Category: International Political Economy

Whose Polycrisis?

Farwa Sial10 Comments

鈥榠f God the Father had created things by naming them, Elstir recreated them by removing their names, or by giving them another name鈥�.

Marcel Proust (II, 566)

An emerging consensus originated in the US has declared 2022 as the year of the , with a view to marking the beginning of an era of turbulence and unrest in the global economy.  Under this conceptualisation, recent events including the Covid-19 pandemic, climate change catastrophes, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the rise in energy and food prices are generally postulated as separate crises, which can have an effect on each other but nevertheless have separate origins.  This centrifugal analysis of events predicates on the decline of the uni-polar world order, as well as acknowledging the emergent structural weaknesses in the traditional western powers; all of which can be loosely interpreted as occurring in a period during which power is dispersing and perhaps as a consequence of this dispersion, the current drivers of crisis have multiplied, leading to a multitude of crises, in contrast to preceding historical instances.

In spite of the current use of the term, the origins of the Polycrisis date further and can be more contextualised. However, there is no doubt that it has now become an important neologism for conventional western media and policy institutes, especially adopted by Bretton Woods Institutions, as well as other leading investors.

Civil society has also used this term as a neat summary, however, theirs is a critical response and is not interchangeable with how powerful International Financial Institutions (IFIs), policy think-tanks and investors use the term.  In this sense, the instrumentalisation of this neologism, seems to have more value than its meaning, with the discernible possibility that any perceived political mileage of the Polycrisis, is a complete transformation away from its intellectual roots. Nonetheless, as an artefact, the intellectual roots and the political role of the Polycrisis merits an integrated analysis beyond its instrumentalisation. 

A remarkable feature of liberal thought is the tendency towards identification of social phenomena through the selective elevation of their key distinguishing features, which are abstract enough to form 鈥榮ystems鈥� and neutral enough to subsume the inherent contradictions of capitalist development. Pandemics, climate breakdown, wars and global deflationary pressures are not mere externalities of the capitalist system but intrinsic to its operations- long predicted by a diverse group of thinkers. That these events converge in time is a political outcome, subject to planetary limits, not abstract systemisation, as the Polycrisis seems to imply.  

Critical responses to the Polycrisis have pointed towards its disregard in accounting for the long and sustained crisis of the capitalist world order and a resort towards 鈥樷�� to conceptualise things as they appear to be,  rather than questioning what is occurring beneath mere appearances. Prima-facie accounts often seek to capture the zeitgeist in the endeavour to simplify things. However, there is a need to differentiate between simplification and reductionism. As a concept, the Polycrisis is simultaneously all-encompassing as well as abstract.

In an attempt to grasp both these aspects, this short blog starts with a focus on three messages of the Polycrisis: a) the qualitative nature of change, b) the drivers or causes of crises and c) the role of Bretton Woods Institutions in adopting the concept. In addition, the blog proposes an alternative way of understanding the contemporary crisis, which hinges on the decline of the western capitalist model, followed by some thoughts on multipolarity and geopolitics. 

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Debating 鈥楽tate Capitalism鈥� in Turkey: Beyond False Dichotomies

mehmetermanerol3 Comments

Following the 2016 failed coup attempt, and in the context of increasing mistrust towards the West, Turkey鈥檚 president Erdogan reflected his discontent with the EU and argued that , namely the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) led primarily by China and Russia. Soon after, despite being a NATO member, to buy the S-400 air defence missile system. Taken together with Turkey鈥檚 other 鈥榓dventures鈥� in its region, these developments were perceived as manifestations of a changing political economy of Turkey, and were deeply disturbing to Western powers. After all, since the end of the Second World War, Turkey had been a close ally of the US-led Western capitalist bloc, it continued to be one during the Cold War; and had remained very close to US and EU interests following the end of the Cold War in 1991.

For some accounts[i], these developments are related to the changing world order and global power shifts following the 2008 crisis, as the decline of the 鈥榣iberal international order鈥� and the rise of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) marked transformations of the global political economy. Hence, there is a tendency to explain Turkey鈥檚 late political economy in this context. It is argued that, in this 鈥榩ost-liberal international order鈥� where two competing political economies come to the fore, Turkey is moving towards the 鈥楨ast鈥� or 鈥榥on-West鈥� – mainly China and Russia. As such, Turkey鈥檚 engagement with non-Western 鈥榞reat powers鈥� (which are generally characterised by 鈥榓uthoritarian state capitalism鈥� as opposed to the 鈥榥eoliberal political economy鈥�/liberal democracy/鈥檇emocratic capitalism鈥� of the West), shapes Turkey鈥檚 political economy and paves the way for 鈥榓uthoritarianism鈥�, 鈥榠lliberal democracy鈥� and 鈥榮tate capitalism鈥�. Put differently, as the legitimacy crisis of 鈥榃estern neoliberalism鈥� makes it less desirable for countries like Turkey, Turkey is regarded to have deviated from neoliberalism and liberal democracy and moved to state capitalism and authoritarianism.

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Advocates of the SDGs have a monetarism problem

RRowden2 Comments

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UN Secretariat Headquarters, New York. .

More expansionary fiscal and monetary policies聽are needed to meet the Sustainable Development Goals

This month, the international community will gather at the United Nations in New York to review progress on the implementation of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that are intended to reduce poverty, hunger and economic inequality and promote development, particularly in developing countries. But only one of the SDGs, #17, says anything about how to finance all the efforts. While SDG 17 calls for more international cooperation and foreign aid, it only suggests that developing countries strengthen domestic resource mobilization (DRM) by improving their tax collection and curtailing illicit financial flows, etc.

While important, this approach neglects much bigger problems with the prevailing set of macroeconomic policies that hamper the ability of developing countries to increase public investment, employment and scale-up the long-term investments in the underlying health and education infrastructure needed to achieve the SDGs. The policy framework used in many developing countries is characterized by an overly restrictive low-inflation target achieved by using high interest rates and backed up by strict inflation targeting regimes at independent central banks.Read More »

Tensions in Hegemonic Stability and Global Structural Transformation

Abel B.S. Gaiya1 Comment

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In this article I argue that there is a fundamental tension characterizing the process of global development and structural change. Industrial policy is necessary for triggering structural change in the developing world. Yet such efforts put pressure on economic leaders to adjust structurally as well. Drawing from international relations theory, a hegemon is necessary to provide international public goods such as peace, which are critical for development to be possible in the first place. But this necessity gives the hegemon expansive powers over international institutions of economic governance; and this enables the hegemon to externalize the costs of adjustment associated with structural change in the developing world.Read More »

Market Power = Trade Power? Why the Strong Don鈥檛 Always Win in Trade Negotiations

pegmurrayevansLeave a comment

9781138106833

Do stronger countries always get what they want in trade negotiations? My new book – 鈥� suggests not. In it, I ask how African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries were able to extract a series of concessions from the European Union in negotiations for free trade agreements over the last two decades. In doing so, I explore the underlying reasons why power relationships in trade politics are more complex than they appear at first glance. Read More »

The World Bank Pushes Shadow Banking in the Name of Development

Daniela Gabor1 Comment

10229163274_7cb142ccf3_o.jpgLast month, central bankers and politicians around the world remembered the global financial crisis and the lessons learnt in its wake. The consensus goes at follows: we have done a great deal to reform banks and protect tax payers from their aggressive risk taking but we haven鈥檛 done enough on shadow banking. At this point, the consensus fragments. Central banks claim that they need more power to deal with systemic risks stemming from the shadows, whereas politicians worry about the moral hazards involved in future rescues of shadow banks like Lehman.

We are all the more concerned that the same authorities have been actively promoting shadow banking in the Global South. Under headings such as聽Billions to Trillions聽and the World Bank鈥檚 new聽Maximizing Finance for Development (MFD)聽agenda,听the new strategy for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals is to use shadow banking to create 鈥榠nvestable鈥� opportunities in infrastructure, water, health or education and thus attract the trillions in global institutional investment.Read More »

Trade for Human Rights as a Minimum Core Obligation

sfparrLeave a comment

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In on the Minimum Core Doctrine (MCD) John Tasioulas states:

鈥渢he essence of the concept will be taken to be the sub-set of obligations associated with socio-economic rights that must be immediately complied with in full (obligations of immediate effect)鈥� (p. 3).

He contrasts these against those obligations that require significant resources and are therefore subject to 鈥榩rogressive realization鈥�. Thus, the defining characteristic of MCD is that it differentiates obligations between those of immediate effect and those of progressive realization. And the focus is on the nature of the obligations (what the state must do when) rather than the nature of substantive rights (the condition of people鈥檚 lives).

However, the discussion about what constitutes minimum core obligations in substance focuses on the nature of rights enjoyment and a package of minimum goods and services that would be required rather than the nature of obligations. This starts with General Comment 3 that refers to 鈥榓 minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights鈥�, and to the provision of 鈥榚ssential primary health care鈥� (ICESCR quoted in Tasioulas p. 5). Further, human rights-based practice begins to specify specific types of diseases to be treated and goods and services that would be included in the minimum, as under the 鈥榮elective primary health care model鈥� adopted by UNICEF (Tasioulas p. 5).Read More »

From Addis to Davos: International Development Finance gets Conspicuous

Rose WordenLeave a comment

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The theme of the 2018 World Economic Forum was, 鈥淐reating a Shared Future in a Fractured World.鈥� Its six richest attendees each boasted an estimated net worth of, or the same amount as the total burden of Somalia鈥檚 outstanding debt, which, amid the splendor of the event, Somali Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khayre to discuss . In this era of extreme global inequality, it is estimated that the United Nations agenda of seventeen sustainable development goals (SDGs) known as, will require of investment per year to be realized, or more than twice the amount expected to be available from traditional official development assistance (ODA) alone. Due to the increasing concentration of private wealth in the global economy, discussions around development finance have focused on private sector engagement, rather than more traditional, ODA from predominantly Western donor governments and multilateral institutions.Read More »