By听Ilias Alami 补苍诲听
Recent transformations in the global economy have sparked renewed interest in the role of the state in capital accumulation. Such transformations include a 鈥榬eturn鈥 to various forms of state-led development across the global South since the early 2000s (in China, Russia, and other large emerging economies), extensive state intervention following the 2008 global financial crisis in the global North, and the multiplication of various forms of state-capital entanglements such as sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) and state-owned enterprises (SOEs). For instance, the number of SWFs increased from 50 to 92 between 2005 and 2017, while assets under management grew to over $7.5 trillion worth of assets, which is more than hedge funds and private equity firms听. According to a recent听, 鈥楽OEs generate approximately one tenth of world gross domestic product and represent approximately 20% of global equity market value鈥. SOEs now dwarf even the largest privately-owned transnational corporations, with PetroChina currently leading the list with a market value of more than $1 trillion. Three of the top five companies in the 2018 Fortune Global 500 are Chinese SOEs (State Grid, Sinopec Group, and China National Petroleum Corp). Significantly, these state-capital hybrids have also become increasingly integrated into transnational circuits of capital, including global networks of production, trade, finance, infrastructure and corporate ownership. Does this renewed state activism 鈥 and its remarkably outward orientation 鈥 indicate a changing role of the state in capital accumulation and the emergence of new political geographies of capital?Read More »