburg and Hilferding [2]. This historical moment also saw the intellectual and theoretical influence of Marx in the economic literature discussing the conversion from value-based prices to prices of production (a.k.a. the transformation problem), including critiques from economists Bohm Barwerk and Bortkiewick, for instance. Concomitantly, there were also economists, such as Rubin and Grossmann, discussing and articulating broad aspects of Marx鈥檚 theory of value (commodity fetichism, alienation, money, capital, crises and proletariat).

As reminds us, the first decade of the 20th century saw increasing influence of Marxist thought (what Kolakowski called 鈥渢he golden age鈥�), which was also accompanied by an increase in the number of critiques towards Marx鈥檚 analysis of capitalism. The result was a rich development of economic theories, which did not stop there. As the 20th century passed by, Marx and Engels鈥� ideas on socialism and economic planning would be behind the socialist calculation debates, which included prominent economists, such as von Mises, Hayek, Lange, Lerner and Taylor. The discussion on value was closely related with Marx and it inspired economic analysis by authors such as Samuelson, Sraffa and Morishima, for example (these discussions of value somehow seem to have been purged from the Economics curriculum, as recently argued by ). For the sake of speculating, we wonder how the theoretical development on law of value, subjective theory of value, price theory and economic planning would have played out without Marx鈥檚 theoretical, intellectual and political influence.

Although the encounter between Marxism and the 鈥淭hird World鈥� is one that is difficult to reconstruct, 聽the Third International, the anti-imperialism, the independence movements and the appeal to socialism as an alternative for many of these countries, were undoubtedly forces that contributed to taking Marx to faraway lands. Marxist-inspired theories, structuralism [3] and dependency, would confront Rostow’s model of development. The [under] economic development debate would then be framed in terms of core versus periphery in a context in which questions over the possibilities of development became critically associated with issues of exploitation, the plantation system, conspicuous consumption, profit remittance, autonomous development, technological innovation and class alliance. The rich literature on economic development is seen through works by the economists Prebisch, Singer, Frank, Furtado, Pinto and dos Santos but to mention a few. Again, our counterfactual thinking leads us to wonder about what would have been of this vibrant debate and theoretical developments without Marx鈥檚 influence.

The list of great economists and economics debates that somehow exposes how vast, rich and important Marx鈥檚 influence is extends far beyond the above. 聽[It absolutes includes one of the most brilliant economists of the 20th century Joan Robinson who, with her unique feisty trait, added to the product of her efforts to understand Marx a still appropriate epigraph, 鈥淢arxism is the opium of the Marxist鈥漖. However, we will stop here with the hope that we have given enough background to explain our continuous disappointment regarding the lack teaching of Marx鈥檚 economic theories in departments of Economics today.

As is well known among historians of economic thought, Marxian Economics, as well as other non-Neoclassical schools of thought such as Keynesian Economics, Structuralism, and Institutionalism, have been from the mainstream curriculum since the 1970s. This is a loss to our understanding of Economics as a community of economists, not only because of Marx’s influence on important economic debates and social movements, as described above, but also because of his important insights about many central economic issues, such as capital accumulation, inequality, competition, bargaining, crises, unemployment, and much more (see on the importance of Marx for the foundations of modern micro, and Milanovic on the). Indeed, it is time to normalise Marx. History shows how much economic analyses and economists can benefit from Marx鈥檚 insights.

Today, the Economics departments that actually take Marx seriously are limited to a handful in the US (e.g. at and ), the UK (e.g. at ), India (e.g. at ), Brazil, China, and in a few other countries scattered across the globe. Because of the Economics discipline鈥檚 lack of openness to alternative ways of thinking about Economics, studies by scholars from these departments will rarely make it into mainstream journals and students from these departments will not be considered as economists in mainstream departments. We believe this has led to a homogeneity in Economics that can be destructive. Beyond the fact that Marx鈥檚 work is important in its own right, having more than one theoretical view of a problem can enhance scientific creativity and innovation, and challenge the idea of Economics as a universal and neutral science. While there have been incremental improvements in response to student movements that popped up after the financial crisis of 2007/08, Marx is still likely only to be mentioned in derogatory terms in most Economics departments.

In fact, we believe that this marginalization of Marx in Economics is part of the reason for the conflicting articles written on Marx on his birthday, as well as the rest of the year. Due to decades of marginalization, Marx鈥檚 ideas have largely been forgotten in most Economics institutions, and only a twisted memory of his contribution remains. There is then no wonder that not even the author of the bestselling Capital in the 21st Century understands Marx鈥檚 insights on technological change [4].

——–

[1] Among the many comments to Raoul Peck鈥檚 The Young Karl Marx, it is worth highlighting how, probably for the first time, Jenny Marx and Mary Burns were inspiringly portrayed as assertive women with strong political convictions and ideas. Although the veracity of the scenes that reflect their character has been challenged, thorough historical research supports Peck鈥檚 take on their personalities and qualities.

[2] No, we will not get into the discussion of reformism and revisionism within the social-democrats in Germany at the time.

[3] Yes, we know, some authors argue that the Structuralist school did not have Marxist influence. However, we are looking into at a broader debate here and not into what the feasible solution is, i.e., socialist revolution or industrialisation.

[4] Thanks to for pointing this out. that 鈥淢arx totally neglected the possibility of durable technological progress and steadily increasing productivity鈥�. As Anwar Shaikh , this is a pretty ignorant statement, even for an MIT economist!

The discussions of the processes behind the growing importance of finance, financial transactions and financial motives, as well as the sustainability of the financial systems, have been located in the critical political economy debate of financialisation and neoliberalism (; ; ; ; ; ; ).

The analysis of financialisation in developing and emerging economies (DEEs) is relatively novel (). It is rooted in earlier discussions about the risks of financial globalisation and liberalisation (; ; ; ; ; ; ; ), including the Latin American Structuralist literature on the hegemonic role of the US dollar and its financial and monetary implications for DEEs (; ; ; ; ); the debate on capital account liberalisation and capital market integration (; ; ; ); and the Minsky-inspired currency and boom bust dynamics of financial crisis in developing economies (; ; ; ; ).

Recently, a literature has emerged which looks more directly at the financialisation of DEEs. One strand of this literature has focused on its international dimension, particularly the ability of both foreign and domestic actors to exploit interest rate differential and exchange rate volatility and the political economy implications of such a process (; , ; ; ). This aspect of DEE financialisation is associated with, and reinforced by, the capital flows dependency of many DEEs, which demands appropriate economic policies that guarantee and contribute to generate attractive financial returns (; ). Indeed, a key issue in this literature is the extent to which DEE governments have been compelled to provide liquidity to financial markets, as financial investors have a significant influence on the domestic currency, weakening central banks exchange rate management and contributing to exchange rate volatility (; ; , ; ; , 2011; ). This is closely associated with growing national public debt, which has been understood as a core feature of financialisation in DEEs, as government bonds are used to mitigate and protect the country against investor speculation, usually by accumulation of foreign exchange reserves and their use as hedge mechanism (Alves, 2017; ; ; ; , ).

Another strand of the literature has sought to map the financialisation phenomena encountered in the Anglo-Saxon core onto DEEs. For example, empirical evidence has been used to show the transformation of non-financial corporations (NFCs), i.e., their shift from being primarily involved in real sector activities to becoming financial actors themselves. The debate draws attention to the costly efforts to increase shareholder value, which induces NFCs to decrease productive investments, which negatively affects employment and wages, and increases their vulnerability to (international) market conditions (; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ). Further, the literature shows that NFCs in DEEs have also started to rely on long-term bond issuance rather than bank borrowing (; ; Lee, 2012; ; ). Related analyses have examined financialisation in DEEs from the perspective of changes in the financial sector, such as the entry of foreign banks in DEEs and the adoption of practices found in financialised developed countries, in particular, lending to individuals for mortgages and consumption and the creation of new tradable financial securities based on these cash flows (; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ).

The above reflects a rising interest in the issue of DEE financialisation, its manifestations, drivers and implications. However, despite this rising interest, many questions still remain unanswered. For example, what, if any, are the specific features of financialisation in DEEs? Can domestic public debt (Alves, 2017; ) or high interest rates () or a subordinate aspect () be such a feature? What is the link between DEEs鈥� specific financialisation features and their 鈥榬eal鈥� international integration into international production networks? Does mapping the phenomena encountered in the Anglo-Saxon core onto DEEs overlook the structural differences of these economies and, therefore, their different financialisation practices and features? Also, can financialisation processes be compared between DEEs? What are the roles of different institutions, policies and indeed locational factors in shaping these processes? Can the notion of 鈥渧ariegated financialisation鈥� be helpful in these respects (; )? Similarly, is financialisation driven rather by international factors or by autonomous domestic political economy processes ( , ; )? Empirically, is it possible to delineate financial development and deepening from financialisation in DEEs, and to what extent can it be quantified (Karwowski and Stockhammer, 2017)?

With these questions in mind, a workshop on How to conceptualise Financialisation in Developing and Emerging Economies? Manifestations, Drivers and Implications will be hosted at Girton College, University of Cambridge, 13-14 December 2018. For more details, please, see the .

We will be delighted to see you there!

Carolina Alves, ,

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Photo:

Book review of N. Levy-Orlik & E Ortiz (2016), The Financialization Response to Economic Disequilibria: European and Latin American Experiences, Edward Elgar Publishing: Cheltenham UK

Levy and Ortiz鈥檚 is a timely book. It critiques mainstream economic theory and its limitations in explaining how economic conditions change or the transition from one state of equilibrium to another. Its analyses rely on Keynes, Kalecki, Kaldor, Minsky, Prebish, Furtado, and Marxists such as Luxemburg, Marini and Lapavitsas. Macroeconomic teachers interested in a heterodox approach may benefit from Levy and Ortiz鈥檚 book as complementary material with experiences showing the dysfunctionality of the global economy from the specific prism of financial disequilibria.

The book has as a common denominator the power dispute within the capitalist system. Disequilibria are not the result of market imperfections and exogenous shocks, but are seen as structural and inherent to the system, resulting from powerful groups determining productive and financial struc- ture, controlling surplus size and influencing its distribution between social classes. The analyses in the book go further in expanding these imbalances from the perspective of unequal power between countries. The hegemonic power of the US, the US dollar and the strength of other financial centres in developed countries are crucial to understanding the processes of deregula- tion and financial globalisation that have happened since the 1970s. The denomination of private debt in US dollars, with no institutions to act as lenders of last resort or regulations to limit capital movements globally, increase the international liquidity disproportionately, puts pressures on financial markets and reinforces the power of financial centres, which they exert in shaping the solutions to financial disequilibria. This is what is behind a monetary policy that is obsessed with price stabilisation and attracting for- eign investment, which repeatedly restores the activity and profitability of financial markets while failing to increase employment or wages, or promote social spending on health and education.

Chapters 1-3 shed light on the conundrum behind the euro crisis while challenging mainstream economic theories regarding i) trade imbalances (Optimum Currency Areas and inter-temporal approach to current accounts); ii) monetary policy that focuses on price stabilisation and control of public finances, based mainly on the channels of interest rates and credit; and iii) explanations for recession based on excess of money supply or policy mistakes on the 鈥榬eal side鈥� of the economy when it is possible to observe a debt deflation process 脿 la Fisher in the US and Europe during the recent crisis.

Chapters 4-5 challenge the new growth theory and the theory of (stat- ic) comparative advantage, arguing that structuralist and dependency analy- ses are still relevant to the situation of peripheral countries today, especially considering the continuing extraction of surpluses towards hegemonic coun- tries. Essentially, the new financial and global order recreated old disequilib- ria in new forms of dependency. For example, i) trade policy, fiscal and mon- etary policy, and labour regulation constrained by free mobility of capital; ii) new forms of dominance by foreign capital accompanied by external disequi- libria that stop peripheral countries overcoming domestic structural limita- tions; and iii) a type of external accounts opening that empowers financial cap- ital and increases external liabilities, which then reinforces the extraction of surpluses towards developed countries. Chapters 9-14 examine some of these aspects in more detail when considering the case of the Mexican economy.

Overall, the analyses in the book attempt to theoretically and empiri- cally understand the increasing trade of financial securities and other finan- cial instruments as well as foreign exchange activities, which has been accompanied by overall unemployment, weak economy recovery and increas- ing inequality (Chapters 6-8 discuss this more directly). They emphasise over- indebtedness and excessive leverage and their effects on income generation.

However, the reader may still wonder: why do financial activities 鈥榙ecouple鈥� from the productive sector in the first place? The transformations understood under the neoliberalism umbrella and technical innovations explain the 鈥榙ominance of finance capital鈥�, and the 鈥榙ifferent interest/power groups鈥� explain the control and distribution of surpluses, but what explains the alleged dichotomy between financial and productive capital? The emer- gence of financialisation has made the discussion on value and creation of wealth more pertinent than ever, but both orthodox and heterodox economic theories continue to neglect this. The acknowledgement that production cre- ates value followed by a focus on problems of surplus distribution and/or con- trolling of debt does not solve the contradictions that are part of the process of creating of value in the first place.

This book review was first published in Economic Issues, Vol. 22, Part 1, March 2017.

Carolina Alves is a PhD student in Economics at School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS)

I recently read Claudia Sahm鈥檚 on why there are very few female economists in the blogosphere. As a blogger herself, as someone who is active on Twitter, and as a follower of approximately eighty blogs, she states with no hesitation: 鈥淚t’s true, very few female economists blog. Period.鈥� For her, three hypotheses may explain this absence: women with opinions are not well received, women are busy with other forms of service, and women underestimate what they would contribute by blogging. But aren’t these actually manifestations of a deeper issue?

Surprisingly, the absence of expert women鈥檚 voices from the economic blogosphere seems to have caught Sahm鈥檚 attention only recently when Miles Kimball listed his in the blogosphere and all of them were men. Kimball quickly cobbled an addendum listing , , , and , but the question on the male dominance in the economic blogosphere did not go away. One could argue that Kimball is referring only to the female bloggers he interacts with, but, for the sake of the argument, if we focus on numbers for a bit, we can also bring into the discussion the . Disappointingly, but not unexpectedly, the list contains merely three women bloggers: , 补苍诲听.

To be fair, some of the blogs in the Intelligent Economist鈥檚 list rely on a group of economists. So, out of curiosity, I had a quick look at the blogs that list their contributors[1]. Interestingly, a few more female names popped up. Betsey Stevenson and Megan McArdle from the Bloomberg View economics blog; Carmen Dorob膬葲 from the Mises Wire blog; Melody Barnes, Heather Boushey, Janet Currie, Laura D鈥橝ndrea Tyson from the Equitablog; Eileen Norcross and Emily Washington from the Neighborhood Effects blog; Julie Hotchkiss, M. Melinda Pitts, Paula Tkac, Lei Fang, Karen Kopecky, Jessica Dill, Pam Frisbee and Sandra Ghizoni from the Macroblog; Rania Antonopoulos, Lekha Chakraborty, Ellen Condliffe Lagemann, Yeva Nersisyan, Pavlina Tcherneva and G眉l 脺nal from the Multiplier Effect blog; Frances Woolley from the Worthwhile聽Canadian Initiative blog; Adrianna McIntyre from the Incidental Economist blog; Joanna Shepherd from the Truth on The Market blog; Lynne Kiesling from the Knowledge Problem blog; Eileen Appelbaum, Deborah James, Cherrie Bucknor, Laura Jung, Tillie McInnis, Dawn聽Niederhauser, Becca Watts from the CEPR Blog; and Susan Ariel Aaronson, Asha Abdel-Rahim, Arnelyn Abdon, Yukiko Abe, Laura Abramovsky, Abigail Adams, Malin Adolfson, Al铆cia Adser脿, Gara Afonso, Sagiri agiri Kitao, Swarnali Ahmed Hannan, Rahel Aichele, Anna Aizer, Kehinde Ajayi, Stefania Albanesi, Cinzia Alcidi, Mariya Aleksynska, Michelle Alexopoulos, Laura Alfaro, C茅line Allard, Ingvild Alm氓s, Mary Amiti, Elizabeth Ananat, Maria Victoria Anauati, Siwan Anderson, Mitsuyo Ando, Svetlana Andrianova, Marianne Andries, Emilie An茅r, Chiara Angeloni, Shamena Anwar, Chie Aoyagi, S贸nia Ara煤jo, Eva Arceo, Cristina Arellano, Janine Aron, Nava Ashraf, Katrin Assenmacher-Wesche, Bettina Aten, Maria Attinasi, Britta Augsburg, Emmanuelle Auriol, Susan Averett, Meghana Ayyagari and Ghazala Azmat from the VOX 鈥撀燙EPR鈥檚 policy portal blog [2].

Okay, wipe the grin off your face. The number of names above should be taken carefully. Scrutinising the list of contributors of some of the 100 top Economics blogs clearly shows more female names, but an accurate conclusion on the gender balance in the economic blogosphere would demand a look at the proportion of women bloggers compared to the total number of bloggers. Just to give you a little taste, the VOX 鈥� CEPR鈥檚 policy portal blog indeed presents an impressive number of 45 female contributors. Nevertheless, this number becomes much less impressive when considering that the total number of contributors for the VOX 鈥� CEPR鈥檚 blog is 219. Unfortunately, similar imbalance is witnessed in the CEPR Blog, which contains only 8 women out of a total of 20 contributors.

We can keep looking at the numbers for as long as we want to expose the gender imbalance in the economic blogosphere, but it is unlikely that Sahm鈥檚 conclusion is wrong. Still, I just can鈥檛 understand why people seem surprised to find out that there are very few female economists blogging. Unfortunately, Amanda Bayer鈥檚 study on has already provided ample evidence that Economics is a male-dominated field (see also )[3]; the gender gap in Economics is also documented by a recent paper , and this gap gets larger at each stage of the profession according to (see also ,听听补苍诲 ). So why wouldn鈥檛 the economic blogosphere reflect the male dominance in the field? It is crucial that we openly acknowledge the gender imbalance in the Economics profession before raising hypotheses on why there are so few female economic bloggers. Otherwise, we are not able to tackle the key issue in this discussion, i.e., sexism in our society and in our field.

In this sense, a clarification is in order when Katie Evan stresses that the “.” The blogosphere definitely perpetuates male bias, but it is the male dominance in Economics that makes the economic blogosphere a job for boys in the first place. This is not about being picky. It is about recognising that the key issue is not 鈥榦h women do not blog, men are taking over again’, but rather the fact that women are still a minority in this field, and the male-dominated environment plays out in a number of ways that add up to a huge overall damper on the number of women who try to make it to the higher ranks of the discipline. Why is it that The Economist鈥檚 recent list of did not include a single woman? Shouldn’t we confront the lack of women in the economic blogosphere as Miles Kimball and an anonymous writer bluntly did when asking: Why are top-notch female economists not being taken seriously? The list of issues women in Economics face that their male colleagues might not be aware of is long and includes enduring misogyny on the virtual domain (see ). See for the long journey for a female economist to become tenured full professor. See also and for the extent to which sexist ideas and prejudices find a refuge in Economics that they do not find elsewhere in academia, apparently. In other words, patriarchy and sexism are pretty much alive in Economics, and the blogosphere is not exempted from its effects.

It seems obvious to me that the answer to the question why are there so few female economic bloggers? should start by acknowledging that the limited number of female bloggers is evidently linked to the limited number of female economists in the first place. We must then go through the inhibitions and oppression that a male-orientated environment means for the women in the field, which in turn involves addressing an extremely relevant point already raised by Noah Smith: Finally, the male-orientated sexist field of Economics does not exist in a vacuum. We do live in a patriarchal society whose values and beliefs, sometimes at an unconscious level (see ), negatively affect female economists who, for example, are often absent from media debates and academic events (see , , and ). We should stop pretending that our modern times are 鈥榚mancipated鈥� times, and speak about sexism more openly and directly in our profession and society.

Regarding this last aspect, i.e., patriarchal society, I want to raise a specific point. In some areas of the globe, a considerable share of women has acquired some degree of professional and financial independence. However, we still struggle to have support in order to perform this independent and relatively new role and, at the same time, perform the 鈥榯raditional鈥� role of being a wife and a mother (see , , and ). There’s a huge amount of anxiety that goes with this situation, and pressures to play those roles, whichever they are.

In academia, for example, that men鈥檚 academic career is actually bolstered when they have children, but the same is not true for women. The findings actually show that 鈥渕en’s academic careers receive additional support by their (non-academic) wives in a way that’s not true for academic women with academic partners鈥� (see also ).

Blogging is another job that requires time, but how does it fit in the traditional family structure? I will risk saying that the nuclear family division plays a massive role in freeing time for male bloggers, while the same nuclear division probably stops us, women, from blogging, I suppose. See for a very interesting account on the nuclear family in contemporary society. I suspect that a questionnaire on how many female bloggers, excluding the ones whose job involves daily blogging, are married, married with young children, married with grown-up kids, and how many are single may also contribute insights into understanding why there are so few female economic bloggers. What if many of us are not blogging or tweeting late at night in order to spend time with our kids or do the housework?

Claudia Sahm鈥檚 hypotheses explaining the absence of women in the economic blogosphere are interesting, valid and, despite not being acknowledged by her, certainly related to the gender division of work, gender intimidation, and the glass ceiling. But without contextualising these issues within structures of patriarchy and sexism, they become shallow, and addressing these issues alone is unlikely to 鈥榝ix鈥� the problem. I do agree with her final observation that 鈥渢he reason why there are few women blogging is probably a complex mix of factors鈥�. However, there is enough evidence out there showing that the great majority of these factors, if not all of them, come down to sexism and its intersection with other forms of inequality like class, race, sexuality and education. I am disappointed that Sahm鈥檚 piece does not directly and categorically address what seems to be the core and the root of the problem leading to the lack of female economist bloggers. My concern in this case is particularly related to the pressures we keep piling onto ourselves without confronting, discussing, and changing the structural conditions that put us, women, in such situations in the first place.

We should be very cautious to not strengthen the type of feminist argument. If the key issue was that any woman willing to work hard can climb the [corporate] ladder all the way to the top (in this case, any woman willing to blog more can help to correct the gender imbalance in the economic blogosphere), we would not be talking about very few female economists blogging or none making the list of the most influential economists in the first place. Otherwise, we better just assume that we didn’t want it badly enough. We should also always ponder our personal experience and remember that privileged white women are quite often the beneficiaries of solidarity and understanding from their male colleagues, while women of color, women without financial privilege, and women on the LBGTQA spectrum are not (see and and ). Further, individual success stories and experiences, showing hard work and perseverance, will not alone challenge the white supremacist patriarchal structure that is in place right now. The idea of 鈥榯rickle-down feminism鈥� might be very comforting, but it’s never borne out in reality (see and ). Lean in feminism is a convenient faux empowerment idea for a tiny number of women, often based in developed countries and/or from a privileged social positions, but rather damaging for the majority of us (see the excellent bell hooks ). By no means we should give space for it or let our personal experience validate it.

Blogs of female economists:

黑料社区

[1] I did not have access to the WSJ-Real Time Economics blog and The Economist Free Exchange blog.

[2] These are just the bloggers starting with the letter A.

[3] Bayer鈥檚 research is, in fact, much broader than the question of gender inequality in the economic profession. Her concern is about the lack of diversity in economics, in particular women and members of historically underrepresented racial and ethnic minority groups. She makes a strong case that the economics profession could benefit from more diversity (see ).

Thanks to Ingrid Harvold Kvangraven, Feyzi Ismail and Pedro Mendes Loureiro for helpful comments. All remaining errors are my own.

Carolina Alves is a PhD student in Economics at SOAS.