What if the story of economic development doesn鈥檛 begin with the market, but with the household? And what if property, often assumed to be a static bundle of rights, is better understood as a dynamic institution鈥攁daptive, historically layered, and relational?

These questions sit at the heart of my recent research, which I had the opportunity to present at the Open University鈥檚 legal histories conference Land and Property Beyond the Centenary. While my work focuses on property governance and transformation in rural China, its implications stretch far beyond. It challenges dominant liberal narratives about property and development by presenting institutional change as a process of negotiated adaptation shaped by vulnerability and crisis, rather than a linear path towards free markets and individual ownership.

At its core, this work brings into dialogue three theoretical frameworks that are rarely combined: resilience theory, Martha Fineman鈥檚 vulnerability jurisprudence, and evolutionary institutional economics inspired by Thorstein Veblen. Together, they offer a rich toolkit for reimagining how development happens鈥攁nd for whom.

Resilience Beyond Metaphor

鈥楻esilience鈥� is everywhere these days鈥攆rom climate adaptation plans to corporate strategy documents. But in many of these settings, the term functions as a loose metaphor: a call to 鈥榖ounce back鈥� from crisis, often without interrogating what resilience means, or whose resilience is being protected.

In contrast, resilience theory, which originated in ecological sciences during the 1970s (Holling 1973), initially defined resilience as the capacity of a system to absorb disturbances while maintaining core functions (Walker and Salt 2006). Over time, the concept evolved beyond ecological sciences to address social and institutional dynamics (Humby 2014), culminating in an approach emphasising adaptive governance of socio-ecological systems (SES) (Folke et al. 2005; Duit et al. 2010).

Crucially, contemporary resilience framework is not about stability鈥攊t is about transformation under constraint. Applied to economic development, this approach shifts the focus away from fixed development goals (e.g., free markets, individual land ownership) and towards the processes and institutional arrangements that enable adaptation over time.

This is especially important in the context of land, property, and household governance鈥攚here liberal models prioritising formal markets and individual ownership often fail to capture the lived realities of economic life in the Global South. In this framing, resilience serves as a critical lens for analysing how property systems evolve under pressure, rather than functioning as a rhetorical term.

The Household as an Adaptive Institution

Nowhere is this more evident than in rural China, where the household has long operated as more than a private, familial unit. Historically, it was a key node in systems of imperial governance, tax collection, and collective responsibility. During the Maoist period, it was scaled up and subsumed into communes through collectivisation. And in the late 1970s and 1980s, it re-emerged as the cornerstone of agricultural reform under the Household Responsibility System (HRS).

Under the HRS, rural land remained collectively owned by the village committee or the collective economic organisation, but rights to use, manage, and benefit from rural land for farming purposes were contracted to individual households. These households鈥攖hough not legal persons in a Western sense鈥攂ecame the operative economic units, making decisions about production, investment, and surplus. The state retained oversight, but the locus of everyday governance shifted to the household.

This arrangement defies standard models of property. It is neither fully private nor fully communal. It does not rest on individual title, yet it has enabled a massive increase in agricultural productivity, lifted millions out of poverty, and persisted for over four decades. From a resilience perspective, the HRS is a compelling example of institutional adaptation: a locally grounded, historically informed response to systemic crisis.

From Vulnerability to Institutional Support

Yet resilience alone is not enough. As Martha Fineman has powerfully argued, resilience must be understood in relation to vulnerability. Fineman鈥檚 (e.g., 2004, 2010, 2013, 2017) vulnerability theory challenges the liberal conception of individuals as fully autonomous, rational, and self-sufficient actors. Instead, she posits human vulnerability as universal and inevitable, experienced differently across the lifecycle but requiring continuous institutional support.

Central to Fineman鈥檚 critique is the reconceptualisation of resilience as a socially and institutionally constructed capacity rather than merely an inherent individual trait (Fineman 2013). Acknowledging universal vulnerability demands that resilience be understood as the outcome of supportive institutional structures. Fineman (2010) explicitly calls for a 鈥�responsive state鈥� that mitigates structural vulnerability by fostering institutional support. All human beings are vulnerable: to illness, to economic precarity, and to displacement or the loss of social support systems. What varies is how that vulnerability is mediated鈥攖hrough family, community, legal structures, or the state.

Fineman鈥檚 theory pushes back against liberal assumptions of autonomy and self-sufficiency. She reminds us that informality can also obscure deep inequalities, especially around gender and care. In China, for example, household-based land contracts have often been issued in the name of male heads, with women鈥檚 access mediated by marital status and household registration. This creates hidden dispossessions: when households divide, or when women marry out, their land rights can evaporate. It calls for what Fineman terms the responsive state: one that recognises universal vulnerability and designs systems to mitigate, not reproduce, inequality.

Bringing Fineman into dialogue with resilience theory helps refine our approach. Resilience is not just the ability to adapt鈥攊t is the product of institutional arrangements that distribute resources, manage risk, and support those most exposed to harm. Fox O鈥橫ahony and Roark (2022) also note: resilience must not be confused with endurance alone; resilient property must be assessed in relation to how it confronts or reinforces structural injustice. Their work offers an important reminder that without state responsiveness and institutional accountability, resilience risks becoming a justification for inequality.

Veblen, Evolution, and Development as Process

The third strand of this framework鈥�evolutionary institutional economics鈥攁dds another layer. In 痴别产濒别苍鈥檚 classic formulation, institutions evolve not through design but through selective adaptation: a process shaped by habit, experimentation, and context (Veblen 2007/1899; Hodgson 2012). What persists is not always what is deemed most efficient by liberal standards, but what is most compatible with prevailing ecological and socio-economic conditions.

This evolutionary logic is essential for understanding property and development in non-liberal contexts. It explains, for instance, why Chinese rural households could reassert themselves so effectively in the late 1970s. The HRS cannot be adequately explained solely as a spontaneous market-oriented response. Instead, it emerged from historically entrenched practices of household-based governance. The HRS adapted these historical institutional configurations to contemporary ecological and socio-economic conditions through years of local experimentation.

Veblen also helps us move beyond the binary of tradition vs. modernity. He shows that institutional change is path-dependent, historically situated, and plural. The Chinese case is not a 鈥榯ransition鈥� towards Western models of property鈥攊t is a trajectory of its own, shaped by deep histories of governance and human-land relations.

Implications for Development Economics

So, what does all this mean for development economics?

First, it urges rethinking the role of formal institutions and legal formality. As scholars such as Elinor Ostrom (e.g., 1990, 2010) have argued, communities often govern land and resources effectively through informal norms and shared practices. The challenge is not to impose external models, but to understand鈥攁nd where appropriate, strengthen鈥攖he institutional arrangements that already exist.

Second, it calls for integrating vulnerability into development thinking. Much of the field still assumes economic agents are autonomous, rational, and mobile. But real people live in webs of dependency: caring for children, elders, or the sick; tied to households, identities, and places. Economic policy that ignores this鈥攂y targeting individuals instead of families, or by displacing informal systems in favour of abstract rights鈥攔isks deepening insecurity and inequality.

Third, it suggests taking history seriously. Rather than a fixed problem to be solved, development is an evolving process shaped by ecological pressures, socio-economic realities, and the dynamic interplay of conflict, negotiation, and cooperation across multiple levels of governance. The HRS did not emerge from a blueprint鈥攊t emerged from decades of failed collectivisation, suppressed local experiments, and shifting elite consensus. Development economists need to understand these dynamics, not just measure their outcomes.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this perspective opens space for a pluralist approach to institutions and property. There is no universal path to development, no one-size-fits-all model of governance. But by attending to how institutions adapt, absorb crisis, and respond to vulnerability, we can begin to build a more grounded, equitable, and resilient understanding of economic change.

Towards a Resilient Development Paradigm

The concept of 鈥�resilient development鈥� risks becoming another buzzword unless grounded in rigorous theory and empirical nuance. But used critically, it can become a powerful tool: a way to centre adaptation, institutional experimentation, and vulnerability in how we think about growth, property, and justice.

Rural China鈥檚 experience under the HRS offers one case study鈥攂ut not a template. It reminds us that resilience is not about returning to an imagined past or leaping towards a market ideal. It is about building institutions that can change without collapsing, that can absorb shocks without sacrificing equity, and that can evolve with the communities they serve.

Development, in this sense, is not a destination. It is an ongoing negotiation鈥攂etween people, institutions, and their environments. And perhaps the household, so often ignored or oversimplified in economic models, is one of the best places to begin.

References

Duit, A. et al. (2010) Governance, Complexity, and Resilience. Global Environmental Change, 20, 363鈥�368.

Fineman, M.A. (2004) The Autonomy Myth: A Theory of Dependency. The New Press.

Fineman, M. A. (2010) The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State. Emory Law Journal, 60(2), 251鈥�275.

Fineman, M.A. (2013) Equality, Autonomy, and the Vulnerable Subject in Law and Politics. In M.A. Fineman and A. Grear (eds) Vulnerability: Reflections on a New Ethical Foundation for Law and Politics. Routledge, 13鈥�27.

Fineman, M. A. (2017) Vulnerability and Inevitable Inequality. Oslo Law Review, 4(3), 133鈥�149.

Folke, C. et al. (2005) Adaptive Governance of Social-Ecological Systems. Annual Review of Environment and Resources, 30, 441鈥�73.

Fox O鈥橫ahony, L. and Roark, M.L. (2022) Squatting and the State: Resilient Property in an Age of Crisis. Cambridge University Press.

Hodgson, G.M. (2012) Thorstein Veblen: The Father of Evolutionary and Institutional Economics. In E. S. Reinert and F.L. Viano (eds) Thorstein Veblen: Economics for an Age of Crises. Anthem Press, 83鈥�296.

Holling, C.S. (1973) Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems. Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics, 4, 1鈥�23.

Humby, T.-L. (2014) Law and Resilience: Mapping the Literature. Seattle Journal of Environmental Law, 4(1), 85鈥�129.

Ostrom, E. (2009) A General Framework for Analyzing Sustainability of Social-Ecological Systems. Science, 325(5935), 419鈥�422.

Ostrom, E. (2010) Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems. American Economic Review, 100(3), 641鈥�672.

Veblen, T. (2007/1899) The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study in the Evolution of Institutions. Oxford University Press.

Walker, B. and Salt, D. (2006) Resilience Thinking: Sustaining Ecosystems and People in a Changing World. Island Press.

is Professor of Law at Essex Law School, University of Essex. Her research focuses on comparative property law; Chinese law; law, governance and development; and political economy. @TingXu7

Having laid out the horizontal dimensions of diversity in property in Part 1, I here offer a critique of the assumption in mainstream economics that all kinds of property institutions need to be or will be transformed into private property to promote economic development. I also reflect on my previous work that applies and develops Darwinian mechanisms of variation, inheritance, and selection鈥攚hich has been extensively discussed in evolutionary biology and evolutionary economics鈥攖o study property regime transformation in China.

While working on , Professor Erik Reinert introduced me to two very important books and encouraged me to think about the relevance of the work of Darwin and Veblen to study property regime transformation in China: by Stephen Jay Gould (1941-2002), Harvard biologist and historian of science; edited by Erik himself and Francesca Viano. Erik also introduced me to the work of evolutionary economists including of Columbia University.

In (1859), Darwin specified three mechanisms of evolutionary change鈥攙ariation, inheritance, and selection. It should be noted that Darwin never liked the word evolution due to 鈥榟is denial of progress as a predictable outcome鈥� (). Gould (1996/2011: 41) argued that 鈥楧arwin鈥檚 revolution should be epitomized as the substitution of variation for essence as the central category of natural reality.鈥� He further argued:

鈥n Plato鈥檚 world, variation is accidental, while essences record a higher reality; in Darwin鈥檚 reversal, we value variation as a defining (and concrete earthly) reality, while averages (our closest operational approach to 鈥渆ssences鈥�) become mental abstractions.

In ,  Hodgson (2012: 287) argued that Veblen had contributed to evolutionary and institutional economics by bringing 鈥楧arwinian ideas into the economic arena鈥�.

痴别产濒别苍鈥檚 ) definition of institution is dynamic:

Institutions are, in substance, prevalent habits of thought with respect to particular relations and particular functions of the individual and of the community [鈥 The situation of today shapes the institutions of tomorrow through a selective, coercive process, by acting upon men鈥檚 habitual view of things, and so altering or fortifying a point of view or a mental attitude handed down from the past. [鈥 The evolution of society is substantially a process of mental adaptation on the part of individuals under the stress of circumstances which will no longer tolerate habits of thought formed under and conforming to a different set of circumstances in the past.

Changing socio-economic contexts may shift and reframe 鈥榩erceptions and dispositions within individuals鈥� and give rise to new 鈥榟abits of thought and behaviour鈥� (Hodgson 2012: 287) and thus new forms of institution. Veblen (1899/2007) termed this phenomenon 鈥榮election鈥� as 鈥榮elective adaptation鈥�. Although Veblen 鈥榙id not make the context, criteria or mechanisms of selection entirely clear鈥�, he 鈥榞enerally saw institutions as units of selection in a process of economic evolution鈥� (Hodgson 2012: 291).

In terms of 鈥榗o-evolution鈥�, it is the 鈥榮ignature term鈥� of Richard Nelson. His 1982 book with Sidney Winter represented the start of the neo-Schumpeterian wave. Most evolutionary economists use the term 鈥榗o-evolution鈥�. Further, the Darwinian mechanisms have been extensively discussed by biologists, institutional and evolutionary economists, for example (discussing creation, selection and variation) and (discussing variation, selection, and niche construction).

Bringing Darwinian ideas and Veblenian institutions to the analysis of property regime transformation, I completed a working paper in 2015 and argued that the works of Darwin and Veblen also contribute to studies of property. The (Darwinian) transformation of property can be elucidated not only by drawing analogies to the Darwinian mechanisms of variation, inheritance, and selection, but also by broadening the scope of the Darwinian framework, from the biological world to human interactions in society.

There are key mechanisms for understanding and analysing the co-evolution of diversity in property and economic development:

1. Variation: the existence of diversity in property in accordance with dynamic socio-economic conditions.
2. Inheritance: the persistence and continuity of the old property regime despite legal and political changes.
3. Selection: the formation of new forms of property more adapted to socio-economic contexts.

Institutions are created or modified to selectively adapt to the changes in socio-economic contexts. But institutions which enable economic development are often brought about by emulation and innovation beyond adaptation. I will leave the discussion of emulation to my next blog posts and focus on innovation here.

To further illustrate the importance of innovation for economic development, we need to bring in Schumpeterian institutions, which are concerned with the importance of innovation in generating new knowledge and modes of production, which helps move the economic activities to the next 鈥榮tage鈥� or 鈥榩aradigm鈥� (). The relevant discussion of Schumpeterian institutions can be found in my previous blog post on 鈥業nstitutions, Economic Development, and China鈥檚 Development Policy for Escaping Poverty鈥�.

When we bring in Schumpeterian institutions to Darwinian mechanisms and Veblenian institutions discussed above, the third mechanism can be developed as selection: the formation of new forms of property more adapted to socio-economic contexts; for economic development, selection need to be prompted by emulation and innovation.

All the three mechanisms can be found in China鈥檚 long-term property (in rural land) regime transformation (see Part 1).

Variation (diversity) existed in all four periods. The introduction of collective ownership to rural China (1956-1978) by political forces did result in the decrease of diversity in property, therefore reducing the degree of resilience of the property regime in instances of natural disasters and economic and political crises.

The attempt to eliminate diversity in property, however, only lasted for a relatively short span of time, as the political programmes could not change the mode of agricultural production, which still relied on household-based productions. Fundamental aspects of the old property regime persisted and continued, despite alterations, if the economic conditions have not been fundamentally changed (inheritance).

The household responsibility system鈥�a development-promoting institution鈥攚as introduced in the late 1970s. This rural land management system was adapted to household-based agricultural productions (selection). Once farmers had discharged their duty to meet the grain quota imposed by the state, they could retain their additional production鈥攖he grain produced over and above the required quota.

Further, beyond being a property institution formed through selection adaptation, the household responsibility system was also an innovative property institution in the period between the late 1970s and 1980s, which gave incentives to individual farmers and their households to engage in farming within collective ownership of rural land (innovation).

In the 1990s techno-economic development in agricultural production, however, began to require a new mode of production for promoting cooperation and consolidated/industrialised farming. The household responsibility system, which was once an innovative initiative that promoted economic development, had come to function as a roadblock to further development. New development-promoting property institutions were created in the 1990s and further developed to promote the new mode of production, initiating a process of 鈥�creative destruction鈥�.

In , I further clarified three interrelated terms: .

Property regime transformation in the broad sense does not indicate either a clear trend or a foreseeable outcome; it need not be progressive. By contrast, innovative property transformation with reference to Schumpeterian institutions conveys a positive connotation of enabling economic development and structural change, which may not be a smooth process. Property evolution in the broad sense conveys a positive connotation (it may even contain a teleological element), but not necessarily the identical form of connotation found in innovative property transformation.

In conclusion, the transformation of property is neither a spontaneous process nor a process solely prompted by external factors; it does not move towards a predictable outcome. Diversity in property and economic development co-evolve. We need to examine changing contexts, in particular techno-economic change over time rather than a linear, normative series of changes such as from communal property to private property, as the inevitable result of property regime transformation.

Ting Xu is Professor of Law at Essex Law School, University of Essex. Her research focuses on comparative property law; Chinese law; law, governance and development; and political economy. She tweets at .

This blog post builds on the 鈥業nstitutions, Economic Development, and China鈥檚 Development Policy for Escaping Poverty鈥� piece and comprises two parts dealing with the key concepts (Part 1) and mechanisms (Part 2) for evaluating the co-evolution of diversity in property and economic development. I argue that diversity in property plays a key role in economic development and that there are two dimensions that are important for examining the co-evolution of diversity in property and economic development鈥攈orizontal (Part 1) and vertical (Part 2).

In this post, I offer a critique of the assumption in mainstream economics that private property is the only kind of property institutions that can stimulate and preserve economic development (I am, of course, not the first to offer critiques of this assumption; for existing studies, see e.g., ). I focus on the meaning of 鈥榙iversity in property鈥�, which concerns the horizontal level analysis.

Introducing the concept of 鈥榙iversity鈥�

鈥樷�� means 鈥榤any different types of things or people being included in something.鈥� Professor Erik Reinert introduced me to the concept of 鈥榙iversity鈥� and encouraged me to examine the nature and significance of diversity in institutions such as property and the co-evolution of diversity in institutions and economic development. I started my research in this area by co-authoring a working paper on 鈥�鈥� with Erik in 2013.  

In , Erik and I examined diversity not only as part of nature鈥檚 strategy for the survival of species from natural shocks but also as a strategy consciously employed in human societies for the same reason. We argued that diversity constitutes a key element in economic development. Starting in the 1400s, Europe鈥攁nd later the West in general鈥攅xperienced an explosion of intellectual creativity and economic development, due to increasing diversity in polities, policies, cultures and ideas. Simultaneously, China started a process of de-diversification in that period and fell behind. We were worried about the lack of concern for diversity in today鈥檚 mainstream economics and development policies.

Due to diminishing diversity in mainstream economics and development policies, economists and policy makers tend to see聽 (Reinert 2000: 180) and changes to be predicted or prescribed. When this pattern of thinking is transferred to evaluate the nature of property and the process of property regime transformation, the importance of 鈥榮trong and clear鈥� property rights is emphasised as if they were a panacea that can create and preserve a well-functioning market. Further, to promote economic growth, other kinds of property institutions need to be transformed into private property as 鈥榞ood institutions鈥� understood by (). Diversity in property is eliminated.

Diversity in property

When examining the nature and significance of diversity in property, I see diversity in property as a 鈥榙evelopment-promoting鈥� institution, in contrast to what is considered 鈥榞ood institutions鈥� by the World Bank, which tends to focus more on eliminating corruption and securing private property. To understand the nature and significance of diversity in property, we need to clarify some basic concepts.

First, property refers to both a resource over which an individual, a community or the state has overall control and the way a resource is managed and regulated by an individual, a community or the state. Property is more concerned with how a resource is used, managed, or governed rather than how it is owned. , for example, means 鈥榓 resource over which a community and its members together have overall control and the way a resource is managed and regulated by a community for its collective purposes鈥�. The term 鈥榩roperty鈥� is more helpful than 鈥榦wnership鈥� especially in the Chinese context where ownership is defined by the owner鈥檚 identity (which gives little information on how the resource is used and governed) and closely associated with ideology.

Second, the concept of private property is both ambiguous and broad: individual and corporate ownership are 鈥榩rivate鈥�, while 鈥榞overnment ownership of resources such as office buildings [is also] essentially private鈥�, as ) argued.  When referring to a resource controlled by a human person, it is better to use the term 鈥榠ndividual property鈥� rather than 鈥榩rivate property鈥�.

Third, within communal property, individual property rights/interests may co-exist with communal property rights/interests. Here I use rather than 鈥榩rivate property rights鈥� which may be held by either a human being or an artificial legal entity. The introduced in China in the late 1970s is a classic example. The collective issues contracts to the household, which has responsibility for the management of farming an area of land called 鈥榬esponsibility land鈥�. Farmers have an individual property right/interest in rural land to possess and use it for farming purposes.

including the household鈥檚 interest and the collective鈥檚 interest. Although diversity in property is not unique to China, the household responsibility system is an innovative development-promoting institution introduced in China in the late 1970s, while the ideological function of collective ownership of rural land is preserved but less constrained for individual and communal property rights performing their economic functions.  

Diversity in property in China

Diversity in property has a much broader scope than that of diversity in ownership. The latter exists in China鈥檚 鈥榮ocialist market economy鈥� with a mix of state ownership, collective ownership, and individual ownership. Diversity in property differs from the evolution of diverse forms of property, for example, from communal property to individual property or from informal property to formal property. These are different forms of property existing at different times.

To use my previous work as an example, my book discussed the re-emergence and recognition of private property rights in the context of China鈥檚 social and political transformation and economic development since 1978. Illustrative cases include the revival of private property rights in the reform of State-owned enterprises (SOEs) and development of township and village enterprises (TVEs). The focus was on diverse forms of property.

After my 2014 book, I moved my research area from examining diverse forms of property at different times to diversity in property. Two research projects facilitated this new area of research. I was awarded two research projects on diversity in 2014: funded by the European Commission, Joint Research Centre (completed in 2015); funded by the British Academy International Mobility and Partnership Scheme 2014-17 (completed in 2017).

The meaning of diversity in property (in rural land) in the Chinese context is elaborated in the following table, focussing on four key periods of property regime transformation. The collectivisation period (1956-1978) is not included, as diversity in property was virtually eliminated in this period. Diversity in property includes two levels:

1. the coexistence of different types of property;
2. within communal property, the coexistence of individual and communal property interests.

Table 1 demonstrates that diversity existed in most parts of China鈥檚 long-term property regime transformation except the collectivisation period.

Table 1: Property regimes across vertical and horizontal dimensions

Diversity in property, offering a better reflection of China鈥檚 socio-economic realities than diversity in ownership, plays at least three important functions in reshaping development policies:

1. it shifts the focus away from ideological debate on public versus private dichotomy;
2. it directs the focus to thinking about how a resource can be better governed;
3. it directs policies to match context.

In my next blog post (Part 2)., I will explore the vertical dimension of the co-evolution of diversity in property and economic development by focussing on some key mechanisms informed by evolutionary economics.

Ting Xu is Professor of Law at Essex Law School, University of Essex. Her research focuses on comparative property law; Chinese law; law, governance and development; and political economy. She tweets at .

I recently have had opportunities to reread the works of Professors Erik Reinert and Peer Vries and to reflect on my previous work on the relationship between institutions, economic development, and China鈥檚 development policy for escaping poverty. Professors Reinert and Vries have studied, along with a few other distinguished economists and economic historians, 鈥榩overty traps鈥� at national and transnational levels for decades (eg, Serra 1613; Landes 1998; Reinert 2007; Reinert 2009; Vries 2013). Both argued that innovation and structural change are the keys to escaping poverty.

Professors Reinert鈥檚 and Vries鈥檚 work on economic development has brought the work of Joseph Schumpeter (1883-1950) to light. In this blog post, I will review how the work of Schumpeter, Reinert, and Vries helps us explore three key questions: First, what kind of development does a country need to escape poverty? Second, what kind of institutions can promote development? Third, how to develop? These three questions are crucial to understand China鈥檚 escape from poverty.

Professors Reinert鈥檚 and Vries鈥檚 arguments can be well supported by China鈥檚 national development policy. Below are a few highlights of rich empirical evidence. In 1984 the Chinese government proposed a development-oriented poverty reduction policy to replace the previous aid reliance policy (Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council 1984; for critiques of relying on massive foreign aid to escape poverty, see e.g. Moyo 2009; Hubbard and Duggan 2009; Banerjee and Duflo 2011). On 18 January 1992, Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997, leader of the PRC from 1978 to 1989) made a famous speech in his Southern Tour, emphasising that 鈥榙evelopment is the absolute principle鈥� (fazhan cai shi ying daoli). Since then, China鈥檚 economic development has entered a new stage. In 1994 the Chinese government fully adopted the development-oriented poverty reduction policy as a national policy.

Schumpeter made a fundamental distinction between economic development and economic growth. This distinction helps answer the first question. Mere quantitative growth does not amount to economic development: as Schumpeter (1934/2012: 64) argued, 鈥榓dd successively as many mail coaches as you please, you will never get a railway thereby鈥�. GDP growth, for example, does not equal Schumpeterian economic development. Economic development 鈥榗omes from within the economic system and is not merely an adaptation to changes in external data; it occurs discontinuously, rather than smoothly; it brings qualitative changes or 鈥渞evolutions,鈥� which fundamentally displace old equilibria and create radically new conditions鈥� (Elliott 2012: xix). A country needs this kind of economic development to escape poverty (Reinert 2009).

Economic development needs Schumpeterian institutions. This answers the above second question. Schumpeterian institutions are concerned with the importance of innovation in generating new knowledge and modes of production, which helps move the economic activities to the next 鈥榮tage鈥� or 鈥榩aradigm鈥� (Reinert 2000: 11). Schumpeterian institutions focus on production, and this stands in sharp contrast to the view of institutions adopted by mainstream economics, which focuses on the free market and trade and favours export-led and FDI-driven economic growth (Reinert 2006: 2-3). Further, Schumpeterian institutions differ from the world bank鈥檚 conception of 鈥榞ood institutions鈥� including those for 鈥榖uilding market institutions that promote growth and reduce poverty鈥� (World Bank 2002: III).

Professor Vries also highlighted the difference between 鈥榞rowth-promoting institutions鈥� (I use development-promoting institution below for consistency with Schumpeterian economic development) and 鈥榞ood institutions鈥� as preconditions for growth as understood by the World Bank. Economic growth existed before the formation of 鈥榞ood institutions鈥�. He argued:

Many institutions [,,,] which in mainstream institutional economics are regarded as necessary preconditions for growth actually only emerged when the economy already was growing and a certain wealth already existed: they, in brief, often were effect or symptom rather than cause (Vries 2013: 377-378; italics original; see also Chang 2002: Chapter 3)

We now need to think about the third question of how a country can develop. It is important to recognise the process of economic development as 鈥榗reative destruction鈥�: 鈥榌a] process of industrial mutation鈥hat incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one鈥� (Schumpeter 1943/2010: 73, italics original).  Combined with the answer to the second question, economic development as a process of 鈥榗reative destruction鈥� can be elaborated as in table 1.

Table 1: Economic development as a process of 鈥榗reative destruction鈥�

Double arrow line indicates a co-evolution process. 鈥業nstitutions and economic activities clearly co-evolve 鈥� the arrows of causality necessarily move in both directions鈥� (Reinert 2006: 10). Single arrow line indicates a causal evolutionary process.

Further, whether due to 鈥榠mprovisation and luck鈥� (Vries 2013: 378) or through purposeful activities, the 鈥榙evelopment state鈥� plays a crucial in promoting innovation laying the foundational elements for escaping poverty, that is, diversity, competition, and emulation (Reinert 1999; see also Vries 2013: 376). Professor Reinert argued:

[鈥 the antagonism between state and market, which has characterised the twentieth century, is a relatively new phenomenon. Since the Renaissance one very important task of the state has been to create well-functioning markets by providing a legal framework, standards, credit, physical infrastructure and 鈥� if necessary 鈥� to function temporarily as an entrepreneur of last resort. Early economists were acutely aware that national markets did not occur spontaneously, and they used 鈥渕odern鈥� ideas like synergies, increasing returns, and innovation theory when arguing for the right kind of government policy (Reinert 1999: 268).

Table 2: The relationship between the state and market

The single line and question mark indicate a non-causal relationship. Double arrow line indicates a co-evolution process. The single line and question mark indicate a non-causal relationship.

The importance of the development state and the mutual relationship between state and market are reflected in China鈥檚 development policy. For example, Wen Jiabao (the sixth Premier of the State Council of the PRC 2003-2013) made a speech at the World Bank Global Poverty Alleviation Conference on 26 May 2004, emphasising:

[China should] continue 鈥渄evelopment-oriented poverty deduction鈥� and enhance the capacity of the poor to escape poverty and become rich [鈥 [We should] adhere to [the policy] that the state plays the leading role, make full use of market mechanisms, and improve the level of self-accumulation and self-development in poor areas by improving infrastructure construction, adjusting economic structure, and developing local resources.

Since how to develop is the central issue or problem of China鈥檚 escape from poverty in China鈥檚 national policy, it has become a key contemporary research topic. A quick search via the National Library of China using key words such as 鈥榩overty traps in China鈥� and 鈥榚scaping poverty traps鈥� gives at least hundreds of research outputs. Every scholar who studies poverty alleviation in China or China鈥檚 escape from poverty would like to give their own answers. I think whether China will continue its past success to develop depends on two key issues: first, whether it continues expanding the 鈥榤arket鈥� to allow exploring, testing and experimenting with different ideas and policies; second, whether the state will continue to promote diversity, competition, and emulation. This will be the subject of my next blog posts.

References

Banerjee, Abhijit and Duflo, Esther (2011) Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to Fight Global Poverty. Public Affairs.

Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council (1984) 鈥楴otice on Helping Impoverished Areas As Soon As Possible (Guanyu bangzhu pinkun diqu jinkuai gaibian mianmao de tongzhi), the Gazette of the State Council of the People鈥檚 Republic of China, 1984,No. 25.

Chang, Ha-Joon (2002) Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective. Anthem Press.

Elliott, John E. (2012) 鈥業ntroduction鈥� to Joseph Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle, 16^th edn. Transaction Publishers, vii-lix.

Hubbard, R. Glenn and Duggan, William (2009) The Aid Trap: Hard Truths About Ending Poverty. Columbia Business School Publishing.

Landes, S. David (1998) The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor. W. W. Norton & Company.

Moyo, Dambisa (2009) Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa. Farrar, Straus & Giroux.

Reinert, Erik S. (1999) 鈥楾he Role of the State in Economic Growth鈥�, 26 Journal of Economic Studies 4/5: 268-326.

Reinert, Erik S. (2000) 鈥楰arl B眉cher and the Geographical Dimensions of Techno-Economic Change: Production-Based Economic Theory and the Stages of Economic Development鈥� in J眉rgen Backhaus (ed), Karl B眉cher: Theory-History-Anthropology-Non Market Economies. Metropolis-Verlag, 177鈥�222.

Reinert, Erik. S. (2006) 鈥業nstitutionalism Ancient, Old and New: A Historical Perspective on Institutions and Uneven Development鈥�, UNU-WIDER (World Institute for Development Economics Research), Research Paper No. 2006/77.

Reinert, Erik S. (2007) How Rich Countries Got Rich…and Why Poor Countries Stay Poor. Carroll & Graf Publishers.

Reinert, Erik S. (2009) 鈥楾he Terrible Simplifiers: Common Origins of Financial Crises and Persistent Poverty in Economic Theory and the New 鈥�1848 Movement鈥�, DESA Working Paper No. 88.

Reinert, Erik S. & Xu Ting (2013). 鈥樷��,&苍产蝉辫;the Uno Newsletter Working Paper Series, 2(13), 1-21.

Schumpeter, Joseph (1934/2012) The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle (16^th ed). Transaction Publishers.

Schumpeter, Joseph (1943/2010) Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. London and New York: Routledge.

Serra, Antonio (1613), A Short Treatise on the Wealth and Poverty of Nations, edited by Sophus A. Reinert. Anthem, 2009.

Vries, Peer (2013) Escaping Poverty: The Origins of Modern Economic Growth. V&R unipress GmbH.

Wen Jiabao (2014) at the World Bank Global Poverty Alleviation Conference on 26 May 2004.

World Bank (2002) . Oxford University Press.

Ting Xu is Professor of Law at the School of Law, University of Essex. Her research focuses on comparative property law; Chinese law; law, governance and development; and political economy. She tweets at .

Photo by