Author: Andrew M. Fischer

Reflections on aid and regime change in Ethiopia: a response to Cheeseman

Andrew M. Fischer1 Comment

By Jimi O. Adesina, Andrew M. Fischer and Nimi Hoffmann

In a , published on 22 December 2020, that he as the most important thing he wrote in 2020, Nic Cheeseman penned a strong criticism of what he calls the 鈥榤odel of authoritarian development鈥� in Africa. This phrase refers specifically to Ethiopia and Rwanda, the only two countries that fit the model, which is otherwise not generalisable to the rest of the continent. His argument, in a nutshell, is that donors have been increasingly enamoured with these two countries because they are seen as producing results. Yet the recent conflict in the Tigray region of Ethiopia shows that this argument needs to be questioned and discarded. He calls for supporting democracy in Africa, which he claims performs better in the long run than authoritarian regimes, especially in light of the conflicts and repression that inevitably emerge under authoritarianism. His argument could also be read as an implicit call for regime change, stoking donors to intensify political conditionalities on these countries before things get even worse.

Cheeseman鈥檚 argument rests on a number of misleading empirical assertions which have important implications for the conclusions that he draws. In clarifying these, our point is not to defend authoritarianism. Instead, we hope to inject a measure of interpretative caution and to guard against opportunistically using crises to fan the disciplinary zeal of donors, particularly in a context of increasingly militarised aid regimes that have been associated with disastrous ventures into regime change.

We make two points. First, his story of aid dynamics in Ethiopia is not supported by the data he cites, which instead reflect the rise of economic 鈥榬eform鈥� programmes pushed by the World Bank and IMF. The country鈥檚 current economic difficulties also need to be placed in the context of the systemic financial crisis currently slamming the continent, in which both authoritarian and (nominally) democratic regimes are faring poorly.

Second, we reflect on Cheeseman鈥檚 vision of aid as a lever of regime change. Within already stringent economic adjustment programmes, his call for intensifying political conditionalities amounts to a Good Governance Agenda 2.0. It ignores the legacy of the structural adjustment programmes in on the continent during the 1980s and 1990s. 

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Haemorrhaging Zambia: Prequel to the Current Debt Crisis

Andrew M. Fischer9 Comments

Following a stand-off with commercial creditors and protracted but unresolved negotiations with the IMF, Zambia defaulted on its external sovereign debt on 13 November this year. While most commentary has focused exclusively on the government鈥檚 sovereign borrowing, our own research has detected massive outflows of private wealth over the past fifteen years, hidden away on an obscure part of the country鈥檚 financial account. The outflows are most likely related to the large mining companies that dominate the country鈥檚 international trade. With many other African countries also facing debt distress, the lessons of this huge siphoning of wealth from the Zambian economy need extra attention within discussions about debt justice in the current crisis. We explain here what we鈥檝e found.

Zambia was already debt-stressed going into the COVID pandemic. The economy was hard hit following the sharp fall in international copper prices from 2013 to 2016, especially that copper made up about (including unrefined, cathodes and alloys). Following a , the government entered into negotiations with the IMF but never agreed on a programme. There was some improvement in macroeconomic outlook in 2017 due to rising copper prices, which sent international investors throttling back into . However, international investors again turned against the country in 2018 in the midst of the , which compounded the effects of . As a result, the government was already teetering on the edge of default on the eve of the COVID-19 pandemic. The economic fall-out of the pandemic has since pushed the country over the edge (see an excellent analysis ).

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Ephemeral universalism in the social protection response to the COVID-19 lockdown in the Philippines

Andrew M. Fischer1 Comment

By Emma Lynn Dadap-Cantal, Andrew M. Fischer and Charmaine G. Ramos

Since March 2020, the Philippines has implemented one of the world鈥檚 strictest and longest lockdowns in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, which has caused severe disruptions in peoples鈥� livelihoods. The government鈥檚 emergency social protection response, the 鈥楽ocial Amelioration Program鈥� (SAP), has also been notably massive, introducing one-off near-universal income protection. It is an insightful case given that the country鈥檚 existing social assistance system has been celebrated as a model for developing countries, even though it has been mostly bypassed in the emergency response. Moreover, the country鈥檚 highly stratified and fragmented social policy system has resulted in implementation delays and irregularities that have fostered social hostilities and undermined the potential for such momentary universalism to have lasting transformative effects.

The Philippine government first imposed its 鈥榗ommunity quarantine鈥� on 15 March, which has since been extended until 30 June. Thus far, the pandemic has not been severe relative to evolving global indicators, with 302 confirmed infections per million people and 11 confirmed deaths per million people as of 25 June (although at only 5,760 tests per million people, these confirmed rates are likely to be significantly underestimated). However, as elsewhere in the Global South, the lockdown has thrown the country into an employment crisis given that more than 60 percent of its workforce is informal, most in precarious situations even when earning above the official poverty line.

In response, the government rolled out the 鈥楽ocial Amelioration Program鈥� (SAP), comprising at least 13 different schemes and with an estimated total budget equivalent to as much as 3.1 percent of the country鈥檚 GDP [1]. The largest scheme is the Emergency Subsidy Program (ESP), which has been allocated 200 billion Philippines pesos (PhP; about 3.5 billion euros), more than three times the combined budget of all the other schemes.Read More »