The year 2025 will be the third consecutive year in which the Brazilian economy experiences sustained growth. During the first two years of his administration, economic expansion was above 3% annually, while the outlook for 2025 is for a slowdown: 2.4%, according to IPEA, one of Brazil’s leading state economic analysis agencies.
Since June-July 2024, during the U.S. presidential election and with the possibility of Trump being re-elected, Brazil, like other emerging economies, faced devaluation pressures. This led to higher inflation due to rising exchange rates and supply shocks caused by climate issues. These issues have reduced the food supply (mainly coffee, eggs, and beans), causing prices to rise.
This macroeconomic instability scenario was reloaded by the Trump-driven trade war, particularly when the 50% tariff on purchases from Brazil was announced under a mix of arguments between commercial (trade deficit), political (preventing Bolsonaro from being judged for an attempted coup d’茅tat and US bigtech鈥檚 regulation), and geopolitical (the advance of the BRICS on a possible replacement of the dollar in commercial relationships).
What was the response in terms of economic policy? The institutionalization of the inflation target led to an increase in the SELIC interest rate from 10.75% in September 2024 to 15% in June 2025, the highest level since 2006. The orthodox argument suggests that raising interest rates reduces the money supply, curbing aggregate demand and reducing inflation. From another perspective, raising interest rates promotes carry trade, which attracts foreign capital through the capital account and allows the exchange rate to appreciate. In this way, the economy partially protects itself from speculative capital outflows and reduces the prices of imports and exports, thus decreasing the inflation.
In contrast, a sharp rise in interest rates deepens the pernicious effects of financialization: it impoverishes indebted families and concentrates income. Are there any other alternatives available? The economic toolbox offers other options. Many observers have noted a striking characteristic of Lula鈥檚 third administration: the absence of open confrontation with Brazil’s powerful financial sector. This is no coincidence. The painful lessons of Dilma Rousseff’s presidency (2011-2016) and her impeachment weigh heavily on current political calculations.
To understand this, we need to analyze the historical lesson of Rousseff’s removal, its macroeconomic causes, and how this experience has limited economic policy options.
Read More »
黑料社区 