In a compelling new contribution in the journal Development and Change, a political economy collective led by builds a strong case against calls to 鈥渦niversalize鈥 Development Studies shifting the focus from 鈥淚nternational鈥 to 鈥淕lobal鈥 Development. Indeed, many such calls at universalization 鈥 at least in the two influential 鈥減andemic papers鈥 the collective thoroughly revises, one is main-authored by and the other by 鈥 are misguided. As convincingly argued by the collective, these calls tone down the structural historical nature of the Global North-Global South divide; they erase development paradigms and understandings from the Global South and trivialize the nature of challenges emerging from long histories of colonialization and plunder, which still regenerate along global value chains and networks, as authors like have shown, as well as distinct regimes of social reproduction and contemporary crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, as I explain here and .
Yet, universalizing and globalizing are not the same thing; they can be operated in distinct ways, and through entirely different intellectual projects. Moreover, the discipline of Development Studies, in its mainstream dominant avatar, badly needs 鈥済lobalizing,鈥 given its Eurocentrism 鈥 yet in ways that center the experiences in/of the majority world; think through plural frameworks and locations; and speak to the extraordinarily diverse material realities and practices of power, inequality, and subordination across our planet. Crucially, such experiences, realities, and practices are, at once, the result of trajectories mediated by the Global North-Global South Divide, as emphasized in critical International Development frameworks, yet also always been global in nature 鈥 calling for Global Development lenses 鈥 unlike what narrow development economic theorizing heavily relying on modernization theory has and still suggest/ed. Ultimately, one may wonder: in the debate between 鈥淚nternational鈥 and 鈥淕lobal鈥 Development, why and what exactly do we need to choose?
This famous sentence from Joseph Ki-Zerbo could be translated as 鈥榳e do not enforce development; we develop ourselves.鈥 However, development paradigms have been largely influenced by external views, mainly those of Western countries. 鈥淒evelopment鈥 is considered as a moral concept. Many people around the world suffer and don鈥檛 have access to welfare programmes that are fundamental to strive, hence the need for development, through the improvement in terms of basic needs and democratic institutions. However, development as a concept is far from having a universal definition, on how to develop and the ultimate goals of this development. Development paradigms are fundamentally linked to ideologies. In particular, the connection between the economics discipline and the dominant development paradigm is deep. Thus, rethinking development also calls for rethinking the assumptions in the economics discipline. In this blog, I summarize the main ideas of a recent paper I published (鈥溾).
The holy triad of economics: 鈥榤arket-scarcity-rationality鈥
Karl Polanyi established two different definitions of economics: a formal one, used to justify the rise of self-regulated markets, and a substantive one, trying to show that markets are not a universal truth in the history of human exchanges. The formal definition refers to the logic of rational action and decision-making based on alternative uses of scarce resources. This formal approach has gradually become the dominant definition of (mainstream) economics, through the theory of utility value, based on the subjective utility associated with the consumption of goods and services. In this view, the primary focus is the individual, captured through the market relationships that he or she enters into. Resources, as natural resources, are allocated through market mechanisms, the main instrument of efficiency in what is called neoclassical economics. The implications of these assumptions are very important for development.
Since the process of formal decolonization began, the mainstream view of development has been founded on the assumption that post-colonial economies can develop in the same manner that Western countries did. In this sense, they are assumed to simply be at a later stage of Western economic history. In this context, economic growth is often considered an indicator of progress. This idea gained currency with modernization theories that started to dominate mainstream development discourse after the second World War, conceiving development as an imitative process, establishing from the onset a distinction between a modern sector (capitalist economy derived from the Global North) and a traditional sector (considered as a subsistence economy, that should be abolished). With the Washington consensus in the 1980s and the resulting structural adjustments, pulling developing countries towards stability, getting them as close as possible to the market ideal was the new goal for development, society becoming an auxiliary of the economy. In the 1990s, the discourse of international financial institutions evolved, as they incorporated political and social dimensions to their economic analyses to better explain the failures of the past. However, instead of challenging the fundamental assumption of this narrative, the new incorporations simply include more ways in which the developing countries need to 鈥榗atch up鈥, such as through developing better institutions. We went from economic determinism to institutional determinism and not much has changed over time.
However, the mainstream view of development has been challenged from many quarters. For example, as scholars from the Global South long understood, underdevelopment and development are actually two sides of the same coin, based around the uneven accumulation of capital on a world scale. Dependency theorists, the regulation school, and post-developmentalist theorists all recognized this. Economic growth and capital accumulation in the Global North still relies on . Even alleged attempts to become more sustainable, as with electric cars or renewable energy, rely on . It is time now for new frameworks for development thinking.
Since the 2008 financial crisis and the end of the Millennium Development Goals, academics and practitioners working in 鈥榙evelopment鈥 have been groping for a new development paradigm. Yearning for the end of neoliberalism and stumped by the rise of China, hopped on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) bandwagon to call social scientists to think 鈥榞lobally鈥 beyond national-centric analyses. This was, of course, a noble goal 鈥 no different from the . New 鈥楪lobal Development鈥 proponents argued that we must think globally and relationally, surprising some within development studies that this had not been happening already (think ).
As Development Studies departments found themselves new names and new networks were established, some academics took the opportunity to stake claim over the meaning of Global Development. argued that a new Global Development paradigm would rescue us from development studies鈥 oppressive past, which obsessed over distinguishing between a backward developing world and a utopian 鈥榙eveloped鈥 heaven. They reasoned that this was necessary because the 鈥楽outh鈥 was actually rising in comparison to the 鈥楴orth鈥 on the basis of growth and human development indicators. But in presenting this trend as a these scholars misdiagnosed the problem. They presented the entire 鈥楽outh鈥 as rising, failing to isolate China鈥檚 rise and obscuring the fact that countries may have experienced very different trajectories.
In a section that appeared in Development and Change, the case for Global Development was subjected to open debate. The case for Global Development is based on 鈥榗onverging divergence鈥, which suggest that there is increasing convergence between the North and South while there is increased evidence of sustained within-country inequalities (divergence). of 鈥楪lobal Development鈥 selected 1990-2015 as the time series within which convergence was identified in terms of growth, health and education. The paper was roundly for its sloppy use of indicators. For example, generalisations of wellbeing were based on (in every intro to development studies course) Human Development Indicators. In selecting the time period 1990-2015, the paper implies that convergence resulted from the implementation of market-led policies, implicitly condoning neoliberalism, as Andrew Fischer argued. Of course, such claims stand directly opposed to the experiences of most countries in 鈥榯he South鈥 where structural adjustment and the legacy of market-led reforms has limited prospects for structural transformation.
The paper was also criticised within the Forum on several other counts (see 鈥檚 contribution for example). For their part, Global Development proponents most criticisms. However, they refuse to nuance their claims of converging divergence. They replied that the study was a purely empirical exercise and converging divergence was . It is as if selecting which data you use, as well as the time period, is not a choice.
Any discussion of economic development – either implicitly or explicitly – contains the distinction between developed countries and developing (or under-developed) countries. While there are many theories on what promotes development and how best to achieve it, in all cases the goal is for a country to eventually become 鈥榙eveloped鈥.
This begs the question – what is a developed country? There are at least three common definitions, which are presented below. These definitions overlap in many cases, but in others they are at odds. This piece argues that a broader definition is needed in light of recent failures of several 鈥榙eveloped鈥 countries to cope with shocks ranging from the COVID-19 pandemic to natural disasters.
While classical political economy has been considered outdated by many social scientists, I argue here that it can provide insights about the world today and the challenges we face.[1] One of these insights has to do with the early disagreement that existed between Adam Smith and the mercantilists of his era with regards to the wealth of nations, a topic sometimes captured under the label 鈥渄evelopment鈥. Based on this disagreement, this blog post develops a typology of Smithian and Mercantilist nations as different models of capitalist development that may be considered alternatives for developing countries today.Read More »
(1959) infamously put forth a five-stage theory of economic development, extrapolating from the experiences of the great industrialized nations. However, as dependency theories strongly pointed out, the conditions under which those countries industrialized is significantly different from those that prevailed after decolonization. In addition to this, democratic capitalism experiences turbulence, which I argue makes development under this global system a struggle against powers and against what I call 鈥淏urawoyan Cycles鈥.Read More »
This summer I attended several academic conferences, and while I was initially extremely enthusiastic to be given the chance to put my work out for discussion, exchange with and learn from colleagues, by early autumn I am fatigued and disenchanted.
Maybe the reason for this is that several of these events where claiming to be 鈥渞ethinking development鈥, yet by the end I fail to recognize what was essentially new in the arguments exchanged and the discussions led and what will move us forward.
The root of my discontent is that while everyone continuously debated 鈥渄evelopment鈥 and attempted to 鈥渞ethink鈥 it, not once it was clarified what the (minimum) common denominator of the 鈥渄evelopment鈥 to be rethought would be. Were we talking about intervention, projects, stakeholders, cooperation? Were we rethinking technical modes of intervention? Ways of studying or researching? Or were we questioning the roots of persistent inequalities, the sources of poverty and the causes of injustices (e.g. the legacy of colonialism, global capitalism and our imperial mode of living)?
Much has been said about what鈥檚 going wrong in development economics 鈥 on this blog (for example by Adel Daoud, Ingrid H. Kvangraven, or Jacob Assa) and elsewhere (for example by , , and ), as well as . Much has been written, too, about alternative perspectives and approaches to economic development thinking (this gives an overview of many of them). But is it possible to build a coherent pluralist and critical framework out of these approaches? If so, what could a critical and pluralist research agenda for development economics look like?Read More »