More expansionary fiscal and monetary policies听are needed to meet the Sustainable Development Goals

This month, the international community will gather at the United Nations in New York to review progress on the implementation of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that are intended to reduce poverty, hunger and economic inequality and promote development, particularly in developing countries. But only one of the SDGs, #17, says anything about how to finance all the efforts. While SDG 17 calls for more international cooperation and foreign aid, it only suggests that developing countries strengthen domestic resource mobilization (DRM) by improving their tax collection and curtailing illicit financial flows, etc.

While important, this approach neglects much bigger problems with the prevailing set of macroeconomic policies that hamper the ability of developing countries to increase public investment, employment and scale-up the long-term investments in the underlying health and education infrastructure needed to achieve the SDGs. The policy framework used in many developing countries is characterized by an overly restrictive low-inflation target achieved by using high interest rates and backed up by strict inflation targeting regimes at independent central banks.

These prevailing policies place major constraints on the ability of countries to mobilize more domestic resources, thus present a major obstacle to achieving SDG 17. The problematic nature of the policies was underscored in a 2017 joint publication by the听听which called on countries to adopt 鈥渁 more accommodating macroeconomic framework.鈥� This would entail lowering interest rates and allowing governments to use 鈥渉igher budget deficit paths and/or higher levels of inflation without jeopardizing macroeconomic stability鈥� in ways that could enable increased public investment. But doing so would bump up against the prevailing conservative policy orthodoxy as practiced by most central banks and finance ministries around the world and enforced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) through its loan conditions and policy advice to developing countries.

The IMF insists the policies are needed to first ensure 鈥渕acroeconomic stability鈥� before other goals like the SDGs can be pursued. But there is concern that the IMF鈥檚 definition of macroeconomic stability is too restrictive. While policies have been successful at reducing inflation in developing countries, they tend to suppress aggregate demand and make it difficult for governments to generate higher GDP growth and employment. Most importantly, they undermine the ability of countries to engage in deficit spending needed to significantly increase public investment for long-term development. To achieve and maintain low inflation, the IMF typically advises central banks of developing countries to raise the interest rate at which they lend to other banks to between 15 and 25 percent or higher, which can quickly make any deficit financing by governments unaffordable. The net effect is to constrain governments鈥� ability to increase long-term public investment as a percent of GDP in key听. The deficit reduction policies reduce resources available for long-term capital expenditure and instead often lead to layoffs, hiring freezes and public sector wage caps, which tend to听听the basic functioning of government over time. In other words, today鈥檚 advocates of the SDGs have a 鈥渕onetarism problem鈥�.

The prevailing orthodoxy is monetarism, a school of thought in economics which came to听听with the Reagan/Thatcher revolution of the 1980s and that proposes that the size of the money supply in an economy is the key factor to control for reducing inflation and managing economic cycles. Although their central theory about a link between the money supply and nominal GDP rates was disproven over time, monetarists still influence contemporary policy: primarily, the prioritization of low inflation over other goals and use of high interest rates as the key policy tool to lower inflation.

The ILO, UNICEF and UN Women report called for a 鈥渕ore accommodating macroeconomic framework,鈥� in which more expansionary policy options are considered by developing countries. These听听allowing for higher budget deficit paths and/or permitting higher levels of inflation. While annual inflation rates above 20 percent are certainly a problem, the historical record on the听听shows that countries were able to maintain moderate levels of inflation 鈥� between 10-20 percent 鈥� for long periods without jeopardizing macroeconomic stability. This stands in stark contrast today鈥檚 prevailing monetarist orthodoxy that prioritizes inflation at 5 percent or lower for developing countries.

Monetarist policies have been broadly criticized for slowing potentially higher GDP growth rates and undermining the ability of countries to scale-up long-term investment in public health, education, and infrastructure. Important听听have been issued about how IMF policies 鈥渙verly concerned with macroeconomic stability鈥� may be too austere, lowering economic growth from its optimal level and 鈥溙齪rogress on poverty reduction.鈥�

While the academic literature on the impacts of IMF programs on economic growth is mixed, there is considerable听听that IMF听听is correlated with听听, and negative听听on听听and听(the IMF opposes听). There are also concerns about the disproportionately negative economic听, and how the policies听governments鈥櫶齮o fulfil economic and social听.

But听听the criticisms, the IMF is听听conditioning loans and advising developing countries to adopt overly restrictive fiscal and monetary policies. This situation presents a challenge for advocates of the SDGs who want countries to do more than just increase tax collections.

There is much more that developing country governments could do on DRM. In addition to a 鈥渕ore accommodating macroeconomic framework,鈥� advocates of more progressive approaches to DRM are calling for听听the critical role of听, and in particular,听. Despite the projected trillions of dollars needed to meet the SDGs, there is听听that 鈥渢raditional鈥� public funding sources cannot fill the gap. Central banks, too, have historically played听听roles in policies designed to achieve national development听听that should be听. Others听听the IMF could听听to better support countries鈥� efforts to achieve the SDGs 鈥� but doing so is likely to require political pressure by civil society advocates.

But expanding the tool box will require challenging the dominant orthodoxy on macroeconomic policy and exploring听heterodox听approaches that offer options for increasing public investment. With more expansionary policies, developing countries could increase GDP growth, employment and long-term public investment while improving听. Advocates for the SDGs can start by insisting that the entire range of macroeconomic policy options is fully explored and opened to a broader and more inclusive public debate.

Rick Rowden recently completed his PhD in Economic Studies and Planning from Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) in New Delhi.

This essay was first published on the听.听

Is philanthrocapitalism a vehicle for so-called 鈥渄evelopment鈥�? In an article recently released in Globalizations (), Juanjo Mediavilla (University of Valladolid, Spain) and I analysed the phenomenon of philanthrocapitalism as a financing for development (FfD) instrument from the perspective of Critical Development Studies and Discourse Theory. We argue that we are witnessing the deepening of a neoliberal development agenda, where philanthrocapitalism and the elites play a key role.

Reinforcing a neoliberal development agenda鈥�

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (the 2030 Agenda) constitutes the institutional framework in which international development will be unfolding in the coming years. It is often presented as the expression of a complex, universal and holistic vision of development, profoundly inclusive (鈥�leaving no one behind鈥�), agreed upon after an open and horizontal negotiation process, and capable of making development and environmental sustainability compatible.

Without denying some of the progress made with the 2030 Agenda, critical academic literature has been de-constructing this candid vision of it, showing that the Agenda is the result of a process of technification and de-politization of development (), which aims to present the neoliberal perspective of development as the only possible one. Also, being solidly anchored in a market episteme (), it constitutes one more step towards the commodification, privatization and deep marketization process of development (), and contributes in different ways to the reinforcement of a neoliberal development agenda (see for a collection of papers).

In addition, there is the limited possibility of fulfilling the objectives within the Agenda (e.g. end poverty in all its forms everywhere), the resounding absence of other options and approaches to 鈥渄evelopment鈥�, the incompatibility between several of the goals and targets, the lack of progress we have seen in the first few years of the Agenda, or the absence of an explanation based on evidence of how the Agenda will unify this form of development with environmental sustainability.

鈥� and a privatized and financialized FfD system

In this process of constructing and consolidating the neoliberal agenda, the financing model that accompanies the 2030 Agenda, mainly the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA), plays a key role.

Critical development literature () has shown that without a stable and predictable funding system, which generates sufficient resources and adopts a 鈥榟olistic approach鈥� to the issue, it is not possible to establish a fair, coherent and effective development model capable of providing well-being for all and, simultaneously, of addressing the civilizing crisis which, in ecological and socio-metabolic terms, our planet confronts.

In contrast, the AAAA promotes a neoliberal and financialized FfD system in (almost) all possible ways. For example, it does not introduce effective measures against illicit capital flows or the functioning of tax havens; nor does it critically analyse the actual impact of the dysfunctional financial liberalization process on developing economies; nor does it propose solutions to the tax competition process that hinders the real possibility of establishing optimal, efficient and fair tax systems 鈥攁lso in developing economies; nor does it suggest sound measures to reform the global financial architecture or to achieve international fiscal coordination.

What it does achieve is to boost the generation of funds of a neo-extractive nature, private and public-private financing instruments, and a process of 鈥�center/periphery financialization鈥� (), which has had important consequences for the Global South (), for example, with the role given to international finance (blended finance, green bonds), to public-private partnerships (PPPs) and their more than dubious results in terms of development (), or to 鈥榝inancial inclusion鈥� and its consequences in terms of financialization ().

Philanthrocapitalists鈥� place in the 2030 Agenda

Within the framework of neoliberal capitalism, ‘philanthropy’ loses the sense of giving altruistically (if it ever had it) and reconfigures itself as a hybrid concept in which it is understood as ‘investment’, transmuting itself into ‘philanthrocapitalism’, and converting self-proclaimed ‘philanthropic foundations’ into authentic ‘philanthrocapitalist institutions’.

The 2030 Agenda has created spaces for these philanthrocapitalist institutions to play an active role in financing development. Thereby, philanthrocapitalism has not only been legitimized as a financing tool but its role has been expanded with the neoliberalization of international development. As philanthrocapitalism reinforces the dialectical relationship between those who “aid” and those “aided”, it becomes an instrument to achieve ethical leadership () and moral and cultural hegemony, promoting a situation of supremacy and domination that implies giving more power of decision and control to the richest, in the simple logic that they are the ones that own the capital ().

In our work we analyse the context and the inherent concept of development generated from the discourses of a set of philanthrocapitalist institutions and international organizations, in which philanthrocapitalism stands as a key element of the financing for development system.

Philanthrocapitalism as a 鈥�neoliberal development artefact鈥�. Plutocracy and hegemony

Under the surface of a seemingly well-intentioned discourse, philanthrocapitalist institutions and international organizations play a hegemonic role in the field of financing for development, derived from their ability to control the agenda, generate dominant discourses, and promote a univocal vision of international development. As a result, philanthrocapitalism becomes a neoliberal artefact of control and political, social and cultural hegemony.

The consequences are predictable, both in developed and developing countries: fetishism of the ‘private’, loss of legitimacy of states, political decisions based on ‘entrepreneurial’ and individualist approaches, hegemony of the rich, a plutocratic drift, and so on.

Jorge Garcia-Arias is an Associate Professor at the Department of Economics, University of Leon, Spain, and a Research Associate at the Department of Development Studies at SOAS, University of London, Uk.

REFERENCES

Bortz, P. & Kaltenbrunner, A. (2018). The international dimension of financialization in developing and emerging economies. Development and Change, 49(2): 375-393.

Carroll, T & Jarvis, D. (2015). The new politics of development: Citizens, civil society, and the evolution of neoliberal development policy. Globalizations, 12(3): 281-304.

Gabay, C., & Ilcan, S. (2017). Leaving no-one behind? The politics of destination in the 2030 sustainable development goals. Globalizations, 14(3): 337鈥�342.

Gabor, D. & Brooks, S. (2017). The digital revolution in financial inclusion: international development in the fintech era. New Political Economy, 22(4): 423-436.

Garcia-Arias, J. (2013). The systemic approach to international financing for development and the need for a World Tax and Financial Organization. European Journal of Development Research, 25(1): 60鈥�77.

Garcia-Arias, J. (2015). International financialization and the systemic approach to international financing for development. Global Policy, 6(1): 24-33.

Languille, S. (2017). Public Private Partnerships in education and health in the global South: a literature review. Journal of International and Comparative Social Policy, 33(2): 142-165.

Liu, H. & Baker, C. (2016). Ordinary aristocrats. The discursive construction of philanthropists as ethical leaders. Journal of Business Ethics, 133(2): 261-277.

Mediavilla, J. & Garcia-Arias, J. (2019). Philanthrocapitalism as a Neoliberal (Development Agenda) artefact: philanthropic discourse and hegemony in (铿乶ancing for) international development. Globalizations, DOI:

Thorup, M. (2013). Pro Bono? On philanthrocapitalism as ideological answer to inequality. Ephemera: Theory & Politics in Organization, 13(3): 555-576.

Weber, H. (2017). Politics of 鈥榣eaving no one behind鈥�: Contesting the 2030 sustainable development goals agenda. Globalizations, 14(3): 399鈥�414.

Why (not) population?

It is fairly obvious that population matters for sustainability. The more people we are, the more resources we use. The human population grew at an astounding pace in the 20^thcentury, and even though the growth has slowed down considerably, the latest UN estimates suggest we are likely to reach听. Most of the growth will take place in so-called developing countries. While fertility rates are steadily declining, more children survive and people live longer thanks to advances in medicine and improvements in living standards.

No matter what we do, the global population will continue increasing for decades. What is called the听听means that due to higher survival rates and high fertility levels in the past, there will be more births in the decades to come. Fertility rates are lower, but there are more women giving birth. So, if we were to put population at the centre of the sustainable development agenda, how would we deal with population growth?

Population control has a dark history, and has tended to be strongly jolted against less privileged segments of societies, often also with racist twists. The sterilization programmes in, for example, India and Singapore come to mind, but history includes countless other examples. Another approach has been the strict population policies of authoritarian countries, such as China鈥檚 one-child policy and Vietnam鈥檚 鈥榦ne or two children鈥� policy. They have surely been effective, although with a host of negative consequences.

What all examples of population control seem to have in common, is that they have either led to violence against marginalized groups or to significant demographic challenges (or both). China is now听, something Singapore has been doing for a long time already through their听. Such efforts are common around the world. Affluent countries are in general struggling with low fertility rates and hence fear an age boom unsustainable for state budgets and national welfare programmes. The UN Population Fund in its听听finds that 33% of governments in more developed countries consider fertility rates to be too low and are trying to increase them. In most rich countries, immigration is strictly necessary in order to keep the economy running.

Reproductive rights, including family planning and access to contraceptives should be public health priorities in every society. Limiting population growth also has听. And we know how to do it. The single most efficient way of dealing with population growth is to improve women鈥檚 rights and听. Although the relationship is often complex, in general, higher living standards are closely related to couples getting fewer children. No rich country has听.

To put it crudely, when we consume more we have fewer children. But the few who consume a lot are worse for global sustainability than the many who consume little.

Consumption as key to sustainability

From a global sustainability point of view, what matters is how much resources we use. It seems many people in rich countries find booming populations in poor countries terrifying, but as long as these people consume only a fraction of the resources of an affluent consumer, they are not the main challenge for global sustainability.

The world鈥檚 richest听听As climate scientist听, 鈥渢he responsibility for global emissions is heavily skewed towards the lifestyles of a relatively few high emitters鈥�. Although more people will consume more resources, it seems obvious that the most urgent issue is to deal with those who consume the most.

As part of the indicators for Sustainable Development Goal 12 on sustainable production and consumption, the material footprint has been introduced听听鈥渢he total amount of raw materials extracted globally鈥攁cross the entire supply chain鈥攖o meet that economy鈥檚 final consumption demand鈥�. The latest听听finds that 鈥渇or all types of materials, developed countries have at least double the per-capita footprint of developing countries鈥� and that 鈥渢he material footprint for fossil fuels is more than four times higher for developed than developing countries鈥�. These are averages, the difference between the poorest and the richest countries is much larger, and that between the richest and the poorest people enormous.

Or take the听, which also includes the land and water needed for dealing with our waste. The听听per capita of 8,4, close to five times higher than the estimated available biocapacity听 per person on earth (1,7). At the other end of the ranking, Eritrea鈥檚 per capita听 ecological footprint is at 0,5. In other words, the poorest countries can add quite few people to the earth and still make a considerably smaller impact than the richest countries.

Elephants in the room

So the population elephant has left the room. Has the consumption elephant entered it? Yes, but that claim requires some clarification. Consumption is hardly ignored. Criticizing overconsumption is an everyday activity among environmentalists and critical scholars alike, and the issue tend to get quite some media coverage, particularly at times surrounding big consumption bonanzas, like Christmas or the most recent American export, Black Friday.

But it is an elephant in the sense that the high consumption society is simultaneously a benchmark for measuring development success and at the very core of unsustainable development. And governments do not do anything about overconsumption, apart from every now and then encouraging consumers to go green. In this way, responsibility is shifted towards consumers, although we know from research听. The reasons are of course quite simple. Limiting consumption could prove highly unpopular among voters and could be very bad news for the economy.

The SDGs are another good example of our inability or unwillingness to deal with consumption. While sustainable production and consumption received its one SDG, there are听听beyond limiting food waste. Instead, focus is on reducing waste, encouraging sustainable practices and spreading information about more sustainable consumption patterns in the hope that consumers will make the right choice. Again, practically everything we know about the drivers of consumption suggests this will not be enough.

Consumption patterns are extremely uneven both within and between countries, and they are problematic in different ways. For example, while听, for the first time in history there are听. And while the richest among us consume obscene amounts of energy, still听.

The听. Blaming the underconsuming many for the failures of the sustainable development agenda means to avoid taking responsibility for our unsustainable consumption patterns.

Population matters

Of course population matters. And population issues need to be addressed, with particular focus on reproductive rights, gender equality and increasing the living standards of the world鈥檚 poorest people.

But the poor are still not to blame for the dire situation the earth is in. All the talk about population misses the most crucial part of the picture. Instead we should start really taking consumption seriously. Not mainly as a question of individual responsibility, but as questions of inequality, distribution and societal responsibility. As the听听(thanks to both increases in income and population), in turn considerably increasing the global demand for resources, these issues are more urgent than ever.

A wide range of consumption patterns need to come under closer scrutiny, but we know very well where we should start. The听听all belong to typical affluent consumption patterns: too much meat, too many polluting cars, too many plane trips, too much electricity, too much stuff.

Arve Hansen听is a Postdoctoral Fellow at Centre for Development and the Environment, University of Oslo.听.

This post was first published on the听听at听

The theme of the 2018 World Economic Forum was, 鈥淐reating a Shared Future in a Fractured World.鈥� Its six richest attendees each boasted an estimated net worth of, or the same amount as the total burden of Somalia鈥檚 outstanding debt, which, amid the splendor of the event, Somali Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khayre to discuss . In this era of extreme global inequality, it is estimated that the United Nations agenda of seventeen sustainable development goals (SDGs) known as, will require of investment per year to be realized, or more than twice the amount expected to be available from traditional official development assistance (ODA) alone. Due to the increasing concentration of private wealth in the global economy, discussions around development finance have focused on private sector engagement, rather than more traditional, ODA from predominantly Western donor governments and multilateral institutions.

Blended finance and the SDGs

The Blended Finance Task Force released its report , heralding the momentum building around a new framework to shift trillions of dollars in private capital into 鈥渂lended finance鈥� mechanisms to fund international development. According to the report, blended finance offers a means 鈥渢o de-risk SDG-related investments (into things like sustainable infrastructure, healthcare, education and sustainable land use) in order to attract commercial capital from private investors who would otherwise not have participated.鈥� What does this latest example of a policy framework introduced at the glitzy Davos event mean for development?

The topic of blended finance has made its way through the discussion circuit for several years. At the international Financing for Development Conference held in Addis Ababa in 2015, the OECD showcased 鈥渂lended finance鈥� as a new way to engage private capital to leverage financing for sustainable development projects. Simultaneously, OECD member states blocked to create an international regulatory tax body, ensuring that international tax policy remain 鈥渢he domain of the powerful.鈥� In one, at least $1.1 trillion in illicit funds flow out of developing countries every year. Information gleaned from data leaks such as the and have offered some insight into the vast world of illicit capital, controlled by elites (some who are regular attendees at Davos) beyond the scope of regulation. At the 2015 financing conference, an organized civil society contingent to its outcome document, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, that 鈥渨ithout a parallel recognition of the developmental role of the State and clear safeguards to its ability to regulate in the public interest, there is a great risk that the private sector undermines rather than supports sustainable development.鈥�

An official created by OECD reports 鈥渢he good news鈥� that private capital flows to emerging and frontier markets [those belonging to counties that appear on an official list of 鈥渇ragile鈥� states] are already growing: foreign direct investment (FDI) from private investors more than doubled between 2004 and 2014, from under $400 billion to over $1.1 trillion annually.鈥� 听In other words, the total of private capital flowing into these markets is estimated to equal from developing countries. It is in this context that the discussion of public-private partnerships in development finance has emphasized , a goal in the targeting of blended finance in sub-Saharan Africa, where forty percent of all blended finance transactions have taken place as of 2017. The OECD that blended finance could attract 鈥�1.5 times the aggregate financing provided by all international financial institutions to ODA-eligible countries.鈥�

The Role of the State

There is evidence to suggest that private capital injections as a vehicle for development will amplify already existing gaps in resource distribution. , which represents a group of states deemed 鈥渇ragile鈥� by the international community, has shown that prioritizing fiduciary risk over development outcomes contributes to the fragmented, project-oriented approach that is the norm in development. In cases where funds have been channeled through national systems, rather than parallel structures, development outcomes have been more broadly achieved. Despite this, that from 1997-2006, only 16 percent of World Bank post-conflict development funds were disbursed through governments, and between 2004-2006, in World Bank designated 鈥淟ow Income Countries Under Stress, only 25 percent of aid flowed through governments. Private sector approaches emphasizing protection of private investors would likely follow the same trajectory.

Moreover, it is estimated that one third of global aid is currently spent on , a spending area that is prioritized in public-private partnerships, despite the fact that much of these funds directly return to the developed world as salaries. Since gaining momentum as a modality for development finance, concern has also grown that public-private partnerships by competing with other health programs and prioritizing private interests in the delivery of health services.

Davos Men as Multi-stakeholders

German economist and engineer Klaus Schwab inaugurated an annual meeting of European business leaders at the European Management Forum in 1971, which has later become known as the World Economic Forum. The annual meetings held almost immediate significance for international organizations and national governments. In 1972, the first state leader to be invited, Luxemburg President Pierre Werner, presented a plan for a single European currency and Monetary Union. Participants soon agreed to a Davos 鈥淐ode of Ethics,鈥� based on business management principles of 鈥渕ulti-stakeholder engagement,鈥� a concept that takes into account the views and impacts on society at large (stakeholders and shareholders) of management decisions. As the forum grew in membership and notoriety, it expanded its purpose from 鈥渁n independent, self-financing, not-for-profit Foundation, aligned with the strategic needs of the top decision-makers of European business鈥�[1] to include the interests of business and world leaders across the globe.

Klaus Schwab has remained committed to the project of globalization in all its aspects through the decades. Between 1977-1987, the forum established a partnership with the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, received official sponsorship from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and updated its name to the World Economic Forum to reflect its growth in outreach. Discussions among trade ministers at Davos eventually led to establishment of the World Trade Organization in 1995.[2] When anti-globalization movements took shape around the world in the 1990s, Schwab connected 鈥渢he rise of a new brand of populist politicians鈥� in industrial democracies with of 鈥渉elplessness and anxiety鈥�. Yet, eight months prior to the collapse of global markets, in January of 2008, Schwab expounded upon the 鈥�,鈥� and corresponding influence of 鈥渃orporate governance, corporate philanthropy, corporate social responsibility, corporate social entrepreneurship, and corporate citizenship,鈥� in global society.

The World Economic Forum鈥檚 multi-stakeholder approach considers the impacts of business on societies, but places onus on corporate entities to design strategies that benefit all stakeholders when 鈥渞ule of law is weak and what is acceptable may not be clear.鈥� After the 2008 crash, Schwab decried 鈥渂onuses and other systems that link the management to the short-term interest of the shareholders.鈥�[3] For better or worse, the multi-stakeholder concept has become fundamental to international development.

As shown in Klaus Schwab’s book “Modern Enterprise Management in Mechanical Engineering”, the company is at the center, surrounded by its stakeholders.

In 2008, future Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart explored the menagerie of philanthropic, governmental, and international interests occupying parallel spaces throughout the developing world in their book Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World. In it, they paint a picture of international bureaucrats toiling in developing country offices, 鈥減reoccupied with the latest intellectual fashions and initiatives at their faraway headquarters,鈥� while 鈥渕anaging hundreds of disparate projects that can never compose an organized developmental vision.鈥� Ghani and Lockhart refer to the material difference between the experiences of international and national staff as a 鈥渟overeignty gap,鈥� and blame its persistence in many countries on corruption鈥攆ed by the non-disclosure of contractual arrangements for the extraction of minerals and other resources, the pooling of resource rents to offshore accounts, and impacts of frequent banking crises, while government officials lead lives of 鈥渃onspicuous consumption.鈥�

鈥淭hough living in the same country, the two bureaucracies鈥攐ne international and well-funded from abroad, one national and almost always starved for funds鈥攁re conceptually (and in terms of available resources) miles apart and therefore rarely interact meaningfully.鈥� – Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart

Ghani and Lockhart refer to an annual ritual of global elites that is analogous to Davos, that of attending the annual meetings of the UNGA in New York, and meetings of the IMF and World Bank in Washington DC. These journeys represent 鈥渞ituals of sovereignty,鈥� social acts through which world leaders exercise their de jure right to participate in the international organizations of which they are constituents. Formal debates in these organizations might begin as informal discussions at the annual meeting in Davos, or its many regional meetings. The World Economic Forum, originally conceived in alignment with 鈥渨ith the strategic needs of the top decision-makers of European business,鈥� has morphed into 鈥渁 multi-stakeholder platform for global affairs,鈥� and finally, into 鈥渢he International Organization for Public-Private Cooperation.鈥� As the terms of this cooperation are increasingly negotiated outside of formal structures, it is clear that in developing countries, a multitude of stakeholders will share the future.

Where is John Galt? At Davos.

Notes

[1] World Economic Forum. “A Partner in Shaping History: The First Forty Years 1971-2010”, 2010, p. 21

[2] Ibid. p. 50

[3] World Economic Forum. “A Partner in Shaping History: The First Forty Years 1971-2010”, 2010, p. 239

Rose Worden is a Research Consultant. .

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By Ingrid Harvold Kvangraven

Last week, the 鈥淪ustainable Development Goals鈥� (SDGs) were launched at the UN in New York. This is the outcome of two years of consultations, lobbying, and debate about what the should look like. The assumption has been that the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were a huge success and that we, therefore, must proceed with a new round. Unfortunately, this assumption is not backed by empirical evidence.

While the SDG debates have been raging, New School and I have been asking ourselves why goals should be adopted at all. What function, if any, might they serve, and under what conditions could they do so successfully? Quite striking is the fact that听 systematic efforts to answer these seemingly elementary questions have been absent.

Based on our answers to these questions, we find serious inadequacies in the contemporary approach to development goals and relate these to weaknesses in how the goals were conceived and formulated. However, we do find that despite the weaknesses of the SDG framework, higher-level goals may play a useful role if the approach to them is embedded in a holistic and integrated vision of a better world. In fact, the goals in the SDG framework incorporate a marked move away from the basic needs approach of the MDGs, towards a stronger focus on structural issues. Generally, the SDGs place a greater emphasis on environmental, economic, and social sustainability than the MDGs did, making the SDGs more transformative and potentially less depoliticizing than the MDGs.

However, the SDG framework fails to pay attention to the dynamics of development and the constraints faced by many developing economies. It also fails to give attention to the question of how wealth and power is produced and reproduced in the global economic system or within national economies. In effect, the view of poverty within the SDG framework appears to be one that abstracts from economic processes and systemic features that determine national growth prospects or individual circumstances. Thus, while the goals could potentially be transformative, the specific targets suggest an eviscerated causal analysis that shies away from challenging, or even identifying, the wider range of economic structures that may systematically favor the wealthy and even impoverish the poor.

Finally, with 169 highly specific targets, the SDGs appear too specific to fit into a global framework that could also claim to accommodate contextual conditions. We therefore argue that focusing on the set of 17 goals, rather than the 169 targets, would open up much needed space for flexibility, innovation, and fuller democratic accountability.

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This blog post was originally published on the (September 28, 2015).