In his , Zimbabwe鈥檚 Finance and Economic Development Minister, Hon. Prof. Mthuli Ncube identified rising inflation and currency depreciation as the major challenges requiring 鈥渢he support of all stakeholders and citizens鈥�.  Zimbabwe is failing to ward off persistent inflation. According to Ncube鈥檚 mid-term budget report, headline inflation increased from 60.7% in January to 191.6% in June 2022.

In this post, I will argue that whilst price and the exchange rate have some importance, preoccupation with them can constrain economic development. I start off by giving a brief background of inflation in Zimbabwe as well as inflation targeting policies, before arguing that sheepishly pursuing currency and price stability equates to commodity fetishism. I then look at the real beneficiaries of price and currency stabilisation policies. Finally, I attempt to demystify value and price in Zimbabwe鈥檚 context.

Zimbabwe and inflation targeting

Almost a decade ago, Zimbabwe issued a 100 trillion dollar note 鈥� the first of its kind in the history of money. Because of this record, it is unsurprising that analysis, rhetoric, and policies on Zimbabwe鈥檚 economic development have tended to focus on inflation and currency stability. Echoes of hyperinflation have contributed to the fetishization of currency and price stability. For instance, in a 2021   the Monetary Policy Committee of the central bank  expressed 鈥渟atisfaction鈥� with the previous monetary policy 鈥渄ecisions鈥� because they had helped to 鈥渟tabilise the exchange rate and domestic prices鈥�. Evidently, prices and the exchange rate are of utmost importance to Zimbabwe鈥檚 central bank. But Oscar Wilde once said, a cynic is 鈥渁 man who knows the price of everything and the value of nothing鈥�.

Since the 1970s, governments the world over seem to have tacitly agreed to focus on price. For example, the bank of England has set an %. However, this target is coming under increasing scrutiny as the UK faces a devastating . It must be borne in mind that under the current neoliberal order, price and currency stability are key elements of class struggle. More critically, they have developed a life of their own as policy objectives that must be pursued almost blindly often with the support of international financial institutions like the IMF and the World Bank.

To an ordinary citizen price and exchange rate stability are noble policy goals not the least because has been associated with stagnating wages. Therefore, it makes sense that prices remain constant otherwise the corollary is a fall in living standards. For politicians, focusing on price and currency stability offers a simple but powerful campaign message primarily because it avoids the more uncomfortable question of class 鈥� the marketplace sees no colour or creed. Many Zimbabweans are probably familiar with the meme 鈥�Tsvangirai akauya ne dollar for two鈥� loosely translated as Tsvangirai brought the pricing model of $1 for two commodities. This was in praise of the late opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai for supposedly bringing price stability during his era in the 鈥榠nclusive鈥� Government of National Unity (GNU). The late Tsvangirai served in the GNU between 2009 and 2012.

Price and currency stability as commodity fetishism

Although a stable currency and prices might give the appearance of stability, this is a deception! Things are not always the way they appear. Of course, a certain level of price and currency stability is essential for economic development, however, social scientists don鈥檛 necessarily agree on what the rate of inflation should be as well as . Thus, although necessary, price and currency stability are insufficient for economic development. In fact, the dogmatic pursuance of price and currency stability is what Marxists would refer to as .

A simplified definition of commodity fetishism was provided by Ben Fine and Alfredo Saad-Filho in their book Marx鈥檚 Capital. According to them, commodity fetishism is the idea that although under capitalism workers and owners of the means of production confront each other in definite social relationships, the exchange of goods and services appears as a relationship between things independent of the way they are produced. This results in an appearance of profit, interest, and rent as the products of machines, money, and or land whereas they are the outcome of the way in which society is organised. Thus, although money and prices may appear as if they are the products of nature, they cannot be divorced from societal relations of production. Consequently, inflation and currencies must be viewed through this lens.

Since gaining independence in 1980, Zimbabwe has not only grappled with currency and price instability but also high levels of unemployment. Because of this, most Zimbabweans tend to have a short-term relationship with money. Seventy per cent of Zimbabwe鈥檚 population resides in rural areas where there is limited social reproduction through the market. What is more, Zimbabwe鈥檚 labour regime is of a and largely conforms to Issa Shivji鈥檚 concept of 鈥榳orking people鈥�. This basically means that to reproduce their lives, Zimbabweans engage in farming, wage-work, artisanal mining, and petty commodity trading. There is therefore no working class that is comparable to that in the advanced capitalist countries. Because of these reasons, prices are of relatively little importance.

Who benefits from the fixation on price and currency stability?

So, who benefits from policies that seek to overemphasize price and currency stability? In Zimbabwe, the strength and domination of Multinational Corporations (MNC鈥檚) in production may lead us to some important clues. The dominance of MNCs in Zimbabwe cannot be overstated given their involvement in the most productive sectors of the economy. Despite the global attention that it has received including being sanctioned by the EU and the US, Zimbabwe is dependent on a limited range of primary commodities. According to an , tobacco, minerals, and metals are central to Zimbabwe鈥檚 export basket constituting over 70% of the country鈥檚 export earnings. Control of the export-orientated sectors is firmly in the hands of MNCs. For example, the mining sector is controlled by three MNCs (Zimplats, Anglo-American, and Mimosa). Similarly, all the country鈥檚 tobacco is processed by three MNCs (Tobacco Processors Zimbabwe, Mashonaland Tobacco, and Zimbabwe Leaf Tobacco).

Christian Palloix the famous Marxist economist demonstrated that as expressed through the emergence of MNCs was a hindrance to independent economic policy. Palloix argued that the internationalisation of capital compelled nation states to constantly adjust to international conditions through monetary policy. In Zimbabwe, the internationalisation of capital is observable by the shift in state power from production orientated ministries to finance ministries. Unsurprisingly, industrialisation plans are now of less appeal compared to budget speeches. At independence, Zimbabwe had a Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development but today we have a Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. Economic planning has clearly been displaced by the anarchy of the market because of the growing importance of finance. Understanding these dynamics contextualises Zimbabwe鈥檚 price and currency regime.

Demystifying value and price in Zimbabwe鈥檚 context

During my 2021 fieldwork trip to Harare many people expressed their dislike of the Zimbabwe dollar mainly because of its association with the 2008 hyperinflation. People in the managerial class and some trade union leaders argued that government policies were responsible for price and currency instability. Looked at superficially these arguments seem plausible. But are prices and currency strength really the subject of the confidence of citizens or government policies? The answer must be in the negative for an affirmation would be to mystify them.

And here I must make two points. Firstly, there are fundamental differences between . Secondly, the prevailing price and currency system in Zimbabwe is a product of the structure of its economy, the domination of MNCs in production and the internationalisation of capital. Whilst it cannot be denied that how an economy is managed affects both inflation and currency stability, it is neoliberal nonsense to simply attribute currency stability and inflation to good governance. I touched briefly on the second point in the previous section. Let me proceed to dealing with the first in greater detail.

Value and prices

The notion of value was historically at the centre of political economy. However, debates about value have been squeezed out of the discipline with the success of the marginalist revolution in economics in the last century (). As the award-winning economist Mariana Mazzucato once put it, until the mid-nineteenth century, it was widely held that: 鈥渢o understand the prices of goods and services it was first necessary to have an objective theory of value”. This meant taking a multi-dimensional approach to understanding price formation by looking at things like conditions of production, technological advancement, and the quality of labour employed in the production of goods and services. Today, once again to paraphrase Mazzucato, value is in the eye of the beholder. Perhaps she should have said value is in the eye of the beer holder given mainstream

Value can be understood in many ways, but the most compelling theorical framework of value was given by Marx. From a Marxist perspective, value theory based on capitalist social relations is only relevant in the context of commodity production and irrelevant in product creation. The distinction between products and commodities is of utmost importance. As Marx emphasized, production for own use and consumption . In developing countries many sectors of the economy do not necessarily produce commodities. Moreover, developing countries especially former colonial subjects are characterised by advanced commodity production in the export-oriented sectors and product creation in the domestic sectors. Because of this, inflation and the rate of exchange are often mediated by global conditions. Thus, as I argued earlier, Zimbabwe鈥檚 high levels of inflation and volatile currency must be understood in the context of its underlying economic structure that is dominated by few commodities produced by MNCs.

At a global level, Zimbabwe exchanges a quantum of its national products (gold, metals, and tobacco), in which a certain amount of its national labour is crystallised for the produce of other countries in which a quantum of their labour is crystallised. Marx showed that : 鈥�on an average, commodities are sold at their real values, and that profits are derived from selling them at their values, that is, in proportion to the quantity of labour realized in them鈥�. Therefore, the value of the Zimbabwe dollar mainly depends on this relationship and not on government policies or effective economic management as bourgeoisie economists would have us believe.  

To sum up, price and currency stability tell us nothing about the complex relations between those who own the means of production and the labouring masses in society. However, by exhorting all of society to concentrate on the superficial external appearance that is price, the ruling classes successfully manage to divert attention from the mass exploitation that is the order of the day in mineral and tobacco production the commanding heights of the economy of Zimbabwe. Therefore, one of the first steps towards understanding and perhaps transforming Zimbabwe鈥檚 economic development involves rejecting the centrality of prices and currency as the core units of analysis. Progressive Zimbabweans must avoid the cynicism of knowing the price of everything and the value of nothing!

Francis Garikayi is a PhD researcher in economics at the Open University.聽His research interests are in the areas of political economy, money and finance聽in sub-Saharan Africa, industrialisation,聽input-output analysis, and structural change. He tweets at .

Photo of a  by , used under a Creative Commons License.

As the 2018 elections in Zimbabwe draw near, the political contest on which political party is best suited to steer the country towards a better future will be dominated by the economic agenda during campaigns. The kind of language that both ZANU PF and the opposition coalition led by the MDC (M) will use to persuade the electorate has become all too familiar.

On the one hand will be the nationalist/patriotic discourse celebrating land reform and advancing the programme for indigenisation and economic empowerment. Inherently connected to that is a sharp criticism of global imperial machinations against Zimbabwe through sanctions against a party determined to defend the fruits of its economic transformation following the fast track land reform programme. Underlying this discourse is the argument that Zimbabwe is using local economic transformation to challenge the worst excesses of enduring global imperialism. ZANU PF will again depict the opposition, particularly the MDC, as a movement that is severely compromised by collusion with the imperialist west to the extent that it will struggle to balance local national interests against those of the British and American governments.

Offering an alternative narrative to this discourse is opposition politics that will claim that the more immediate struggle is against nationalist authoritarianism. Making reference to the unending economic crisis, the opposition will argue that the ruling party presided over a poor human rights record, economic collapse characterised by high deindustrialisation, record unemployment, the informalisation of the economy and hyperinflation in the period between 2000 to 2009; as well as its contrasting current excesses of severe illiquidity. The suggested alternative will be re-engagement with the global economy through attracting investment and creating jobs for all.

The Utility of the Paradigms?

Both strategies are influential and very effective to respective constituencies of the political parties, but are also limited in terms of their capacity to sustainably develop a vibrant economy in the context of the complex global political economy. This is especially true as Zimbabwe has experienced tremendous changes in the nature of its society and economy, all of which have been shaped by the trajectory that its politics has followed. At the attainment of independence and for the better part of the first two decades, the political narrative followed the contours of the now infamous patriotic history narrative deployed to steer the power dynamics of the post-colony. Towards the turn of the century and influenced by a number of political and economic changes, the government shifted from its early collusion with colonial and foreign capital (the reconciliation of Zimbabwe with Rhodesia) towards a kind of decolonial turn characterised by the politics of radical economic redistribution of land and commercial resources. The shift, forced as it was by forces outside the corridors of power but ultimately shaped by consideration of political survival, represented a kind of exhausted nationalism. In fact, the patriotic narrative was criticised for elevating the record of the ruling party as one of the sole authority on liberation, transformation and empowerment while failing to call the state to account for the crisis it presided over since the 2000s.

Remembering History: The Nuances

Historians of Zimbabwe have indeed taken up the challenge to demonstrate that history is not limited to a narrative about 鈥渁rmed men liberating the land from white settlers鈥�, that 鈥渢he Zimbabwe crisis is by no means simply a land crisis. It is best understood as 鈥榓 complex set of historically specific, interrelated and mutually reinforcing crises that need to be unpacked and analysed in relation to one another鈥欌��. Historians cautioned that reducing history to political agendas results 鈥渋n the flattening of difference; the privileging of certain voices over others; and the identification of hegemonic nationalism as the bearer of improvement and progress鈥�. This is not to discredit the nationalist nuances of Zimbabwe鈥檚 history, but to call for more holistic and inclusive histories. Such an approach decentres politics and incorporates other perspectives in the search for a more sustainable challenge to the colonial legacies that we still face today.

It was in this context that the politics of democratic change emerged, promising to repair the economic damage caused by the government鈥檚 radical turn. The MDC and its various splinter factions鈥� main criticism about economic collapse was that ZANU PF had failed to manage it and lost the confidence of foreign investors.

Although the ruling party never sounds a trumpet to acknowledge this criticism, some its senior members accept that the country is in crisis. But they offer a different explanation. In their view, the radical changes to the economic structure from one based on the colonial distribution of land and other resources were critically overdue and required redress. To them, such a marked shift in racial-economic relations upset the diplomatic relations between Zimbabwe and the imperial west resulting in sanctions. But the critical economic imbalance was still overdue and was confronted by the deployment of big man authoritarian politics, requiring a stalwart figure that could stand up to western condemnation. But in spite of the limits of the nationalist party鈥檚 patriotic narrative and the democratic discourse鈥檚 appeal, the country became split between the various emerging interests. The economy, once formally based, anchored on agrarian development and white monopoly and foreign capital, enjoying high employment and a vibrant secondary industry was gradually transformed into one where the mass of the unemployed exploited a vent within an informal economy arising out of formal economic collapse and a reconstructed agrarian base. In this new narrative, the patronage based politics of ZANU PF is pitted against the democratic and formal economic recovery discourse of opposition politics whose main challenges is representing workers in an economy dominated by informality and a dwindling labour base.

Counting the Opportunity Cost of Reform

But they represent a very specific local political and economic dynamic that does not adequately confront a much broader issue in Zimbabwe鈥檚 global economic context. The nuanced character of Zimbabwe鈥檚 economy is that interests have become widely disparate, depending on economic access to resources.

The main issues being addressed, and indeed for political expediency, are temporal. The nationalist party鈥檚 discourse of transformation was land, but this had not adequately yielded the expected transformative outcomes as poverty still reigns and the economy struggles. The brief moment of the GNU and its currency stabilisation, on the other hand, failed to persuade the nation to fully back the political change, democracy and economic recovery discourse as the 2013 elections demonstrate. Certainly, the concerns of Zimbabwe鈥檚 electorate are much more nuanced and disparate than initially envisaged. For example, the concerns of the beneficiaries, at lower level of the value chain, of land reform are their continued and undisturbed access to this resource, just as is the case with people whose livelihoods have been based on state grants for small businesses in trade, fisheries and other trades. This includes, higher up the value chain, tenderpreneurs and politicians who have benefited from national resources, for example in the mining in diamonds, platinum and gold. To convince these beneficiaries of the imagined progressive alternative of democracy politics would be difficult. On the other hand, to convince the suffering middle class, mass of unemployed youths and informal traders that the exclusive ZANU PF project can sustainably address the national economic challenges has proved inadequate.

The Limitations of the Redistributive or Radical Narrative

For me, the political philosophy of Zimbabwe is too narrowly confined. We tend to forget that any economic transformation, redistributed or not, if limited in scope to the national context will not have a sustainable long term effect on the economy. In my view, the discourse needs to incorporate broader geo-political-economic considerations. For example, to what extent can external markets determine the fortunes of our economy? I could argue that the best example on how a state can sustain a formal vibrant national economy can be derived from the UDI Rhodesian experience. Despite global sanctions against the colony, the Rhodesian Front government managed to keep their heads above water, managing to even prosper more significantly in comparison to our entire postcolonial experience. But of course, the crucial benefits were for the minority white constituency while Africans were kept at the periphery of this economy. This is among the reasons why the liberation war was waged, to rid the country of this discrimination, but the point is that the Rhodesians economic coordination machinery worked to their advantage.

At independence, much the same structures were maintained, in which the markets, especially the external markets which Zimbabwe was re-integrated into, influenced the direction of politics to a significant degree. This partially explains why the ZANU PF government could not immediately implement radical economic changes. As they were pushed into a corner, the changes emerged from outside the state, from landless people seeking land, workers suffering collapsing standards of living, war veterans demanding compensation, indigenous business people unhappy with exclusion from the mainstream economy. The opposition rode this wave of mass discontent to challenge nationalist rule. In response, the state was forced to implement radical changes to appease pockets of the discontented through land reform, compensating war veterans and instituting programmes of indigenisation and economic empowerment. But this had the adverse effect of affecting the markets, and the result was economic plunge, most manifest in hyperinflation and demonetisation.

The Global Markets: The Missing Link

But all political formations, although disagreeing on the process, concur that many of these changes were necessary. Yet they all regret the response of the markets and desire a return to reengaging them. Therein lies the problem. The discourse of attracting investment needs to consider the power that these markets have in determining the political course of the nation. Markets have complex relationships with developing countries, anchored as they are on highly nuanced operations. The financial investments on stock markets, money markets, bonds markets etc, depend on a very specific model of economy. Whatever the economic reconfigurations within Zimbabwe and despite who leads it; beyond temporal constituency appeasement, my main worry is the ability and extent to which the markets will take us back to the beginning. This concern is never seriously considered in our political discourse but needs some level of attention. It should not just be about retaining power or political change, but should prompt active imaginations about how to confront a fast-changing global economy that has the power to direct how economies integrated into it operate. For me, economic transformation limited to domestic considerations is inadequate and can be rendered hopelessly unsound if they fall out of line with what investors expect if they are to realise profitable returns. Not that we should comply with market demands, far from it, we should understand how they work so that we are able to navigate them and derive optimum benefit without compromising the balanced aspiration of the disparate interests of those who constitute what can become the nation of Zimbabwe. At present, we are too fractured on competing visions of what the nation should be and the type of economy that should support it, but I will urge all the leaders to consider imagining this local/global economy nexus as part of their very crucial strategies towards appeasing their various constituencies in terms of the immediate demands placed on them.

Tinashe Nyamunda is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow with the International Studies Group, University of the Free State, South Africa.

This blog post was originally published as an article in Gravitas Volume 1. Issue 9/2017.

This blog post attempts to proffer insights on the possible influence of prevailing economic circumstances and how they may play out in political dynamics in the run-up to the 2018 elections. Zimbabwean politics has been intensely competitive since the formation of the MDC in 1999, giving the ruling ZANU PF the most effective challenge since independence. Nowhere, however, did the opposition come any closer to clinching electoral victory than in 2008 where they were eventually talked into sharing power after a violent build up to the run-off elections. The two parties will face each other again in 2018 and the question that remains is whether the efforts at 鈥榞rand coalition鈥� building will address the deficiencies of the opposition. However, as 2018 draws near, it is becoming crystal clear that the structural constraints facing the economy is already setting the battlelines for political parties. Therefore, debates on 鈥榞rand coalition鈥� building in one way or another will have to address the question of the economy in a manner that will resonate with the ordinary men. The political parties that will see beyond electoral fraud and malpractices in their strategies will most likely have more traction with voters.

From Stability, to Illiquidity
The period of the Government of National Unity (GNU) between 2009 and 2013 allowed the ruling party to rebuild and assemble an arsenal that allowed it to retain power in the 2013 elections. The fractures within the opposition political movement did little to help their cause and this has worsened their public image ever since. The electorate supported the opposition mainly on the back of an economic crisis that deepened since the 2000s. Although the main symptom of economic decline has largely been recalled in terms of hyperinflation, the crisis was layered with a collapse in public services, health provision, food shortages, record unemployment, and disinvestment, among many other factors. The short-lived reprieve that emerged with dollarisation and the GNU soon gave way to a new form of economic crisis.

This time, the crisis is not associated with shortages of basic commodities or hyperinflation. On the contrary, there are plenty of commodities on the market accompanied by declining income levels and insufficient cash notes in circulation. But the big question is can the opposition movement seize this discontent to mount a strong challenge against the ruling party? The political scene of the early 2000s and that of today has transformed. Whereas it was really easy to argue that the MDC鈥檚 support was derived from mass discontent with the ZANU PF government鈥檚 record on the economy that cannot be easily sustained today. The same is just as true when arguing that ZANU PF will argue the rains-fed harvest was a consequence of command agriculture and therefore use it as a campaign strategy.

True, these elements are very influential in informing the attitudes of the electorate towards which political party they support. It can be argued that as much as some have erroneously chosen to believe in a post-crisis Zimbabwe, others have mistakenly viewed it also as postland reform. But this has ushered in new perspectives on approaching politics.

After All, it is Still the Economy
The political scene has become so fractured that understanding the political dynamics of today鈥檚 Zimbabwe must be much more nuanced. Since the GNU, the MDC has split into various factions, the most recent of which witnessed Tendai Biti forming his own political party as he was unhappy with the manner in which MDC -T had managed its campaign and handled the post-election situation. It remains to be seen how the recent reconciliation among the opposition splinter groups will work out. ZANU PF also experienced increased and more visible infighting resulting in the expulsion of many of its members including war veterans. Among the most prominent leaders to be expelled from party structures include the former Vice President Joice Mujuru who went on to form her own political party. With Mujuru eliminated from the succession race, the competing factions of Lacoste and G40 continue to compete for the top job in the event that a successor becomes necessary. So, the political scene has become much more fractured that a greater degree of nuance is required in order to follow and truly appreciate how the situation is unravelling.

The rallying point in Zimbabwean politics remains ordinary people鈥檚 economic fortunes; whether it is about indigenous resource ownership or formal economic revival and the creation of jobs. What remains to be seen is how the parties will rally their respective constituencies amidst different economic dynamics. Can the opposition movement continue to make a case for jobs and a formal economic revival in a setting were a culture of informality is becoming increasingly entrenched? Can the ruling party use the rhetoric of command agriculture which is being expanded to the whole economy when many of the masses whom they say they represent have been operating in disguised unemployment in an informal sector that is not very rewarding?

If anything, the various social movement that destabilised the capital city last year in the form of #ThisFlag and #Tajamuka led by Evan Mawarire and Promise Mkwananzi respectively demonstrated that at the heart of people鈥檚 grievances was a call for accountability from the ruling government. It was not necessarily an opposition movement although there were calls for the President to step down from the Mkwananzi camp. Although Mawarire and Mkwananzi momentarily appeared as respectively the Martin Luther King and Malcom X of Zimbabwean politics, their pressure groups were soon derailed by the state. This kind of left political parties out in the cold as the protests took on a character more inclined towards calling the government to account rather than asking it to vacate its seat of power. As the momentum of the hashtag movements slowed down, the space for political movements has gained pace especially as 2018 draws even closer. However, there is much disillusionment in the voting public. The many that I have engaged argue that the more the political changes that take place in terms of fractures in both parties, the more the political crisis remains the same.

Economic Discontent and Voting Behaviour
The question that begs is how will the current economic challenges inform electoral dynamics? It is likely that the various opposition parties that are currently working towards uniting against a common foe will again ride on economic discontent, this time in the form of the continuing illiquidity in the economy. They will argue that the government has no clue about how a modern economy is managed and they will offer a better alternative. But the question is that strategy enough especially in a highly informalised and reconfigured economy like ours, or it will remain just a Nostalgia of the ZCTU working class politics era of 1990s and early 2000s.

On the contrary, ZANU PF is most likely, to refine and continue its politics of patronage. Where in the late 1990s, they used this tactic with war veterans, this time they will turn towards farmers, artisanal miners, cross-border traders, women and youth empowerment (various facilities have already been announced by the RBZ). Already, the RBZ has dangled a US$15 million facility for Cross-Border traders and Masvingo Resident Minister, Shuvai Mahofa decreed that only ZANU PF linked people should be employed or subcontracted on the dualisation of the Beitbridge -Chirundu highway.

Can a Collective Response Emerge?
The currency crisis was a major source of discontent in the 2008 elections which resulted in increased support for the MDC-T. In the upcoming elections, the RBZ has been keen to avoid the hyperinflation of yesteryear, but its drip-feed approach has seen the deepening of the directly opposite but equally debilitating problem; illiquidity. Not having enough cash to transact with is not better than having too much money with no value that no traders will accept. In the end, the situation is simply the flipping of a coin especially as the queues remain and people are deprived of cash. Where commodities were unavailable in 2008; they may be available in 2018 but increasingly expensive in an illiquid economy.

Just as fractured as the political space is, the economy has also taken on characteristics in which people鈥檚 interests have also become fractured as individuals make do in circumstances where individuals worry about personal rather than national gain. Either some are smuggling goods for resale, or they are supporting protectionism to resuscitate local industry, or they hope to get their remittances in less stressful ways for example. Surviving has become more about the individual instead of the nation. Certainly, the discourse on economic nationalism, on jobs versus empowerment, of what government is and should do has certainly shifted in unpredictable ways. In a highly fractured political and economic space, action is more individualistic than collective. It is more highly nuanced; informed by personal rather than collective considerations. So, to conclude that people will vote against ZANU PF because of the cash crisis is inadequate as they may be beneficiaries of agriculture (land reform or command) or youth grants. In the same vein, to argue that those who benefit from ZANU PF patronage will vote for the ruling party may be misleading as they may be unhappy, not just about the cash crisis as it affects them, but also about their favoured candidates being kicked out of the party or their falling out of favour with the ruling elite as is the case with war veterans.

So, the current economic dynamics do not offer a sufficient guideline over who will take the next election. Even as the coalition of opposition political parties display their confidence that reforms will occur in time for the elections, I think this is highly unlikely. If ZANU PF retains control of the electoral machinery as it is likely to, the next election really is a dead rubber for them. We may see the opposition crying foul again if they do not seriously consider a more effective approach towards electoral reform and a fresh message for the electorate. If not, the more things change in Zimbabwean politics, the more they are likely to remain the same.

Tinashe Nyamunda is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow with the International Studies Group, University of the Free State, South Africa.

This blog post was originally published as an article in Gravitas Volume 1. Issue 7.

Photo: Sokwanele – Zimbabwe.